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This report looks at the medium-term socio-economic consequences of unemployment 
and employment uncertainty among youth in Europe, i.e. it focuses on the question in 
how far unemployment and atypical employment negatively impacts upon the socio-eco-
nomic situation of youth within a five-year time span. In doing so, it complements earlier 
work in the EXCEPT project that has looked at the immediate consequences of unem-
ployment and atypical work for youth: As Rokicka & Kłobuszewska (2016) have demon-
strated based on EU-SILC data, unemployment among European youth instantaneously 
increases their risk to be affected by income poverty, material deprivation and feelings 
of social exclusion. Likewise, they could show that fixed-term contracts often are related 
to lower wages, thereby increasing the risk of both objective and subjective poverty for 
youth affected by such types of jobs.  
Supplementing these analyses by a medium-term perspective is based on the assump-
tion that both the affectedness by labour market uncertainty as well as their socio-eco-
nomic consequences are dynamic phenomena. On the one hand, it has been shown that 
early career uncertainty can have cumulative effects. Young individuals initially affected 
by atypical employment or unemployment will carry a “scar” from this experience, i.e. will 
also be more likely to be affected by these negative states in the future. They thus likely 
will remain in unemployment/atypical employment and not make the transition into a safe 





labour market position. Even in the case of re-employment, scarring effects may be at 
work, resulting in lower wages or lesser employment security as compared to those peo-
ple who started their career in stable jobs. Following the “scarring” argument, socio-eco-
nomic consequences of employment uncertainty hence are not stationary but may even 
deteriorate over time, thus making youth in these states more vulnerable to poverty 
and/or deprivation in the future.       
Alternatively, it may be argued that the vulnerability to labour market uncertainty may 
only be a temporary phenomenon. Youth affected by unemployment may use this time 
as a job search period after which they will be able to enter a safe labour market position, 
maybe even more stable or better paid than those positions available ”at first glance”. 
Applying a similar argument, youths in atypical employment may use this period as an 
“extended internship” to better display their qualifications and capabilities to their em-
ployers and thereby increase their chances to enter into a permanent, continuous con-
tract. In addition, youth in atypical employment may use this as an opportunity to gain 
better access to broader social networks that may help to find better jobs (e.g. through 
colleagues, customers or supplier firm contacts etc.). Following this so-called “stepping 
stone” argument, socio-economic outcomes of employment uncertainty may not be sta-
tionary, but may improve over time. 
In the following, we will investigate in how far early employment uncertainty acts either 
as a trap implying cumulative disadvantage or as a stepping-stone into the safe, primary 
labour market. We also investigate in how far chances and risks differ between different 
groups of youth, i.e. identify those groups of youth that are harmed disproportionately by 
employment uncertainty in the medium-term and those for whom it may act as only a 
temporary disadvantage. We first apply a pan-European perspective, taking data from 
the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) in order to identify the con-
sequences for European youth in general. We then supplement this comparative analy-
sis with selected country case studies, using available longitudinal data from Germany, 
Italy, the United Kingdom and Estonia to investigate the medium-term consequences of 
employment uncertainty for poverty and deprivation under given nation-specific condi-
tions. 
This introductory chapter is structured as follows. The following section will establish the 
theoretical groundwork for the upcoming analyses. It will first define the basic concepts 
used, namely the dimensions of socio-economic uncertainty examined in this report 
(Section 1.1). In a further step, based on existing literature, it links socio-economic con-
sequences to different types of employment uncertainty, particularly looking at the con-
sequences of unemployment and fixed-term employment. Particular attention in this re-
spect will be paid to the effect of intermediary individual-level factors that may determine 
socio-economic outcomes (Section 1.2). Previous comparative research on youth unem-
ployment and atypical employment has shown that the effects of employment uncertainty 
(and its distribution across social groups) may not be uniform within European countries. 
Section 1.3 thus will discuss possible institutional characteristics at the nation-state level 
that buffer or aggravate the effects of employment uncertainty for youth. In this respect, 
we discuss potential effects of education systems, active and passive labour market pol-
icies as well as labour market regulation. We conclude each section by deriving hypoth-
eses for the subsequent analyses, relying on the previous theoretical discussions.   





Sections 2 and 3 will then be devoted to introducing the details of the subsequent anal-
yses. Following the justification of the choice of countries we outline the general design 
of our analysis and the methods applied as well as provide a short synopsis of key char-
acteristics of the data sets under study. 
1. Theoretical background 
1.1 Measuring socio-economic consequences 
Without much doubt, the socio-economic situation of a person is a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon. Accordingly, despite a long history of related research, the question how 
to best describe and measure it is still contested in contemporary research. As Tang and 
colleagues state: “Rich or poor is a state of mind. People may be financially poor but 
psychologically rich and vice versa” (Tang et al. 2004: 119). Building on earlier work in 
the EXCEPT project (Hofäcker and Neumann 2016), we will try to provide an overview 
of key concepts that have been applied to measure socio-economic situation in the fol-
lowing section, namely the concept of income-based poverty, deprivation in everyday 
goods and the subjective feeling of material dissatisfaction.  
Most often, socio-economic disadvantage is described using measures of income pov-
erty, assuming that individuals can be considered poor when falling below an income 
threshold considered to reflect a level necessary to satisfy basic everyday needs (e.g. 
Sen 1983). There has been a long debate on how this threshold may be defined, result-
ing in the development of two alternative concepts: relative income poverty and absolute 
income poverty. Relative income poverty refers to the amount of income an individual or 
a household has available relative to that available to a specific group of comparison 
(usually within the same country). The relative income poverty rate thus reflects the per-
centage of the population with income less than some fixed proportion of a country’s 
median income. The most widely used concept at the European level is the at-risk-of-
poverty rate referring to an income below 60% of the national median equivalised dis-
posable income after social transfers (Eurostat 2016). The concept of relative income 
poverty apparently has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, relative 
poverty is easy to measure and ensures comparability at household and country level. 
On the other hand, the threshold set (in the EU case 60 per cent) is arbitrary and can be 
adapted to meet political interest. Besides, it is criticised that relative poverty measures 
inequality (and not poverty) and it is a bad indicator of the command over resources 
(Bradshaw 2001). People that fall below a relative poverty line still may be able to access 
all necessary goods for everyday life and thus may not be “poor” in a sense of material 
subsistence. An alternative concept often mentioned in poverty research that addresses 
this potential weakness is the concept of absolute poverty which considers people to be 
in poverty if their income is not sufficient to afford a predefined bundle of goods in a given 
year (Bradshaw et al. 1987). Nation-specific poverty lines are often calculated by national 
statistical offices, based on pre-defined bundles of goods considered necessary in a 
given country. Given that the composition of this bundle of goods as well as the relative 
weights assigned to single items may vary across countries, absolute poverty lines are 
frequently more difficult to compare cross-nationally. For the following analyses, we thus 
refer to the standard EU measure of relative income poverty at 60% of the median in-
come. 





The concept of material deprivation provides an alternative approach for the measure-
ment of socio-economic status. According to Townsend (1979: 31), people are in poverty 
when “their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individ-
ual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and 
activities”. Halleröd and Westberg (2006) point out that many young people may have a 
low income but this does not necessarily mean that they actually suffer from economic 
hardship and a low economic standard, i.e. having to forgo vital consumption or having 
problems making ends meet and living in economic insecurity. In order to better approx-
imate this notion of most basic needs, deprivation rates have been developed that ex-
press the inability to afford some items considered by most people to be desirable or 
even necessary to lead an adequate life. The respective indicator adopted by Eurostat 
(2016) – which also the single country studies in this report are aiming to replicate - 
measures the percentage of the population that cannot afford at least three of the follow-
ing nine items:  
i. to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills;  
ii. to keep their home adequately warm;  
iii. to face unexpected expenses;  
iv. to eat meat or proteins regularly;  
v. to go on holiday;  
vi. a television set;  
vii. a washing machine;  
viii. a car;  
ix. a telephone.  
In contrast to general material deprivation, the severe material deprivation rate is defined 
as the enforced inability to pay for at least four of the above-mentioned items.  
It needs to be noted that in comparatively affluent societies (such as most European 
countries), the described measures of deprivation are a more “strict measure” of socio-
economic disadvantage than the income poverty lines. In other words: People can be 
income-poor in relation to a rich society’s median, but may still be able to afford most of 
the afore mentioned necessary items. 
Both measures of objective poverty – income poverty and material deprivation – are 
based on the assumption that it is possible to externally define a threshold below which 
individuals can be considered as poor. In contrast, indicators of subjective poverty 
measure how people perceive their situation; i.e. whether they consider themselves as 
being poor. Bourguignon (2006) highlights that a persistent “feeling” of poverty is often 
reported within some population subgroups. Beneficiaries of minimum income guarantee 
programmes (who objectively surpass an objective income threshold) may still feel stig-
matized receiving social assistance, which provokes a feeling of being poor. At the same 
time, not all households classified as 'poor' according to the objective definition of poverty 
perceive themselves as being poor (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2007). Various 
indicators have been suggested how to measure subjective poverty. In the EU-SILC, for 





example, subjective poverty often has been operationalized in terms of economic strain.1 
In the following country-specific analyses, we shall not use one measure of subjective 
poverty, but draw back to varying indicators that were available in the respective data 
sets.  
1.2 Linking employment uncertainty and medium-term conse-
quences: Theoretical considerations 
How is the occurrence of the aforementioned types of socio-economic disadvantage re-
lated to employment uncertainty in the medium-term? To answer this question, we will 
look at two major types of labour market risks that have been discussed frequently in the 
literature: unemployment and temporary employment. 
1.2.1 Unemployment 
It seems intuitively evident that being in unemployment should have negative conse-
quences for the socio-economic situation of youth, given the lack of an own wage income 
and the dependency on public subsistence benefits. Indeed, within earlier analyses of 
the EXCEPT project (Rokicka & Kłobuszewska 2016), it has been shown that young 
people in unemployment are faced with a significantly higher immediate risk of poverty 
(in various dimensions). Negative effects of unemployment, however, may go beyond 
short-term economic disadvantage. As shown earlier, beyond its immediate effects, un-
employment may also have negative “scarring” effects on later career (e.g. Arulampalam 
et al. 2001, Steijn et al. 2006, Schmillen and Umkehrer 2013). Following this line of ar-
gument, unemployment not only negatively affects the immediate situation of an individ-
ual, but also harms its future chances of labour market security and income. According 
to Arulampalam (2001), different mechanisms can be held responsible for this effect of 
“permanent scars” (Ellwood 1982): First, having experienced unemployment may have 
a negative “signalling” effect (Spence 1973), suggesting that potential future employers 
associate this experience with lower individual capabilities and thus statistically discrim-
inate against the unemployed. Second, the fact that the unemployed do not collect further 
work experience may foster a depreciation of their skills and thus hamper their future 
labour market chances.  
Various studies have confirmed the significance of scarring effect empirically. Based on 
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, Manzoni and Mooi-Reci (2011) show that 
frequently, early unemployment “breeds” future unemployment, i.e. increases the risk of 
future unemployment and thus hampers the progression of future employment careers. 
Furthermore, unemployment often also increases the risk of entering less secure jobs, 
thus promoting unstable careers and the emergence of “low-pay-no-pay” cycles. Schmil-
len and Umkehrer (2013) arrive at similar results using German administrative data when 
demonstrating that early career unemployment among youth raises the likelihood of later 
unemployment significantly. Yet, there are also signs that youth may react strategically 
to the experience of unemployment: Mroz and Savage (2006) find that after experiencing 
unemployment, youth “seek out training and work activities to mitigate possible setbacks 
                                               
1
 EU-SILC respondents are asked to rate the degree of financial difficulty their household 
experiences in ‘making ends meet’. Households which answer with ‘difficulty’ or ‘great diffi-
culty’ in doing so are considered as subjectively poor. 





in their planned human capital profiles” (ibid.: 290). However, even after this “catch-up” 
response, the “scars” for future career remain.  
The experience of unemployment does not only harm future employment prospects but 
also impacts negatively on wages. Various studies have confirmed that early career un-
employment is related to lower future wages, even when entering employment, encom-
passing both country-specific evidence (e.g. from Germany (Möller and Umkehrer 2014) 
Switzerland (Helbling and Sacchi 2014) or the US (Gregg and Tominey 2005)) as well 
as findings from comparative pan-European assessments (Gangl 2006). Justifications 
for the lower wages are often found in the fact that – if unemployed do not receive active 
labour market support – their skills and qualifications depreciate, which makes them 
more prone to be hired in lower-qualified or precarious jobs. There are, however, some 
hints that suggest that this “downward wage spiral” may not necessarily apply to all 
groups of youth. Kahn and Low (1982) argue that for some individuals, remaining in 
unemployment offers better opportunities for a longer and optimized job search than di-
rectly searching from a current job. Individuals that remain in unemployment for some 
time thus may be able to achieve higher wages thereafter. 
Considering results for both employment and wage scars, it appears that the socio-eco-
nomic consequences of unemployment are at least partly ambiguous. While it may im-
pose scars on future careers, for some groups of workers, it may also provide a chance 
for further qualification and job search. Burgess and others (2003) suggest that the ques-
tion whether unemployment has a scarring effect or not strongly depends on the degree 
of human capital endowment and educational attainment. While it is detrimental for the 
lower qualified, it may have effects that are more positive for those with medium or higher 
qualifications. 
Negative effects of unemployment are not restricted to the material dimension of career 
progression and wages. Empirical evidence shows that also on a more psychological 
level, unemployment may leave “scarring effects”. Based on German GSOEP Data, 
Knabe and Rätzel (2011) show that the experience of unemployment promotes negative 
expectations of future employment prospects, thereby lowering people’s life satisfaction, 
an effect that persists even after a successful re-entry into the labour market. The authors 
thus conclude that “past unemployment ‘scars’ because it ‘scares’” (ibid.: 292). Other 
studies report similarly negative effects of unemployment on life satisfaction (Wulfgramm 
2014 for 21 European countries based on ESS data), career dissatisfaction (Helbling 
and Sacchi 2014 for Switzerland), subjective psychological well-being (Korpi 1997 for 
Sweden; Alvaro and Garrido 2003 for Europe), and self-esteem (Sheeran et al 1995 for 
the US). It thus seems fair to assume that scars from unemployment do not only affect 
the objective monetary or material dimension but also have detrimental subjective ef-
fects. 
Irrespective of the dimension of socio-economic disadvantage considered, previous re-
search has highlighted that the scarring effect of unemployment is cumulative; i.e. the 
effect increases as the duration of unemployment increases. Young persons with a short 
period of unemployment thus may be better able to overcome a scarring effect than those 





that have been in long-term or permanent unemployment. This effect has been high-
lighted for employment chances (e.g. Steijn et al 2006) as well as wage levels (e.g. Gregg 
and Tominey 2005) and life satisfaction (e.g. Knabe and Rätzel 2011).   
Summing up the previous discussions, we can hypothesize the following for the effects 
of unemployment: 
• H1a: it can be inferred that the effect of early career unemployment for youth will 
be detrimental for their socio-economic situation irrespective of the dimension 
considered. It will increase the risk of income poverty, material deprivation as well 
as subjectively perceived disadvantage.  
• H1b: This effect is cumulative, i.e., on the one hand, it will increase with the du-
ration of unemployment, i.e. the longer individuals stay in unemployment, the 
higher their risks for future socio-economic disadvantage will be. On the other 
hand, this effect may also apply for repeated spells of unemployment, which may 
create similar scarring effects.   
• H1c: Finally, it can be assumed that both the existence as well as the strength of 
scarring effects will be dependent on the human capital of youth, with the highly-
skilled/-educated being least affected and those with lower/no skills being most 
affected.       
1.2.2 Fixed-term employment 
While in existing literature, the expected effects of unemployment for the socio-economic 
situation of youth has been predominantly negative, the professional discourse about the 
respective effects of fixed-term employment has been more ambiguous. By and large, 
there is a consensus that the effects of fixed-term employment tend to be more favoura-
ble than that of unemployment. As, for example, Gebel (2013) has shown, fixed-term 
employees fare better in terms of permanent employment chances and wages than the 
unemployed in Germany and the United Kingdom after a five-year time span (no such 
effect was found for Switzerland). Despite this comparative advantage to the unem-
ployed, fixed-term employees earn lower wages (Pfeifer 2012; Gebel 2009), particularly 
when comparing temporary and permanent workers in the lower earnings segment 
(Mertens et al. 2007, Comi & Grasseni 2011).  
A controversial debate has evolved around the question, whether such disadvantages 
are of a permanent nature or whether they diminish over time – a discussion often re-
ferred to as that of “traps” versus “bridges” or “stepping stones” (Gash 2008, Scherer 
2004). Advocates of the “trap” argument refer to segmentation theory, arguing that indi-
viduals with fixed-term contracts have a high likelihood to maintain such contracts, thus 
becoming part of a secondary, marginalized labour market with lower wages and em-
ployment security. Furthermore, they often face a higher risk of becoming unemployed 
than those in permanent contracts (Giesecke and Groß 2003, Scherer 2004).  
In contrast, proponents of the “bridge” or “stepping stone” argument put forward that 
fixed-term employment may not necessarily lead into a secondary labour market but can 
also act as an “entry port” into safe and permanent employment (Scherer 2004, Steijn et 





al. 2006). Even though there remains a risk of future unemployment for fixed-term em-
ployees, those who remain in employment have higher chances to be upwardly mobile 
and to arrive in similar occupational positions as those in permanent employment 
(op.cit.). Based on data from West Germany, France, the UK and Denmark, Gash (2008) 
shows that the number of those entering into employment after a fixed-term contract 
surpasses that of falling into unemployment afterwards, highlighting its potentially posi-
tive effects. In the medium-term perspective of around five years, initial disadvantages 
for fixed-term employees diminish over time in terms of both employment chances and 
wages (Gebel 2010 for Germany and the UK, McGinnity et al 2005 for Germany). Rea-
sons for the comparatively positive performance of fixed-term employees are often based 
on the idea that, from a supply-side perspective, employers often use fixed-term employ-
ment as a sort of a “prolonged internship” during which they can better assess the em-
ployees’ qualifications and skills. Upon their approval, fixed-term contracts are then later 
transformed into permanent contracts (Schmelzer et al. 2015). Furthermore, taking a 
supply-side perspective, fixed-term employees also often use their employment as an 
opportunity for further education, thus enhancing their future chances of permanent em-
ployment and future upward mobility (e.g. McGinnity et al. 2005). 
There is evidence that the question whether fixed-term contracts may act as traps or 
stepping stones/bridges is closely related to the human capital of respective employees. 
For Germany, Giesecke and Groß (2003) show that high education protects fixed-term 
employees from future unemployment, a finding that has been confirmed for the UK by 
Gash (2008). In a similar vein, Schmelzer et al. (2015) show for Germany that the higher 
educated more often use fixed-term employment as an extended internship after which 
they enter into permanent employment while for the lower educated, it more often turns 
into permanent flexibilisation on a secondary labour market. Finally, Gebel (2010) shows 
that higher educated suffer from a high initial wage penalty when entering employment. 
Yet, they are also best able to catch up in subsequent years.  
Summing up the previous discussions, we can hypothesize the following for the effects 
of fixed-term employment: 
• H2a: As compared to those in permanent employment, fixed-term employees 
may initially suffer from disadvantages in wage and career outcomes. Yet, in con-
trast to the unemployed, these disadvantages will be less pronounced and within 
a medium-term perspective, young individuals will better be able to catch up. In 
terms of its socio-economic consequences, fixed-term employment thus may 
take an intermediate position between unemployment and permanent employ-
ment.  
• H2b: Considering that income drops resulting from fixed-term employment may 
be not as high as for unemployment, we assume that this relative disadvantage 
does not suffice to result in material deprivation. However, negative conse-
quences for subjective poverty may be expected as well, given that young indi-
viduals may more likely perceive them as “outsiders” on secondary labour mar-
kets. 
• H2c: Individuals that only spend a limited amount of time in fixed-term employ-
ment and use it as a stepping-stone more likely will be able to “make up” for initial 





disadvantages than those that more permanently remain in this state. As for un-
employment, we thus can assume that detrimental effects of fixed-term employ-
ment may also be cumulative.   
• H2d: Finally, the use of fixed-term employment as either traps or stepping stones 
(and the related socio-economic consequences) will differ between youth with 
different human capital attainment, with the highly-skilled/-educated experiencing 
less severe consequences of fixed-term employment than those with lower/no 
skills.       
1.3 Linking employment uncertainty and medium-term conse-
quences: Exploring the relevance of context 
The previous section has discussed the effects of unemployment and fixed-term employ-
ment as if they were generalizable effects across countries. Yet, it can be argued that 
the above types of employment uncertainty are “filtered” by nation specific institutions 
which determine how far the employment uncertainty leads to negative (or positive) out-
comes at the individual level (Hofäcker et al. 2010). In a cross-national comparison of 
unemployment outcomes for youth, Dietrich and Möller (2016), for example, highlight 
that “country-specific factors – institutions, traditions and characteristic structures – are 
of high importance in explaining the huge disparities between European countries”. In 
the following, we look at selected contextual factors that can be expected to “mediate” 
the relationship between employment uncertainty and socio-economic disadvantage. 
1.3.1 General economic situation 
A most obvious institutional factor affecting individual labour market chances and the 
associated poverty outcomes is the overall economic situation respectively the demand 
on national labour markets (e.g. Russell and O’Connell 2001, Breen 2005). This should 
be particularly so for young labour market entrants, who often have acquired least em-
ployment rights and thus frequently are the first ones made redundant in times of eco-
nomic downturns (Caliendo and Schmidl 2016). It can be assumed that young people in 
an economy experiencing economic growth and low overall unemployment have lower 
unemployment risks and may find it easier to transit from unemployment to employment 
than in countries where economic downturns and high overall unemployment restrict the 
availability of jobs and promote unemployment and joblessness (e.g. Dietrich and Möller 
2016). Previous research (e.g. Gangl 2002) has shown that this may be particularly so 
for the lowest qualified whose employment chances may be most negatively affected by 
a deterioration in economic conditions (H3a).  
Yet, as has been shown earlier (e.g. Russel and O’Connell 2001), cross-national varia-
tions in employment uncertainty among youth cannot be reduced to mere differences in 
cyclical conditions. Previous literature has pointed to the additional significance of vari-
ous institutional factors that impact on the employment chances of youth and associated 
socio-economic risks. We will look at these institutional factors below.    
1.3.2 Education systems & labour market regulation 
Education systems are of central importance in determining youth outcomes on the la-
bour market and related socio-economic outcomes. In the ideal case, they equip young 
individuals with qualifications and capabilities needed in the national labour markets. By 





linking different educational attainment levels to specific degree certificates, they also 
provide signals for employers that may facilitate or impede an individual’s job search. 
In labour market literature, usually two opposite types of educational systems are being 
differentiated (e.g. Allmendinger 1989, Breen 2005, Müller and Shavit 1998): The one 
extreme is often illustrated using the case of Germany which education system has been 
described as exhibiting a high degree of both standardization and stratification (All-
mendinger 1989, Müller and Shavit 1998). Stratification refers to the fact that selection 
in the educational system into different educational tracks takes place at a comparatively 
early stage. Educational degrees themselves are highly standardized, i.e. the rules gov-
erning the attainment of the different educational degrees are the same nationwide. 
Based on the attainment of different degrees, employers receive reliable signals about 
the qualifications that students possess. In other words, there exists a “tight coupling” 
between educational attainment and labour market outcome” (Allmendinger 1989: 239). 
While this coupling is beneficial for the adequate job placement for those with higher 
degrees, it simultaneously discriminates against those with lower degrees. In a similar 
way, the German system of vocational education and training, the so-called “dual model” 
(Blossfeld and Stockmann 1999) provides certificates to successful young individuals 
upon completion of their traineeship that are highly standardized and thus contain a high 
informative value for job search. This system may help to lower youth unemployment at 
the aggregate level (Cahuc et al. 2013). At the same time, it discriminates against those 
not able to acquire such degrees, who then become stigmatized as labour market out-
siders, not possessing adequate degrees and qualifications.  
The opposite model is often embodied by liberal countries such as the United Kingdom 
or the United States (e.g. Allmendinger 1989, Müller and Shavit 1998). In these coun-
tries, a comprehensive education is highly general, so that the degree of stratification is 
low. Similar observations can be made for the system of education and training in which 
occupational degrees are only weakly standardized. The signalling value of both educa-
tional certificates and vocational training degrees thus is low, as they do not provide 
adequate information about specific knowledge and capabilities. The link between edu-
cational degrees and labour market demands is less strong. Job-specific qualification is 
often attained during on-the-job training in enterprises. Following this, it can be expected 
that unemployment may occur more often as a consequence of longer job search pro-
cesses or more frequent “job-shopping”. At the same time, the relative “scar” associated 
with unemployment may be less pronounced.  
As Breen (2005) argues, there are complementarities between educational systems and 
“institutional relationships that ensure a close link between job seekers and employers” 
(ibid.: 126). These relationships are recorded in employment regulation. In countries like 
Germany, employment regulation is developed considerably, allowing labour market in-
siders – i.e. those with continuous and permanent employment contracts – a strong pro-
tection against both dismissal and the flexibilisation of their employment contract. The 
flipside of this strong ”insider protection mechanism” is that those outside this ”core la-
bour market” often find it hard to enter, and thus often end up in more flexible, atypical 
employment (Van der Velden and Wolbers 2003). Particularly when the regulation of 
permanent employment is disproportionately higher than that of fixed-term employees, 





young labour market entrants have low transition probabilities into safe permanent em-
ployment and often remain permanently marginalized (Passaretta and Wolbers 2016, 
Gebel and Giesecke 2016). In Germany, this is reflected in a comparatively high share 
of fixed-term employment that has been particularly imposed on young labour market 
entrants (Buchholz 2008). By restricting opportunities for labour market mobility in gen-
eral, strict regulation also reduces transition probabilities from unemployment to employ-
ment among youth (Russell and O’Connell 2001). Indeed in Germany, youth unemploy-
ment – if it occurs – is characterised by long spell duration (Gangl 2004, 2006). Yet for 
those few individuals who make the transition, employment protection enhances post-
unemployment careers and thus reduces the scarring effect, as compared to more liberal 
economies (Gangl 2006). 
In the counterexample of weakly regulated, flexible labour markets, it is easier to set foot 
in employment and to find a labour market position (Van der Velden et al 2003, Breen 
2005). At the same time, the weak level of employment protection also increases the 
chances of becoming unemployed. However, given high labour market flexibility, unem-
ployment spells are shorter and even more it also promotes early re-entries. Human 
capital depreciation during periods of unemployment is not as high as in more regulated 
regimes (Helbling & Sacchi 2014). Nonetheless, the lesser protection of employment 
relationships per se often promotes considerable wage scars among those that exit from 
unemployment (Gangl 2006).  
Drawing one earlier literature (Breen 2005, Passarella and Wolbers 2016), the combined 
consequences of educational signalling and labour market regulation on the employment 
situation of youth can be summarized as follows (H3b):  
• Most unfavourable conditions exist in contexts where educational signalling is 
low, but labour market regulation – particularly for permanent contracts – is high. 
In such countries, entries into safe employment are not smooth; yet, those who 
do not manage to enter are often marginalized in either atypical work forms or 
(mostly long-term) unemployment. Experiences of these states of labour market 
exclusion are very likely to scar young individuals permanently as outsiders on 
the labour market. We thus hypothesise that their risks of experiencing negative 
socio economic consequences are high. Typical countries representing this type 
of configuration are those of Southern Europe. 
• Countries like Germany combine high levels of regulation with high levels of ed-
ucational signalling. The latter will promote a smooth labour market entry for 
those successful in the educational system and thus reduce the prevalence of 
youth unemployment. For them “high signalling will offset the negative impact of 
high regulation” (Breen 2005: 127). Yet, those less successful may also bear high 
risks of permanent labour market exclusion, and the experience of either unem-
ployment or atypical employment will have strong scarring effects. 
• Liberal countries with low employment protection and low educational signalling 
will make it easy for youth to enter the labour market, even though entry positions 
will often not be stable. Unemployment thus may become a common experience, 
yet it will often not be of long duration and will not leave strong scarring effects. 
Atypical employment in these countries will be a rather rare phenomenon given 





that the low level of labour market regulation already provides good opportunities 
for flexibilisation. 
• Most favourable conditions should exist in countries where high levels of educa-
tional signalling are combined with weak employment regulation. Switzerland 
may be regarded as an approximate example for such a (rare) constellation. 
1.3.3 General welfare state protection 
The socio-economic situation of youth not only depends on institutions that influence the 
mere occurrence and duration of labour market uncertainty, but also on how the welfare 
states treat such periods and “buffer” negative socio-economic outcomes, e.g. through 
public benefits and transfers. This may relate to the general level of welfare state protec-
tion and generosity, as described through Esping-Andersen’s concept of “de-commodi-
fication” (see Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Of particular relevance for youth will be in how far public benefits buffer the negative 
effects of unemployment. Earlier research has highlighted, that a developed system of 
unemployment insurance is able to reduce the negative effects of unemployment which 
may be due to the immediate effect of public transfers. At the same time, generous un-
employment benefits may allow individuals a longer job search period by which they can 
optimize their search results. Gangl (2004), for example, has shown for both Germany 
and the US that unemployment insurance reduces workers’ risks of severe earning 
losses and entering unstable job arrangements. In a later paper, Gangl shows based on 
both US and European data that unemployment protection can mitigate the negative 
effect of unemployment on wages, particularly in rather regulated economies (Gangl 
2006). In contrast, the absence of adequate unemployment benefits for youth – as often 
prevalent in Southern European countries – has severe negative consequences for their 
income situation (Ferrera 1996). We thus assume that generous public benefits may 
reduce the risks of both income poverty and material deprivation.  
This effect may also extend to subjective forms of poverty and exclusion. As Wulfgramm 
(2014) shows, countries with generous unemployment insurance are able to reduce the 
drop in life satisfaction associated with becoming unemployed significantly better than 
those countries where unemployment benefits are short or meagre. Hence, we assume 
that welfare state protection will have a positively mediating impact on all types of socio-
economic disadvantage among youth (H3c). 
1.3.4 Active labour market policies 
Another mechanism by which governmental action positively impacts on the medium-
term socio-economic situation of youth are active labour market policies (hereafter: 
ALMP). They do not necessarily affect the situation of youth immediately; yet, by invest-
ing into youths’ human capital and employment chances, they may have positive effects 
in the medium-term. Furthermore, by avoiding skill depreciation, they reduce the scarring 
effects of temporary employment uncertainty (Van der Velden and Wolbers 2003). 
Positive effects of ALMPs on the situation of youth have been confirmed by a number of 
studies. For Sweden, Strandh and Nordlund (2008) demonstrate positive effect for the 
previously unemployed participating in such measures to reach pre-unemployment in-
come and to avoid labour market exit. Sage (2015) highlights positive effects of ALMP 





participation on the well-being of participants. Yet, empirical evidence also warrants that 
the effect of ALMPs will be dependent on the type of programme. Frequently, it has been 
found that the educational programs, qualification and retraining measures are more ef-
fective than direct employment measures, particularly when looking at their long-term 
effects (Strandh and Nordlund 2008 for Sweden, Caliendo and Schmidl 2016 for Ger-
many). Consequently, we hypothesise that the effects of active labour market policies on 
the socio-economic situation of youth will be positive, particularly when taking the form 
of educational programs rather than job creation (H3d). 
2. Overview of Reports and Analytical strategy 
 
In the following parts of this report, analyses will be presented that empirically investigate 
the effects of early employment uncertainty on different dimensions of socio-economic 
consequences among European youth, applying a medium-term perspective of around 
five years. To begin with, two studies will apply a pan-European perspective, aiming to 
identify general trends across Europe: Rokicka first uses data from the European Survey 
of Household and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) to investigate, in how far unemployment 
and fixed-term employment lead to persistent socio-economic disadvantage for youth 
after five years, and which groups among youth are most severely affected. Using the 
same data set, Strandh and Högberg (in this report) subsequently analyse the factors 
that allow youth to transit from fixed-term employment into a safe permanent job, and 
thus to likely evade socio-economic hardship. Particular attention in this chapter is at-
tributed to the institutional mechanism that promote such successful transitions. 
Following these two comparative overviews, four country studies use nation-specific lon-
gitudinal data to investigate the medium-term socio-economic consequences of employ-
ment uncertainty for youth in Germany (Hofäcker et al.), Italy (Bertolini et al.), Estonia 
(Unt and Täht) and the United Kingdom (Nizalova et al.). Even though the choice of these 
four countries was partly driven by data availability, they represent different institutional 
constellations, reflecting different welfare and labour market regimes in Europe. In the 
following, we provide a short stylized overview of the key institutional characteristics of 
these four countries. This will allow for a better classification of these case studies, par-
ticularly concerning the institutional factors discussed earlier (see section 2.3). In doing 
so, we first present an overview of the incidence of both unemployment and fixed-term 
employment in the four countries. We then turn to a stylized classification of institutional 
patterns. 
  





FIGURE I:  UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (LEFT) AND INCIDENCE OF FIXED-TERM EMPLOY-
MENT (RIGHT) 2006/7-2015, YOUTH UNDER-25 YEARS 
Source: Eurostat 2017 
Figure I displays the unemployment rates respectively fixed-term employment shares 
among youths under the age of 25. Substantial cross-national differences are clearly 
observable. Germany stands out as the country with the lowest youth unemployment 
rate that has remained persistently below the 10 per cent margin throughout the 2010s. 
At the same time, Germany ranks highest among the four selected countries with regard 
to the incidence of fixed-term employment with consistently more than 50 percent of 
young employees experiencing it. Entry into the German labour market thus appears to 
be rather smooth, yet it often means entering through atypical employment forms, par-
ticularly for the younger. The situation appears to be clearly worse in Italy where fixed-
term employment rates recently have approached that of Germany. At the same time, 
though, youth unemployment looms large in Italy, particularly since the onset of the 
2010s, nowadays affecting 40 per cent of the labour force. Both countries are examples 
of an insider-outsider labour market, whereas the status of being an outsider in Italy not 
only means being in atypical employment, but often is also related to a high risk of being 
(or becoming) unemployed. Both the United Kingdom and Estonia exhibit low rates of 
fixed-term employment – a typical feature of countries with flexible labour market regu-
lation (see below). In the United Kingdom, unemployment has largely followed the EU-
28 average throughout the observed timeframe. In contrast, Estonia apparently was hit 
by an economic downturn around the 2008 crisis, reflected in a tripling of youth unem-
ployment rates from 10 to 30 per cent between 2008 and 2010, and a return to EU-
average levels in the subsequent years (see also the contribution by Unt and Täht in this 
report).  
The pronounced differences in the incidence of unemployment and fixed-term employ-
ment likely can be traced back to institutional differences between countries. Regarding 
the interplay between educational systems and employment regulations, it seems 
reasonable to argue that the German pattern of low youth unemployment likely can be 
traced back to the strong signalling properties of the German educational and vocational 
training system (see the discussion above). At the same time, the deregulation of tem-
porary contracts coupled with a still stringent regulation of permanent employment in 
Germany has led to a concentration of atypical employment forms particularly among 





youth (Buchholz 2008). The high Italian rates of fixed-term employment may equally be 
traced back to high levels of employment regulation, which makes it attractive for em-
ployers to hire young labour market entrants in more flexible work. Yet, unlike in Ger-
many, the education and vocational training systems are only weakly standardized, thus 
providing only poor labour market signals and thus making the “school-to-work transition 
problematic and very long” (Bernardi and Nazio 2005: 353). The high rate of youth un-
employment is a reflection of this “decoupling of the educational vocational system from 
the labour market” (op.cit.). The United Kingdom has traditionally been described by a 
weak labour market regulation and high labour market flexibility. This structure makes 
the use of temporary employment as a flexibilisation tool obsolete, reflected in its low 
share among youth. At the same time, the link between educational degrees attained in 
the British school system and labour market demands is weak (Gebel 2010), thus making 
labour market entry more difficult and search-intensive. Yet, the flexible labour market 
structure facilitates employment entries and unemployment does not turn into a perma-
nent outsider status. Consequently, the British youth unemployment rates lies between 
that of Germany and Italy, approximating the EU average. In terms of labour market 
regulation, Estonia also resembles a rather liberal model with weak employment protec-
tion and high levels of flexibility (Helemäe and Saar 2011). The Estonian system of edu-
cation and training has been described also as exhibiting a strongly standardized com-
ponent, yet rather based on status than on qualifications. Entry into employment is further 
facilitated by an initially high demand for labour since the 2000s (Katus et al. 2005). This 
process, however, was halted throughout the economic crisis of 2008, reflected in the 
drastic rise of youth unemployment throughout these years.  
FIGURE II:  EXPENDITURE FOR ACTIVE (LEFT) RESPECTIVELY PASSIVE LABOUR 
MARKET POLICIES (RIGHT) AS % OF GDP, 2006-2015 
 
Source: Eurostat 2017 
How do public policies actively (through the promotion of employment) or passively 
(through direct income transfers) support youth in the four countries under study? To 
measure this, Figure II presents the dynamics in active and passive labour market 
policies spending as a percentage of GDP. Naturally, these figures provide only a rough 
approximation of the policy engagement for youth, given that they count expenditures for 
every active or passive measures; yet, a more detailed breakdown of figures to reflect 





youth policies is not available. Still the figures nicely illustrate notable differences be-
tween the countries in a stylised fashion. 
Generally, in all four countries passive policy expenditure surpasses active expenditure. 
Both Estonia and the United Kingdom stand out as low-spending countries that invest 
less than 0.5 per cent of their GDP into either active or passive measures. The only 
exception is the afore mentioned economic crisis in Estonia 2008-2010 when expendi-
tures for passive measures – i.e. unemployment benefits – increased substantially to 
more than one per cent; yet figures normalized at around half a percent in the following 
years. Among the countries observed here, Germany ranks among the highest spend-
ers, with 1.0-1.5 percent spending on passive labour market policies and a declining 
share of around 0.5 per cent for active policies. These figures confirm the frequent clas-
sification of Germany exhibiting a rather generous, conservative welfare state – in con-
trast to the rather residual liberal approach of countries such as the UK and Estonia. Italy 
approximates the German figures in active policy expenditure, yet surpasses the Ger-
man passive expenditure rates after 2010, following a steep increase of expenditures 
from around half a percent to around 1.5 per cent in 2015. This trend is in line with the 
simultaneous sharp increase in unemployment shown in Figure I, necessitating higher 
investments into unemployment benefits. For youth, the Italian figures, however, need to 
be treated with care, as previous research has shown that in contrast to many other 
countries, youth – particularly those with no previous work experience - have only little 
access to unemployment benefits (Ferrara 1996). Taking this into account, it can be as-
sumed that public benefits in Italy – as in the UK and Estonia – only weakly shelter youth 
from socio-economic risks, and that employment uncertainties thus may quickly translate 
into poverty or deprivation, particularly throughout the times of economic crisis. In con-
trast, protection in Germany is relatively generous.   
3. Data Sets & Methodology 
In the following, empirical results from the longitudinal data analysis are presented on 
both a European-wide as well as a nations-specific scale. Comparative analyses use 
data from the European Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). These data 
are supplemented by the data from nation specific longitudinal social surveys (Germany, 
UK, and Italy) and administrative data (Estonia). While the comparative analyses allow 
for a cross-national assessment of European trends and between-country differences, 
the national analyses are aimed to allow a better consideration of country-specific pecu-
liarities, such as specific work forms or types of poverty. The use of data sets of a differ-
ent type (survey and register data) and origin imply that the analyses cannot be treated 
as harmonized in a strict sense, i.e. using exactly identical indicators. Yet, analyses were 
performed in a way that the results can be compared qualitatively by using the same 
dimensions regarding both the dependent and the key independent variables. 
Logistic regressions were estimated in order to empirically test whether employment un-
certainty negatively affects youth’s socio-economic situation in the medium-term. For the 
measurement of socio-economic consequences, where applicable, all three dimensions 
discussed earlier – relative income poverty, material deprivation and subjective poverty 
– were analysed. This was possible for both the European as well as the German and 
UK data. Given the available longitudinal data, the other two country studies needed to 





restrict themselves to an analysis of subjective poverty (Italy) and objective income pov-
erty (Estonia).  
Employment uncertainty was operationalised using unemployment and/or fixed-term em-
ployment as indicators. Where possible and nationally relevant, other flexible work forms 
– such as mini-jobs in Germany or part-time employment in the UK – were considered. 
As we assumed that the effects of employment uncertainty may be group-specific, inter-
actions with further individual-level variables such as educational degree were added 
into the analyses. Durations of unemployment respectively atypical work spells were in-
cluded to account for the assumed cumulative effects of experiencing employment un-
certainty. In addition to these main explanatory variables, control variables at the individ-
ual level were added reflecting basic socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, 
ethnicity, place of residence, marital and family status) as well as the status of residence 
(household composition, household work intensity, parental home vs. own household).  
Medium-term consequences were identified applying a time-frame of four to five years, 
depending on data availability. The consistent use of longer time-periods was aban-
doned, given that some available data sets have a young history or a rotating sample 
design, allowing for no longer observations; yet reference to additional analyses with 
longer time horizons was made where applicable. As the interest of analyses was in the 
overall development across this interval rather than wave-to-wave changes, two time 
points were considered. Independent variables (employment uncertainty, control varia-
bles) were measured at the onset (t), while the dependent variable (socio-economic con-
sequences) was measured four/five years later. Count variables for employment uncer-
tainty were added that measured the length and/or number of unemployment/fixed-term 
employment spells respectively the accumulated length within the time window. Re-
ported results largely stem from the application of pooled regressions. Alternative fixed-
term effects / first difference models have the disadvantage that they may exclude cases 
from the models where relevant variables are time-constant, thus often critically reducing 
the number of cases for the analyses. Yet, where possible, such models were calculated 
as robustness checks. 
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1. Introduction 
As we know from previous studies, incidence of unemployment are more widespread 
among youth than prime age workers (Rokicka et al. 2015). This might be a result of 
transition from education into job market, whereas unemployment incidences are more 
widespread due to higher jobs turnover. Searching for a better job match among school 
leavers might be related to higher incidence of unemployment, and should be just a tem-
porary occurrence. However, the majority of empirical studies show that there is a scar-
ring effect of youth unemployment on prospective earnings, employment conditions, and 
labour market situation (Ellwood 1982, Beadry and DiNardo 1991, Arulampalam et al. 
2001). 
Gregg and Tominey (2005) found that the scarring effect of male youth unemployment 
on prospective wages 20 years later, yet they argue that the effect is much stronger for 
those with higher intensity of unemployment incidence. Similar results were reported for 
the US (Mroz and Savage 2006), Germany (Muhleisen and Zimmerman, 1994), and 
other European countries (Belgium: Cockx and Picchio 2013, Finland: Hämäläinen 
2003). 
Unemployment at young age is also associated with higher likelihood of being unem-
ployed later in life (Kawaguchi and Murao 2014, Nordstrom 2011). However, people with 
certain personal characteristics (low educational attainment, childhood poverty) are more 
likely to be unemployed, therefore there is certain selection based in the personal char-
acteristics (Arulampalam et al. 2001). While the effect of early career unemployment on 
further job prospects is well documented, there are slightly less studies focusing on the 
impact of youth unemployment on subsequent economic and material situation (Saun-
ders 2002). Some empirical studies which use a macro approach, based on aggregated 
data, show that poverty can be reduced if unemployment of household heads is elimi-
nated (Corcoran and Hill 1980), others report that poverty increases with unemployment 





duration of household head (Nicols 2012). In micro studies often the direction of the cau-
sality is questioned: Does unemployment lead to poverty, or does poverty lead to unem-
ployment? One of the possibilities to tackle this issue is the use of longitudinal data in 
which the economic outcomes of unemployment is observed few year after it occurred, 
and thus the risk of inverse causality is reduced. In this chapter, we look at the conse-
quences of labour market exclusion of young people from EU countries on their prospect 
economic situation. 
Our main research question is related to the following issue: 
• Does unemployment at early career stage translate into less favourable 
socio-economic situation of youth in medium-term? 
Several more detailed research questions were also tested: 
• Does the length of unemployment translate into less favourable socio-
economic situation of youth in medium-term? 
• Is the incidence of unemployment incidence experienced at different ages 
is associated with the different socio-economic outcomes? 
•  Does experience of unemployment for youth with different education at-
tainment lead to the same socio-economic situation in medium-term?  
The best source of data, which allows us to address these topics, is a longitudinal version 
of EU-SILC (The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions). First, it is 
the only longitudinal survey harmonized within EU. Second, it covers indicators related 
to the financial and material situation of the household. One of the drawbacks of this 
dataset is that the individual/household remains in the panel only for four years, and then 
is replaced according to the rotation scheme (European Commission 2014). Therefore, 
we can only observe the medium-term effects within a four-years-period. Another issue 
is related to geographical mobility of young people, those respondents who changed the 
living place, are not followed up1 , which can contribute to attrition problems. 
For this analysis, we use the most recent wave (UDB 2014-1) which consists of yearly 
interviews done between 2011 and 2014. We limited our sample to young individuals, 
which in the first wave were at least 18 years old and no more than 29 years old. As we 
are interested in the impact of the labour market situation, we excluded students and 
those who were in education in the first wave of the survey. However, we included in the 
sample those who returned to full-time education after having gained some labour market 
experience.  
Due to attrition and rotating design, the panel is not balanced, thus we used information 
only about individuals who were present in at least three waves. Although the longitudinal 
EU-SILC is designed for EU comparative studies, the EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 
2014 – version 4 of August 2016 covers only 24 out of 28 EU countries, with no data 
released for Germany, Denmark, Slovakia and Croatia.  
                                               
1The rule differs by country, although in the majority of countries they are not followed-up, more 
details can be found in European Commission (2014). 





Consistent with definitions adopted in the research framework for this work package (see 
the introduction chapter in this report), we focus on two objective and one subjective 
measures of youth socio-economic situation2. As a result our dependent variables are 
as follows:  
• an indicator for being at the risk of poverty,  
• an indicator of living in a materially deprived household,  
• and an indicator of subjective perception of living in the household which is una-
ble to make ends meet.   
We have used several estimation techniques to find answers to our main research ques-
tions. We first used descriptive statistics to provide a simple summary of the association 
between our main independent variable of interest: indicators of unemployment and de-
pendent variables describing the socio-economic status of youth. We use three different 
definitions of unemployment to distinguish between: incidence of unemployment at the 
beginning of the observation period, length of unemployment during the observation pe-
riod, and incidence of unemployment at a given year – used in fixed effect models. Our 
main independent variable is binary, and equal to one for an individual who was unem-
ployed in the first wave of the panel, and zero for an individual who was employed. 
Length of the unemployment is depicted by five binary indicators, and no unemployment 
incidence is a base, comparison category. Incidence of unemployment in a given year is 
also a binary variable, equal to one for an individual who was unemployed in the given 
year, and zero for an employed individual. 
In our main analysis, we used a logit regression to investigate the association between 
unemployment and risk of poverty, material deprivation and difficulty to meet ends meet. 
Our dependent variable is equal to one if an individual in 2014 lives in a household at 
risk of poverty (materially deprived household/ or household which make ends meet with 
difficulty or huge difficulty) and zero otherwise. Due to the use of pooled data from 24 
EU countries we applied a country fixed effect model to account for country specific un-
observable characteristics. We also included several control variables such as: age 
(within the age brackets: 18-29), gender, an indicator of educational attainment, an indi-
cator of living arrangement (with parents or without), and household work intensity (share 
of person/months spent at work to overall number of person/months of all members at 
working age at a given year). In few models we also tested several interactions effects, 
which are described in more details in the text. 
2. Empirical analysis 
First, we investigate if there are differences in socio-economic outcomes in 2014, while 
taking into account the labour market situation at the beginning of the study. Table I.I 
shows that those young people who were unemployed in the 2011 are more likely to be 
at risk of poverty, to live in materially deprived households and to report more financial 
difficulties in 2014 than their working counterparts. Interestingly, their relative financial 
situation slightly improved between 2011 and 2014. Yet, we do not control in this cross-
                                               
2
 Definitions are described in details in the previous report by Rokicka and Kłobuszewska (2016). 





tabulation for the change of labour market status, which could lead to this improvement 
(Table I.I). 
Furthermore, this cross-tabulation does not control for some personal, family or country 
specific characteristics which might be associated with higher risk of material distress 
such as: age, gender, education, household composition etc., therefore we should be 
very cautious drawing the conclusions. We thus decided to conduct more detailed anal-
yses that follow below. 
TABLE I.I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (%) 




Difficulty in making 
ends meet  
2011 2014 2011 2014 2011 2014 
Employed at 2011 10.25 11.18 8.97 7.67 26.65 27.36 




23.33 22.08 16.41 14.83 28.84 26.83 
Sources: EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2014 – version 4 of August 2016 (years: 2011-2014). 
Based on the EU-24: due to lack of information and insufficient sample size, excluded countries: 
Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia.  
 
In Table I.II we report the average marginal effects after a logit estimation. As shown in 
the table, a young person unemployed in 2011 has on average 6% higher probability of 
being at the risk of poverty in 2014 than a person employed in 2011. This result varies 
slightly between analysed outcomes, but in general it holds for all analysed indicators of 
economic situation: both objective and subjective ones: unemployment incidence in-
creases the probability to live in a materially deprived, and financially disadvantaged 
household. It is noteworthy that we also control in this regression for basic socio-eco-
nomic characteristics of the person, and his/her household. The experience of unem-
ployment thus has detrimental effects even while age, gender, education and household 
work intensity are accounted for. It is important to mention that those factors are also 
associated with the financial situation. Being female, or having no more than lower sec-
ondary education also increases the probability of being at higher risk of poverty, living 
in materially deprived households, and having more problems in making ends meet. Pro-
tective factors include age, tertiary education, and proportion of working members of 
household in the number of household members eligible for work (excluding students, 
disabled, retired etc.). As we could expect, older youth, youth with tertiary education, and 
living in a household with more working members are less likely to live in financially, and 
materially deprived household. Interestingly the indicator of household work intensity has 
the on average much higher impact on financial situation of the household than the la-
bour market status of the young person. This is an important finding, which indicates that 
we cannot assess the association between an individual´s labour market status and pov-
erty in isolation from his/ her household and living arrangements.  





TABLE I.II: RESULTS OF A LOGIT REGRESSION (AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS): UNEM-
PLOYMENT IN THE FIRST WAVE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE LAST WAVE. 
VARIABLES Model 1 





Model 3 Difficulty 
in making ends 
meet 
Unemployed in the first wave  0.061 0.039 0.059 
 
(0.009)** (0.007)** (0.011)** 
Female 0.015 0.021 0.034 
 (0.006)* (0.005)** (0.008)** 
Age -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Lower secondary education 0.070 0.070 0.107 
 (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.010)** 
Tertiary education -0.097 -0.071 -0.143 
 (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.009)** 
Living with parents -0.039 0.001 0.001 
 (0.007)** (0.006) (0.009) 
Household’s work intensity -0.207 -0.119 -0.230 
 (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.013)** 
Observations 12.999 12.999 12.999 
Sources: EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2014 – version 4 of August 2016 (years: 2011-2014). 
Based on the EU-24, excluded countries: Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia. Standard 
errors in parentheses, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01  
As mentioned in the introduction, we are also interested if there is any cumulative impact 
of unemployment duration, so in the next specification we are checking if the length of 
out of work experience is related to the subsequent economic situation of youth's house-
hold.  
Descriptive statistics are in line with our expectations, the longer unemployment experi-
ence of youth, the higher chances to live in poorer households, with lower material equip-
ment and higher subjective poverty.  
This evidence is also present, while we control for specific individual and household 
characteristics, and country specific characteristics in the logit regression (table below). 
The detrimental effect of labour market exclusion is the smallest for those who experi-
enced up to six months of unemployment between 2011 and 2014 in comparison to those 
who work for the entire period. Interestingly such a short unemployment period is not 
associated with a higher probability of living in a materially deprived household, while 
longer incidences of unemployment are. The effect is the strongest for those who remain 
unemployed for more than 24 months: on average the probability of being at the risk of 
poverty is 10% higher for a respondent, who spent more than 24 months in unemploy-
ment than for someone who worked for the entire period of four years.  
The size and direction of coefficients for the control variables are very similar to those in 
the previous specification, so that they were excluded from the table for the clarity of the 
presentation. 










At the risk of pov-
erty Material deprivation 
Difficulty in making 
ends meet 
No incidence  12.70 7.90 27.10 
1-6 months 15.21 10.53 34.77 
7-12 months 25.04 16.23 45.45 
13-24 months 32.58 20.79 52.96 
25-48 months 41.55 28.85 63.70 
Total 18.11 11.71 34.66 
Sources: EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2014 – version 4 of August 2016 (years: 2011-2014). 
Based on the EU-24, excluded countries: Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia.  
TABLE II.II: RESULTS OF A LOGIT REGRESSION (AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS): 
LENGTH OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN MONTHS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE LAST 
WAVE. 




Difficulty in making 
ends meet 
Unemployed for 1-6 months 0.028 0.016 0.039 
 (0.010)** (0.009) (0.013)** 
Unemployed for 7-12 months  0.046 0.025 0.044 
 (0.011)** (0.009)** (0.013)** 
Unemployed for 13-24 months 0.101 0.057 0.084 
 (0.012)** (0.009)** (0.014)** 
Unemployed for >24 months 0.107 0.078 0.108 
 (0.013)** (0.011)** (0.016)** 
Observations 12.999 12.999 12.999 
Sources: EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2014 – version 4 of August 2016 (years: 2011-2014). 
Based on the EU-24, excluded countries: Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia. Comparison 
category for unemployed: never unemployed. We also control for gender, age, education, house-
hold composition and household work intensity. Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01. 
Our results indicate that unemployment of youth is associated with medium-term persis-
tence of their socio-economic situation. Incidence of unemployment at the age 18-29 
translates into a less favourable financial situation in the subsequent years, i.e. higher 
risk of living in poor household, a higher probability of living in materially deprived house-
hold and higher subjective poverty. Yet not all of unemployed young people are affected 
in the same way. We know from previous empirical studies that there are certain groups 
that are more likely to experience financial consequences of labour market exclusion 
(Gregg and Tominey 2005). 





We thus decided to extend our analysis and check if there is any association between 
age at which the unemployment incidence happened and the subsequent socio-eco-
nomic outcomes. To the first model reported in Table I.II, we thus have added an inter-
action effect between age and the unemployment indicator. According to our results, age 
is a protecting factor against poverty, and the older the youth person (within the age 
group 18-29) the lower the chance to live in the poor or materially deprived household. 
However, as shown in the table below the interaction term between age and incidence 
of unemployment indicates that that the effect of being unemployed is more negative for 
old than for young persons. On Figure I, which shows the marginal effect of being unem-
ployed over different ages, we see an upward trend in the change in probability for a 
change in unemployment status as age increases. One possible explanation is that un-
employment for school leavers might be just a temporary occurrence related to finding 
the best match in the labour market, while unemployment for older youth can be more of 
a permanent phenomenon, which -as we know - leads to more cumulative disad-
vantages.  
TABLE III: RISK OF POVERTY WHILE BEING UNEMPLOYED IN THE FIRST WAVE INTER-
ACTED WITH AGE (LOGIT COEFFICIENTS). 
VARIABLES At risk of poverty 




Unemployed in first wave X Age 0.042* 
 (0.018) 
Observations 12.999 
Sources: EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2014 – version 4 of August 2016 (years: 2011-2014). 
Based on the EU-24, excluded countries: Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia. We also 
control for gender, age, education, household composition and household work intensity. Stand-
ard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
We also checked if the financial situation of those who have no previous working expe-
rience is affected in the same way by unemployment spells, as compared to those who 
lost a job. Similar to the previous specification, we added an interaction term between 
unemployment experience in the first way and no previous employment records in the 
same time. However both: The interaction term, and the indicator of previous employ-
ment records are statistically insignificant, so that we decided not to present the results, 
as no conclusions can be drawn. 
In the line with previous empirical studies we also examine if the effect of unemployment 
on risk of poverty is the same for people with lower and higher educational attainment. 
We also tested a similar specification as above with interaction terms for different edu-
cational groups, but the coefficients of all interaction terms are statistically insignificant, 









FIGURE I: MARGINAL EFFECT OF BEING UNEMPLOYED OVER DIFFERENT AGE 
 
Sources: EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2014 – version 4 of August 2016 (years: 2011-2014). 
Based on the EU-24, excluded countries: Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia. Marginal 
effects from the regression presented in the Table III. 
Fixed effect models 
One of the main drawbacks of our medium-term analysis presented above is the potential 
endogeneity issue. While analysing our outcomes in four years after the occurrence of 
unemployment we are able to avoid a problem of recursive causality, although there 
remains an issue of omitted variables. If there are certain personal characteristics which 
are not available in our dataset, but we believe are related to the socio-economic situa-
tion and our outcomes: poverty, material deprivation and subjective financial situation 
indicators, then our estimates can be biased, and might not show the causality but only 
the association. One of the possible ways to overcome this endogeneity problem is the 
use of fixed effect estimators, which is presented below (individual fixed effect). Yet fixed 
effect models have also side effects, as they cannot be used to examine time-invariant 
causes of the dependent variables (such as gender, education, place of living), being 
designed to study the cause of changes within a person even while we expect that dif-
ferences between people (in regards to education and gender) influence our dependent 
variables: poverty, and material status.  
We thus use this estimator as additional evidence to those presented above. As we are 
interested in the medium-term effect, we use the FE estimator to compare the situation 
at the beginning of the study in 2011 (t=0) and at the end in 2014 (t=4). The sample size 
diminished, as only those individuals in which the change of outcome occurred were 
taken into account. Our dependent variables is defined as the poverty status in t (Model 
1), material deprivation in t (Model 2) and an indicator of having difficulty in making ends 
meet in t (Model 3). Our independent variables are the personal/ household characteris-
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status at t, so it varies between t=0 and t=4, and depicts the labour market situation of 
an individual at t. 
TABLE IV: LOGIT FIXED EFFECT: BETWEEN (T0) AND (T+4) 







Unemployed 0.131 0.267* 0.511*** 
 (0.126) (0.131) (0.099) 
Living with parents -2.039*** 0.650 -0.299 
 (0.344) (0.449) (0.269) 
Household work intensity -2.990*** -1.307*** -1.042*** 
 (0.206) (0.207) (0.142) 
Household size 0.136 -0.129 0.051 
 (0.072) (0.080) (0.056) 
Log likelihood -927.864 -812.425 -1872.450 
N 3288 2512 5570 
Sources: EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2014 – version 4 of August 2016 (years: 2011-2014). 
Based on the EU-24, excluded countries: Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia. Standard 
errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Results presented above only partially confirm our previous findings. We do not see the 
statistically significant impact of the change of unemployment status on the change of 
poverty status. On the contrary, in the case of two other specifications, there is a statis-
tically significant impact of youth unemployment on material deprivation and financial 
distress of his/her household. The direction of this association is the same as in our 
previous results: the unemployed are having a higher probability of living in materially 
deprived, and financially distressed households. Among other time-variant explanatory 
variables, only household work intensity is a statistically significant factor associated with 
lower probability of poverty, material deprivation, and subjective evaluation of household 
financial situation. 
Summary: Our findings confirm the scaring medium-term effect of unemployment expe-
rienced by youth on their subsequent economic situation. Young people who experi-
enced unemployment at the age 18-29 are more likely in four years’ time to be at the risk 
of poverty, to live in a materially deprived household, and to live in a household which 
reports more financial distress, as compared those who worked.  
Moreover, for the older youth, the detrimental effect of unemployment is stronger, as they 
are more likely to be at the risk of poverty, in both objective and subjective terms. The 
impact of unemployment experience on subsequent financial situation also varies de-
pending on the length of unemployment spells. A longer period of unemployment in youth 
translates into a higher probability of being poor, to live in a materially deprived house-
hold and to express greater household financial distress. We haven't found significant 
evidence that the unemployment for schools leavers without previous job experience 
leads to worst financial situation compared to those who worked and lost the job. Neither 
had we found evidence that unemployment among different educational groups leads to 





different outcomes. While controlling for personal unobservable characteristics in a per-
son fixed effect model, we found that unemployment only deteriorates the material situ-
ation, and perceived difficulty to making end meet whilst there was no impact on objective 
poverty, depicted by the poverty line. 
Our findings suggest that experience and length of unemployment at young age have 
considerable implications for future precarious economic situation; the financial conse-
quences of unemployment persist even after four years of its occurrence. This finding 
has considerable importance for policy-makers, requiring policy attention and more in-
tensive inclusive policy for youth excluded from the labour market. 
3. Labour market insecurity and material situation of youth in 
the EU-24 
There is an ongoing discussion on whether temporary employment of young people is 
rather their first step into the labour market, which gives them more flexibility to find a 
perfect job match, and to gain first experiences, or it is a potential trap, translating into 
future disadvantages (Booth et al. 2002, Scherer 2009; see also the discussion in the 
introduction chapter). Previous empirical studies provide inconclusive findings. Gash and 
McGinnity (2007) - using the European Community Household Panel - found that espe-
cially in France, temporary job holders earn less and have a higher risk of becoming 
unemployed. Similar conclusions were drawn by Amuedo-Dorantes and Serrano-Padial 
for Spain (2005). Holding a fixed term contract in Spain is associated with an increased 
risk of poverty for both men and women. While for Germany and the UK, Gebel (2010) 
shows that country labour market regulations are important mediators of the future career 
path of youth in temporary jobs, an essential difference between Germany and the UK 
exists, indicating that in Germany temporary workers - while starting a job – experience 
a higher wage penalty in comparison to permanent workers, while in the UK these dis-
advantages are smaller. However according to these findings, most of the disadvantages 
of fixed-term contracts seem to vanish within a few years after the labour market entry. 
To our knowledge, the association between holding a temporary job in youth and the 
prospective financial situation later in life was not explicitly studied before. Therefore, in 
our approach we try to fill this gap, investigating in this part: 
• whether those with temporary employment are economically disadvan-
taged after four years of having a fixed term contract in comparison to 
those having a permanent position, and  
• whether young temporary workers with different educational attainment 
experience the same socio-economic outcomes in the medium-term? 
As in the previous part, we look at indicators of subjective and objective poverty and 
material deprivation on the household level, using EU-SILC longitudinal data. 
We start with descriptive statistics, comparing the incidence of poverty among the group 
of workers with temporary job to the permanent jobholders. Those who have fixed-term 
contracts at the beginning of the study are more likely to live in a household at the risk 
of poverty, to be materially deprived or assessing the financial capacity of the household 





as difficult both in 2011 and also in 2014. However the gap in poverty indicators between 
temporary and permanent workers is declining over time. 
TABLE V.I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (IN %) 
 
At the risk of pov-
erty Material deprivation 
Difficulty in making 
ends meet 
 
2011 2014 2011 2014 2011 2014 
Temporary at 2011 15.87 15.07 10.29 8.87 29.76 31.01 
Permanent at 2011 6.84 8.57 8.12 6.91 25.30 26.02 
Difference between temporary 
and permanent 9.03 6.5 2.17 1.96 4.46 4.99 
Sources: EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2014 – version 4 of August 2016 (years: 2011-2014). 
Based on the EU-24, excluded countries: Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia.  
To control also for certain personal characteristics, as well as country specific features 
we apply a logit regression, in which our dependent variable is equal to one if a young 
person lives in a household at the risk of poverty (first specification), a materially deprived 
household (second specification) or in a household which difficulties in making ends 
meet (third specification). Our main independent variable of interest is binary and equal 
to one if a young person had a fixed-term job in 2011, and zero if he or she had a per-
manent position.  
TABLE V.II: TYPE OF JOB IN THE FIRST WAVE AND MATERIAL SITUATION IN THE LAST 
WAVE (AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS). 
 




Difficulty in making 
ends meet 
Temporary contract at t=1 0.034 0.007 0.010 
 (0.007)** (0.006) (0.010) 
Female 0.018 0.023 0.038 
 (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.009)** 
Age -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.001)* (0.001) (0.002) 
Lower secondary education 0.062 0.078 0.114 
 (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.014)** 
Tertiary education -0.060 -0.047 -0.134 
 (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.009)** 
Living with parents -0.017 0.009 0.002 
 (0.007)* (0.006) (0.010) 
Household work intensity -0.155 -0.094 -0.226 
 (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.016)** 
Observations 9,719 9,719 9,719 
Sources: EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2014 – version 4 of August 2016 (years: 2011-2014). 
Based on the EU-24, excluded countries: Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia. Standard 
errors in parentheses, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
According to our results, the detrimental effect of temporary jobs (while controlling for 
certain personal, household and country features) exists only in the first specification, 





which measures the risk of being under the poverty line. Four years after the incidence 
of a temporary job, those who held it have on average a 5% higher probability of being 
at the risk of poverty, than their counterparts with a permanent job. However, no associ-
ation is found with regards to material deprivation, and the subjective indicator relating 
to the economic situation of the household.  
As some previous empirical studies indicate, temporary jobs are very heterogeneous. 
Within this group, we can find jobs offered by temporary agents in low-paid and low-
skilled positions, as well as well-paid temporary contracts for a probation period in upper 
labour market segments. Due to the lack of data availability, we cannot make such dis-
tinctions directly, but we can still verify if the young people with different educational 
attainment are affected by job insecurity in the same way. Thus we introduce to our first 
model an interaction term between temporary job incidence and the indicator of having 
no more than lower secondary education. Results of this estimation are presented in the 
table and graph below, where we control for the same characteristics as before, using a 
logit specification.  
TABLE VI: INTERACTION BETWEEN INSECURE JOB IN THE FIRST WAVE AND LOWER SEC-
ONDARY EDUCATION (LOGIT COEFFICIENTS). 
VARIABLES At risk of poverty 
Temporary contract at t=1 0.472 
 (0.106) ** 
Lower secondary education  0.532 
 (0.110) ** 
Tertiary education -0.765 
 (0.118) ** 
Temporary contract x lower secondary education 0.075 
 (0.186) 
Temporary contract x tertiary education -0.436 
 (0.217) * 
Observations 9,719 
Sources: EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2014 – version 4 of August 2016 (years: 2011-2014). 
Based on the EU-24, excluded countries: Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia. We also 
control for gender, age, education, household composition and household work intensity. Stand-
ard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.Figure II: Marginal effect of having temporary 
job over different level of education 
According to the results presented above, a young person with university degree who 
has a temporary contract has on average almost the same risk of poverty as compared 
to an average young person with a permanent contract. The detrimental effect of holding 
a temporary job3 is counterbalanced by the protective impact of holding a university de-
gree for those with tertiary level of education. This finding is in line with the previous 
empirical studies, indicating that there is labour market segmentation with regards to 
                                               
3
 A note for the proper understanding of the association: the coefficient is positive, but our 
outcome is undesirable – so the positive value is associated with higher probability of being at 
risk of poverty, while negative value is associated with lower risk of poverty. 





fixed–term contracts, and individual heterogeneity is essential in sorting the workers into 
the contracts (Berton at al. 2007). The detrimental effect of temporary employment is 
especially strong for those with lower skills, and low levels of education, while the finan-
cial situation of young people with university degree is not affected by their type of con-
tract to the same extent.  
FIGURE II: MARGINAL EFFECT OF HAVING TEMPORARY JOB OVER DIFFERENT LEVEL OF 
EDUCATION 
 
Summary: Our results do not confirm the existence of a large material disadvantage for 
holders of temporary jobs versus those holding the permanent one. Neither had we found 
that temporary job holders are a worse subjective financial situation as compared to 
those with permanent employment. Moreover, we haven’t found no such association also 
in the fixed term effect models, not presented here due to lack of statistically significant 
results.  
Only one of the indicators of material situation (risk of poverty) indicates in both descrip-
tive statistics and the logistic model indicates that those who have temporary job at 2011 
have higher probability to be socio-economically disadvantaged in 2014.  
Yet, our results confirm that the impact of temporary contracts on career of youth varies 
depending on their educational achievements. For those with higher skills, temporary 
jobs seem to be more a stepping stone than a trap, being associated with similar financial 
gratifications as in permanent contract. This finding supports the previous evidence of 
the heterogeneity of temporary employment (Berton at al. 2007). Some authors distin-
guish between workers who are directly hired by the company and those whose employ-
ment arrangements are market mediated by a third agent. Furthermore, European coun-
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rary employment, which could also result in the lack of the clear EU pattern in our anal-
ysis of the medium-term economic consequences of labour market insecurity, depicted 
by temporary job contracts (see the subsequent study by Strandh, in this volume). 
Appendix 
 
Table I.I: Descriptive statistics by country: poverty indicators for 2011 and 2014 
by unemployment status in 2011 
  
N 




Difficulty in making 
ends meet (%) 
  
 2011 2014 2011 2014 2011 2014 
AT EMPL 421 14,25 10,21 2,14 1,66 11,16 13,30 
 UNEMPL *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BE EMPL 390 6,41 4,62 4,36 3,08 13,85 12,56 
 UNEMPL 56 35,71 23,21 19,64 12,50 39,29 39,29 
BG EMPL 361 13,30 14,68 33,24 22,16 52,08 50,97 
 UNEMPL 114 36,84 35,09 69,30 47,37 81,58 78,07 
CY EMPL 484 10,33 11,98 14,88 19,01 51,45 64,67 
 UNEMPL 144 16,67 19,44 22,22 26,39 70,14 79,17 
CZ EMPL 586 5,63 1,88 5,63 3,41 23,21 28,67 
 UNEMPL 83 25,30 14,46 15,66 16,87 49,40 46,99 
EE EMPL 461 9,98 10,63 8,24 3,69 16,27 11,28 
 UNEMPL 97 38,14 30,93 19,59 15,46 45,36 42,27 
EL EMPL 219 17,81 21,46 16,44 15,98 66,21 79,00 
 UNEMPL 211 46,45 43,13 35,07 35,07 74,41 89,10 
ES EMPL 615 13,17 20,65 3,58 4,88 27,64 37,89 
 UNEMPL 361 37,12 42,66 11,91 14,96 48,20 54,29 
FI EMPL 751 9,99 9,72 2,13 1,33 2,66 3,73 
 UNEMPL 75 41,33 37,33 14,67 10,67 22,67 18,67 
FR EMPL 1380 9,93 10,43 2,83 2,25 13,33 99,36 
 UNEMPL 221 28,51 29,41 12,22 8,60 35,75 36,20 
HU EMPL 811 7,89 11,22 21,82 19,98 52,90 45,01 
 UNEMPL 249 37,75 38,96 52,21 47,39 79,52 70,28 
IE EMPL 126 5,56 7,94 4,76 4,76 29,37 33,33 
 UNEMPL 64 35,94 35,94 21,88 15,63 54,69 45,31 
IT EMPL 1027 12,07 12,85 7,79 6,52 31,84 33,59 
 UNEMPL 341 29,91 30,21 19,65 16,42 55,13 50,73 
LT EMPL 259 10,42 8,88 13,51 10,04 23,94 26,25 
 UNEMPL 82 39,02 32,93 34,15 28,05 47,56 50,00 
LU EMPL 318 9,75 11,01 0,00 0,94 7,23 9,12 
 UNEMPL *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
LV EMPL 447 9,62 13,20 19,91 10,51 44,52 38,26 
 UNEMPL 98 35,71 39,80 45,92 32,65 74,49 64,29 





Table I.I continued  
MT EMPL 577 4,85 7,80 9,01 6,93 33,10 28,60 
 UNEMPL *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
NL EMPL 700 4,86 3,86 0,57 0,57 6,00 7,43 
 UNEMPL *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PL EMPL 1268 12,85 12,78 11,51 8,60 28,23 24,76 
 UNEMPL 237 35,44 30,38 27,85 20,25 56,12 47,68 
PT EMPL 427 12,65 13,58 7,26 9,84 43,56 44,73 
 UNEMPL 150 40,00 43,33 21,33 23,33 63,33 65,33 
RO EMPL 521 24,95 21,11 27,26 26,49 40,31 42,42 
 UNEMPL 55 50,91 38,18 45,45 38,18 67,27 70,91 
SE EMPL 318 10,06 12,89 0,00 0,31 2,52 3,46 
 UNEMPL 56 16,07 25,00 7,14 3,57 14,29 16,07 
SI EMPL 678 4,42 9,59 3,24 6,05 31,27 27,43 
 UNEMPL 189 18,52 23,81 12,70 13,23 51,85 42,33 
UK EMPL 562 7,83 9,25 7,65 5,52 17,97 18,33 
 UNEMPL 58 36,21 24,14 25,86 27,59 41,38 32,76 
Sources: EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2014 – version 4 of August 2016 (years: 2011-2014). 
Based on the EU-24, excluded countries: Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia.  
EMPL: employed in 2011, UNEMPL: unemployed in 2011; * b: '20-49' observations; n/a: results 
are not published due to small number of cases below reliability limits. 
 
Table I.II: Descriptive statistics by country: poverty indicators for 2011 and 2014 
by type of contract in 2011 
         
  
N 




Difficulty in making 
ends meet (%) 
   
2011 2014 2011 2014 2011 2014 
AT PERM 359 13,09 8,64 2,51 1,95 10,58 13,09 
 TEMP *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BE PERM 278 5,04 2,88 2,88 1,08 10,79 11,15 
 TEMP 84 8,33 5,95 10,71 9,52 23,81 19,05 
BG PERM 290 9,31 13,79 31,38 19,66 48,62 48,28 
 TEMP *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
CY PERM 357 10,08 11,48 17,09 21,29 55,46 68,91 
 TEMP 101 11,88 13,86 5,94 9,90 34,65 49,50 
CZ PERM 409 2,93 1,96 4,89 2,69 21,27 28,36 
 TEMP 132 14,39 1,52 9,09 5,30 31,06 33,33 
EE PERM 421 9,26 8,79 7,60 3,33 15,91 10,69 
 TEMP *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
EL PERM 131 16,79 22,90 16,79 16,03 70,23 80,92 
 TEMP *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
ES PERM 341 7,33 16,72 3,52 3,81 23,75 35,48 
 TEMP 236 19,49 25,42 3,81 6,36 33,05 42,80 
FI PERM 550 6,73 7,45 1,64 1,09 2,73 3,09 





Table I.II continued    
 TEMP 132 21,21 17,42 4,55 2,27 2,27 6,06 
FR PERM 870 6,44 7,01 2,76 1,72 12,07 14,83 
 TEMP 430 16,28 15,81 3,26 3,49 16,05 20,47 
HU PERM 659 5,92 9,86 19,42 18,36 51,14 42,19 
 TEMP 132 16,67 17,42 36,36 29,55 65,15 59,85 
IE PERM 103 3,88 6,80 4,85 4,85 28,16 31,07 
 TEMP *a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
IT PERM 555 8,65 10,63 6,85 7,21 32,43 36,22 
 TEMP 271 14,76 15,50 11,07 5,54 35,79 33,58 
LT PERM 226 10,62 7,08 13,72 10,18 23,01 26,55 
 TEMP *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
LU PERM 225 8,00 9,33 0,00 0,44 6,67 7,11 
 TEMP 80 16,25 16,25 0,00 2,50 7,50 13,75 
LV PERM 399 8,77 12,78 18,80 11,28 43,11 39,10 
 TEMP *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
MT PERM 500 4,00 7,80 8,60 6,60 32,60 29,40 
 TEMP *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
NL PERM 582 3,44 3,26 0,69 0,69 5,15 7,73 
 TEMP 65 13,85 10,77 0,00 n/a 9,23 6,15 
PL PERM 499 5,61 8,22 8,22 5,81 24,85 19,44 
 TEMP 618 14,89 12,62 13,75 11,33 31,55 30,74 
PT PERM 233 6,87 9,01 6,87 8,15 45,06 44,21 
 TEMP 171 18,13 15,79 8,77 12,28 42,11 46,20 
RO PERM 352 6,82 4,83 16,48 18,47 31,82 35,51 
 TEMP *a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
SE PERM 266 8,65 10,15 0,00 n/a 2,26 3,01 
 TEMP *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
SI PERM 555 1,80 7,21 3,24 5,59 31,71 26,67 
 TEMP 72 12,50 18,06 4,17 9,72 31,94 29,17 
UK PERM 488 7,38 10,25 7,79 5,74 17,62 19,67 
 TEMP *b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Sources: EU-SILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2014 – version 4 of August 2016 (years: 2011-2014). 
Based on the EU-24, excluded countries: Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia. 
PERM: permanent contract in 2011, TEMP: temporary contract in 2011; *a: less than 20 obser-
vations, * b: '20-49' observations; n/a: results are not published due to small number of cases 
below reliability limits.  
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1. Introduction 
Insecure employment conditions in the form of temporary contracts are more common 
among youths than among adults. The proportion of youths in temporary contracts have 
also been on the increase long before the labour market challenges represented by the 
great recession. In 2012, the average proportion of youths in temporary contracts across 
the EU was 42% (Eurofound 2013). That youth have a higher incidence of temporary 
jobs than adults does not in itself have to be problematic. The route from leaving school 
to being established with a regular contract on the labour market could be a process 
most often passing a temporary contract. Temporary contracts could fill functions of nec-
essary try-out periods for both employers and youths allowing for better matching from 
the perspective of both (see for instance Belous 1989, Polivka and Nardone 1989). 
The increase in temporary contracts over time has however given rise to an academic 
discussion about if they do fill this kind of stepping stone function for the youths, or if they 
(increasingly) represent dead ends. In the empirical literature, findings from the U.S gen-
erally have found temporary employment to be a gateway to permanent contracts, while 
findings from Europe have been weaker (Bruno et al. 2012). Research has however 
found a great deal of variation in the prevalence of temporary contracts among youths 
across Europe (see for instance Gebel and Baranowska 2010) and single- or few- coun-
try studies have found differing transition rates in different countries (see for instance 
Scherer 2004). 
This European variation has resulted in a substantial comparative research interest in 
institutional level factors that could explain the differences, where in particular the role of 





differences in labour market regimes have been investigated while the role of the edu-
cational systems has received little interest. The research that has been conducted has 
also mainly used cross-sectional comparative data or repeated cross-sectional data, 
while comparative studies of actual transitions have been uncommon. 
The aim of this chapter is building on previous research to investigate the following main 
research question:  
• Are the national employment protection legislation and education system related 
to the probability of transiting from temporary employment to permanent employ-
ment among youth in Europe? 
2. Previous research 
As noted above, the main explanations for the differences across Europe have been 
sought in differences in labour market regimes, where in particular differences in Em-
ployment Protection Legislation (hereafter: EPL) has been singled out. Theoretically, this 
builds on the assumption that the relationship can be understood from the perspective 
of micro-level behaviour of firms and employees being shaped in relation to institutions 
(Müller and Gangl 2003). In relation to EPL in particular, stricter EPL leads to higher 
potential costs of hiring and firing for employers (Bentolila and Bertola 1990). This should 
lead to a higher incidence of temporary jobs among in particular youths through two main 
mechanisms. Firstly, it should lead to higher proportions of temporary contracts because 
of an increased need for firms to ensure numerical flexibility in relation to market de-
mands. Secondly, the higher costs of hiring and firing should increase the need for, and 
prolong, temporary contracts among youths as firms need stronger signals of productivity 
as later termination of contracts due to low productivity is more difficult (see for instance 
Polavieja 2003, Baranowska and Gebel 2010). Youth should here be particularly sensi-
tive as their productivity is relatively unknown to potential employers as compared with 
workers with more experience (Kahn 2007). 
It is however not sufficient to only analyse the overall strictness of EPL. Theoretically it 
is important to distinguish between EPL for regular (EPL-regular) contracts and EPL for 
temporary contracts (EPL-temporary) as they may have different implications for youth 
labour market outcomes (Gebel and Giesecke 2016). While the strictness of EPL for 
regular contracts should be related to higher prevalence of temporary contracts through 
the mechanism discussed above, the strictness of EPL-temporary could actually be ex-
pected to have the opposite effect. Given that EPL-temporary is largely related to limita-
tions on the use of temporary contracts, strict EPL-temporary should by making the use 
of temporary contracts harder for employers actually lower the incidence of temporary 
contracts. It has also become widely accepted that the strictness of the two types of EPL 
should be considered separately, but that the central factor might be the gap between 
the two. In a situation where EPL- regular is very strict as compared to EPL temporary 
there will theoretically be an added incentive for firms to use temporary contracts to reg-
ulate numerical flexibility in relation to the market (Passaretta and Wolbers 2016). 
The comparative empirical literature dealing with the relationship between EPL and tem-
porary employment is mainly built on cross sectional or repeated cross-sectional designs 
that look at the risk for youth of being in temporary employment. This research mainly 





supports the theoretical assumptions: Less strictness in EPL-temporary has been found 
to be related to higher relative temporary employment rates while less strictness in EPL-
regular has been found to be related to lower temporary employment rates (see for in-
stance de Lange et al. 2014). These conclusions have also been supported in analyses 
of changes in EPL (Gebel and Giesecke 2016). Findings on the relationship between the 
gap and temporary employment among youth have been less clear but appear to con-
form to theory. Whereas Baranowska and Gebel (2010) find no relationship between the 
EPL-temporary and EPL-regular gap in a cross-sectional analysis of youth temporary 
employment rates, Passaretta and Wolbers (2016) in an analyses of retrospective tran-
sitions across countries and time find it to be of importance for transitions from temporary 
employment to permanent employment or unemployment. 
While, as can be seen above, there has been a great deal of interest in the relationship 
between the strictness of EPL and temporary contracts, there has been relatively little 
interest in the role of educational systems for the incidence of temporary employment 
among youth. This is relatively surprising given that the educational system has been 
found to be a central factor for the probabilities for and patterns of school-to-work transi-
tions. Findings indicate that in particular the vocational specificity of upper secondary 
education is of importance, where labour market integration of youth run more smoothly 
in countries where vocational education is more clearly tied to the labour market, some-
thing that theoretically is assumed to be related to clearer signals to firms about the skill 
set of young vocationally educated job seekers (see for instance Müller and Gangl 2003, 
Breen 2005, Wolbers 2007, de Lange et al. 2014, and the discussion in the introduction 
chapter of this report).  
There is good reason to expect that the theoretical assumptions about the importance of 
signalling effects from the educational system also should be of importance for the tran-
sition probabilities from temporary employment to permanent employment among youth. 
Lower vocational specificity in the education system should lead to higher potential costs 
of hiring somebody on a permanent basis. The lack of educational signalling should here 
increase the need for, and prolong, temporary contracts in order to properly signal the 
productivity of the youth to the firm. This assumption has also been supported in cross-
sectional research that has looked at the relationship between vocational specificity and 
incidence of temporary employment, where higher vocational specificity was found to be 
related to lower temporary employment rates among youth (de Lange et al. 2014). 
This chapter has the ambition to add to the previous research on the relationship be-
tween the institutional setting and temporary employment in three ways. Firstly, most 
previous studies have only looked at the relationship between the institutional setting 
and the risk of being in temporary employment. In this chapter, we will look at the prob-
ability for transiting from temporary employment to permanent employment. Even though 
it is likely that the relative rate of temporary employment is related to transition probabil-
ities, this is in no way certain. Secondly, very few studies have looked in particular at the 
role of the educational system for the transition from temporary employment to perma-
nent employment. In this chapter, this will be a central focus. Thirdly, previous research 
looking at the transition from school to work find that both less strict EPL and the highly 
vocationally specific educational systems to be of importance for smooth transitions (see 
for instance Müller and Gangl 2003). As these two factors do tend to be represented in 





different countries, the role of the interaction between these, as noted by Breen (2005) 
in relation to youth unemployment rates, becomes very interesting. This not least in our 
case as a few country studies have suggested that the transition probabilities from tem-
porary employment in contexts that from the perspective of labour law is similar can be 
very different (see for instance Scherer 2004). In this chapter, we will specifically look at 
how EPL and vocational specificity interact in relation to transition probabilities where the 
issue if EPL will have the same effect in different context is central. 
3. Data and variables 
In order to investigate this question there is firstly a need for data that is longitudinal on 
the individual level in order to allow the observation of transitions from temporary em-
ployment to permanent employment. Additionally there is also a need for the data to 
cover many European country contexts in order to allow institutional analysis.  
As was the case in the analysis of the effects of LM exclusion and insecurity on the 
material and financial situation of youth (see the chapter by Rokicka, in this report), the 
longitudinal version of EU-SILC here fits both the requirements. It is a longitudinal survey 
harmonized within the EU, which allows the analysis of labour market transitions for the 
great majority of EU and associated countries.  
There are a couple of data limitations in relation to the research question that will con-
strain the analyses. Even though the individual/household remains in the panel for four 
years before being replaced, the analyses will be based on one-year transitions. This 
means that the probability for a transition is observed for all youth who in a wave are in 
a temporary contract and observed the year after.  
The reason for this limitation is to maximize the number of observations as the number 
of youths 18-29 in the data are limited, and of them only a limited number are observed 
in temporary employment. This need to maximize the number of observations is accen-
tuated by the comparative focus of the research question, where the number of obser-
vation on country level is varied. Youth also have a somewhat higher incidence of leaving 
the panel early through leaving the parental household, which could create stronger se-
lection effects through attrition if analysed in longer panels.  
The dependent variable is type of contract - contractual status. Contractual status is in 
the EU-SILC measured by a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s em-
ployment contract is of limited (temporary) or permanent (unlimited) duration. Only em-
ployees (current or former), but not self-employed, are covered. If the respondent holds 
more than one job, the variable refers to the main job, as defined as the job with most 
hours worked. It should also be noted that if the respondent is unemployed, the variable 
refer to his/her last main job. In addition to the central individual level variable, transition 
to permanent employment or not, a number of additional variables that previously have 
been found to be of relevance for transitions to permanent employment and that could 
be of importance for differential selectivity of temporary workers across countries are 
used as controls. These are gender, age in years and education (ISCED level). These 
variables are not in focus for the analyses, and thus not presented in the table, but are 
included in the models in order to control for possible compositional differences in the 
temporary employed group between countries. 





For the analyses, we have utilized the EU-SILC waves 2006-2013 where all individuals 
who were at least 18 years old and no more than 29 years, in temporary employment 
and observed in two consecutive waves were included. This provided a micro level data 
set with observations of the one-year transition probabilities of youth from 29 EU or as-
sociated countries.  
The second data requirement in relation to the research question is access to relevant 
comparative country level indicators of labour law and school systems. In line with pre-
vious comparative research, we use indicators developed by the OECD on the strictness 
of the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). These indicators measure procedures 
and costs involved in the dismissing and hiring workers and in the chapter we use the 
indicators averaged for 2006-2013. The indicators were constructed based on statutory 
laws, collective bargaining agreements and case law as well as contributions from coun-
try experts (OECD 2017). The chapter uses two OECD version 11 indicators of the strict-
ness of EPL. EPL for regular contracts and EPL for temporary contracts where both 
variables are coded on a scale of 0-6 (where higher scores represent stricter EPL). In 
addition, we also use an indicator of the difference between EPL for regular contracts 
and EPL for temporary contracts (higher scores representing greater strictness of regular 
EPL in relation to temporary EPL).  
One indicator is used in order to measure features of the educational systems that po-
tentially could be related to the transition probabilities from temporary employment to 
permanent employment. This indicator, vocational specificity, was picked to be in line 
with the findings within the school-to-work transitions literature that have emphasized 
these traits as important features for transitions. Vocational specificity represents the 
extent to which education provides students with vocational skills, and the specificity of 
these skills. Educational systems can provide vocational education in the form of broad 
vocational programs or provide students with specific skills in dual systems where edu-
cation and working in firms or organizations are combined (Bol & van de Werfhorst 2013). 
The indicator used to measure the strength of the dual system in the chapter is based 
on the percentage of students in upper secondary education who are in a dual system 
in respective country (OECD 2007).  
In addition to the indicators of labour law and school systems, one country level control 
variable, GDP (USD) collected from the OECD database, is included. GDP is included 
as a control as it theoretically could be a factor that is related both to the institutional 
settings of interest and the transition rates and thus could be a confounder. As the vari-
able is not in focus for the analyses it is not presented in the table, but included in all 
models as controls.  
A limitation of the country level approach used in the chapter is that the analyses are 
based on set or averaged indicators of labour law and school systems. In order to get 
closer to investigating causal relationships between institutional settings and transition 
probabilities, a fixed effects approach would have been preferable. The relative short 
                                               
1
 Version 1 of the indicator of strictness of employment protection incorporates less data items 
than the current version 3, but only verison 1 was available for all years studied.   





time span however limits the level of variation, for in particular the school system varia-
bles, but to some extent also of the indicators of EPL. This means that current results 
should be interpreted as relationships, and that future analyses should expand both mi-
cro and macro level data in order to provide further information on the relationships.  
4. Method 
Given the hierarchical structure of the data, the research question is investigated using 
linear multilevel regression models, with occasions (level 1), nested in individuals (level 
two) nested within countries (level three). By taking the nested structure of the data into 
account, and introducing random intercepts to the models, multilevel techniques provide 
more reliable estimates of standard errors (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2012). A linear 
approach was chosen despite the binary nature of the dependent variable. This in order 
to take into account that comparisons of odds or odds ratios across different models with 
different covariates are problematic (Mood 2010). All analyses were however also re-
made using multilevel logistic regression models and all results were found to be sub-
stantially similar. 
As there are relatively few country-level observations, including all country level variables 
in the model at the same time would risk over-specifying the model, which could lead to 
volatile and imprecise results (Stegmueller 2013). For this reason, all policy variables are 
introduced in separate models (model 1-4) together with the country level control variable 
(GDP) and individual level control variables. This is followed by three models (model 5-
7) where each EPL variable is added together with vocational specificity in order to in-
vestigate how they interact. 





5. Results of the empirical analysis 
Starting the analyses, we in Figure I look at the overall one-year transition rates to per-
manent employment for the youth observed in temporary employment in the data. In the 
longitudinal EU-SILC waves 2006-2013, there are 25.595 observed possible transitions 
nested within 18.945 individuals in 29 countries. In line with previous research on the 
relative rate of temporary employment among youth, Figure I shows that there is also 
great variation in the transition rate from temporary employment to permanent employ-
ment between European countries. The one-year transition rate varies from over 75% in 
Lithuania to only 18% in France, indicating that being in temporary employment means 
very different prospects for establishing oneself o the labour market across Europe.  
FIGURE I. ONE YEAR TRANSITION RATES FROM TEMPORARY TO PERMANENT EMPLOY-
MENT AMONG YOUTH IN OBSERVED COUNTRIES (AVERAGE 2006 – 2013) 
. 
Source: EU-SILC, waves 2006-2013  
It is also interesting to note in the figure that – as compared with findings on the relative 
rate of temporary employment among youth across Europe (see for instance Eurofound 
2013) – there are similarities but there are also differences. There are countries such as 
Sweden, Austria and Ireland that have high or relatively high temporary unemployment 
rates among youth, but where the transition rates to permanent employment are also 
relatively high. Low rates of temporary employment does thus not per definition mean 





high transition rates, and reversely, high rates of temporary employment does not auto-
matically mean low transition rates. The relative rates of temporary employment are thus 
probably not always a good measure of if temporary employment functions as a step-
ping-stone for youth or is a dead end. In a country like Poland, which combines tempo-
rary employment rates for youth over 60% with transition probabilities slightly over 20%, 
this is probably the case, but in a country like Sweden, that combines temporary employ-
ment rates over 55% with transition rates of 55% this is probably less the case. 
We have now seen that there is great variation between European countries in transition 
rates from temporary employment to permanent employment. In Table I, this analysis is 
taken further in multi-level analyses where the relationship between EPL and vocational 
specificity and the transition probability is investigated. Starting with looking at model 1, 
we can see that EPL-regular, in line with theory and previous research on relative rates 
of temporary employment, is negatively related with the transition rate. The transition 
rates from temporary to permanent employment is thus lower in countries with strict EPL-
regular.  
In model 2, we can see that the relationship between EPL-temporary and the transition 
probability also is negative. The transition rate is thus lower in countries with stricter EPL-
temporary. This is interesting in relation to previous research, as it has pointed to stricter 
EPL-temporary being related to lower rates of temporary employment. EPL-temporary 
thus appears to have opposite relationships with the incidence of temporary employment 
and the probability of transferring to permanent employment. It is here possible that the 
relationships theoretically should be understood quite differently. While the relationship 
between EPL-temporary and the temporary employment rights could be understood from 
firms incentives for numerical flexibility, the relationship between EPL-temporary and 
temporary employment could perhaps rather be understood from the additional rights 
that stricter EPL-temporary mean for temporary employed. If the rights of temporary em-
ployed are stronger, and the durations of temporary contracts are mandated to be longer, 
both the need and opportunity for transition to permanent employment could be reduced. 
In model 3, the final indicator of EPL, the difference between EPL-temporary and EPL-
regular, shows no statistically significant relationship with the transition probability.  
 





TABLE I. THREE LEVEL LINEAR MULTILEVEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY LEVEL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROBA-
BILITY OF MOVING FROM TEMPORARY TO PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT, 2006-2013. HAVING PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT AS DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
EPL regular contracts -0.124* 
(0.057) 
   -.212 
(.078)** 
  
EPL temporary contracts  -.094 
(.036) ** 
   -.218 
(.048)*** 
 
Difference EPL regular – EPL temporary   .039 
(.040) 
   .159 
(.060)** 
Vocational specificity    .005 
(.003)(*)  
.006 (.011) -.018(.006)** .013 (.004) 
** 
Vocational specificity * EPL regular con-
tracts 
    .000 (.005)   
Vocational specificity * EPL temporary con-
tracts 
     .015 (.004)***  
Vocational specificity * Difference EPL reg-
ular – EPL temporary 
      -.010 (.004) 
** 
Constant  .644 (.173) .406 (.092) .255 
(.117) 
.207 (.104) .672 (.196) .570 (.114)   .104 (.102) 
N level 1 (occasion) 23,422 23,422 23,422 21,539 21,539 21,539 21,539 
N level 2 (individual) 17,202 17,202 17,202 15,719 15,719 15,719 15,719 
N level 3 (country) 23 23 23 21 21 21 21 
Source: EPL data from OECD (2017), tracking data from OECD (2007), data on vocational specificity from Bol & van de Werfhorst (2013). Individual 
level-data from EU-SILC. 
Note: All models controlled for GDP, gender, age and education (ISCED level). EPL ranging from 0 to 6; Vocational specificity ranging from 0 to 1; 
Age of tracking ranging from 10 to 16; Youth unemployment ranging from 0 to 100. (*) p<0.1 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors 
in parenthesis. 





Turning to the indicators of the education we can in model 4 see that the vocational specificity 
has a borderline significant positive relationship with the transition probability. There is thus a 
tendency of countries with more vocationally specific education systems being connected with 
higher transition probabilities to permanent employment, which would appear to fit both the 
theoretical assumptions and previous findings on the rate of temporary employment.  
Having looked at the direct effects of the EPL and education systems, model 5-7 show how 
respective EPL variable interacts with vocational specificity. Model 5 shows no significant in-
teraction effect between EPL-regular and vocational specificity. Both model 6 and model 7, 
however, show strongly significant interaction effects when EPL-temporary and the difference 
between EPL-temporary and EPL-regular are tested. In both cases, the introduction of voca-
tional specificity and its interaction with the EPL variable also have implications for the direct 
coefficients which makes the interpretation of overall effects somewhat difficult to make. For 
this reason, we have estimated the predicted probabilities for transitions from temporary em-
ployment to permanent employment in respective models, and present them graphically in 
Figure II and Figure III. 
In model 6, both vocational specificity and EPL-temporary are added together with their inter-
action term. Doing this produces a strongly significant positive interaction effect of the two 
variables. The implication of this interaction effect becomes clear when looking at Figure II 
where the predicted probability of a transition from temporary to permanent employment at 
different levels of strictness of EPL-temporary has been calculated for an individual in four 
different hypothetical contexts of vocational specificity, where the proportion in a dual system 
is 0%, 15%, 30% and 45%. What can clearly be seen here is that when educational systems 
becomes more vocationally specific the effects of EPL-temporary (i.e. comparing high EPL-
temporary with low EPL-temporary) on the transition rates changes sign from negative to pos-
itive. 
FIGURE II. PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF TRANSITIONS FROM TEMPORARY TO PERMANENT 
EMPLOYMENT. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN VOCATIONAL SPECIFICITY AND EPL FOR TEMPO-
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In the final model, model 7, vocational specificity and the difference between EPL-temporary 
and EPL-regular are added together with their interaction term. This produces a significant 
positive direct effect of vocational specificity, as was found in the original analysis in model 4, 
but it also produces a strong significant positive direct effect of the difference between EPL-
temporary and EPL regular. This would appear to be directly contrary to theory and previous 
findings, but should be related to the significant negative interaction term between the two 
variables. Figure III shows the implications of the relationship by looking at the predicted prob-
abilities of transitions given the four vocational specificity levels at different levels of difference 
between EPL-temporary and EPL-regular. The figure shows that, as the educational system 
becomes more vocationally specific, the effect of the difference between EPL-temporary and 
EPL-regular (i.e. comparing a low degree of difference with a high degree of difference) 
change sign from positive to negative. 
FIGURE III. PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF TRANSITIONS FROM TEMPORARY TO PERMANENT 
EMPLOYMENT. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN VOCATIONAL SPECIFICITY AND DIFFERENCE BE-
TWEEN EPL FOR REGULAR CONTRACTS AND EPL FOR TEMPORARY CONTRACTS.  
  
6. Summary 
This chapter had one main research question: Are the employment protection legislation and 
the education systems related to the probability of transiting from temporary employment to 
permanent employment among youth in Europe? The conclusion which can be drawn from 
the empirical analyses of longitudinal EU-SILC data is that they clearly are. The analyses to a 
large extent provide support to previous findings on the relationship between EPL and the 
relative rate of temporary employment. Yet, they also provide some new evidence on the dif-
ference between looking at temporary employment rates and the transitional probabilities from 
temporary employment to permanent employment, the role of the educational system for these 
transition probabilities and the role of the interplay between the EPL and the vocational spec-
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The chapter did show that, although there is similarity between the relative rate of temporary 
employment and the transition probability into permanent employment, there are differences. 
Low rates of temporary employment do thus not per definition mean high transition rates, and 
reversely, high rates of temporary employment do not automatically mean low transition rates. 
The conclusion from this is that comparative analyses of temporary employment rates proba-
bly are less than perfect for analysing if temporary employment functions as a stepping-stone 
for youth or as dead ends between countries. In order to understand the role of temporary 
employment on the labour market, both the relative rate as well as transition probabilities need 
to be taken into account. 
In line with previous research on relative rates of temporary employment, the chapter further 
showed that strong EPL-regular is related to lower transition probabilities. It, however, also 
found that strong EPL-temporary was related to lower transition rates, which on the surface 
would seem to contradict previous findings. In line with the conclusion above, this indicates 
that it is important to separate relative rates of temporary employment from the transition prob-
abilities, and that EPL-temporary could theoretically have different effects on these outcomes. 
The findings on the role of the difference in strictness of EPL-temporary and EPL-regular 
showed no direct effects, but it appeared to be of importance when analysed in conjunction 
with vocational specificity. 
The chapter did show that the signalling effects created by the vocational specificity of the 
education system appear to be related to the transition probabilities from temporary employ-
ment to permanent employment. This was less strong when it came to the separately analysed 
direct effect, but very clear when analysed in conjunction to EPL-temporary and the difference 
between EPL-temporary and EPL-regular. 
The chapter finally showed that it in order to understand the role of temporary employment on 
different labour markets, it appears to be important to not only analyse EPL and educational 
systems variables separately. There were strong interactions between two of our EPL varia-
bles, EPL-temporary and the difference between EPL-temporary and EPL-regular, and voca-
tional specifications. This indicates that the impact of EPL and, given that, probably also 
changes in EPL on the transition probability from temporary employment are related to the 
level of vocational specificity in the education system.  
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1. Background 
Given the significant reliance of modern societies on labour income, there is a straightforward 
link between unemployment and poverty. Job loss has been named a key poverty trigger 
followed by decreases in earnings, so that the two combined account for 60% of poverty 
entries (Smith and Middleton 2007). Although most of the people considered poor at any single 
period of time will exit poverty within a relatively short period after entry, the incidence of 
unemployment can trigger other issues, such as mental and physical health problems, which 
can later lead a person back to poverty. 
When considering episodes of labour market exclusion or job insecurity which happen at the 
very start of the career, their impact could be quite different compared to similar experiences 
at older ages. On the one hand, there is a number of reasons to think that their effect would 
be smaller: (i) episodes of unemployment while young may result in a better job match and/or 
further investment in human capital, both of which are likely to result in a better employment 
outcome, and, thus, lower risk of poverty; (ii) having occurred earlier in life, when people do 
not yet have their own families to take care of and are more likely to have access to parental 
support, youth unemployment may be less likely to trigger a vicious cycle of poverty and labour 
market exclusion. On the other hand, it is possible that this effect would be larger: (i) young 
people are living through an important forming stage, when learning by doing is critical and 
work habits are developed, and losing a job or becoming unemployed straight after finishing 
education may set a young person on a downward path leading to lower employability and/or 





jobs with worse conditions, and, as a result, to lower income and poverty; (ii) losing a stable 
source of income leads to dissaving for some, delays the start of savings for others, or even 
pushes people into debt, increasing the risk of future poverty in instances of certain 
unexpected life events (like, child birth, injury or serious health problems, etc.). Therefore, it is 
not clear whether there is a more negative, or less negative, if at all, effect of youth 
unemployment on poverty. Moreover, it may be very short-lived, quickly dissipating with time 
or once the individual improves his or her labour market position. Yet, a better understanding 
of the relationship between youth unemployment and poverty can provide important insights 
into the design of relevant policies and improve their targeting. 
In the UK in 2010-2013, 30% of young people (14-24 years old) were living in poverty 
(measured as living in a household with income below 60% of median income), which is higher 
than the poverty rate among any other age group. At the time of the survey, many of the young 
people still lived with their parents, and for them the poverty rate was 25%, while it was 43% 
among those living without parents (NPI 2015). The same report documents that the poverty 
rate for 20-24 year olds had grown by 6 percentage points over the preceding decade. In 
support of earlier theoretical considerations, the highest rates of poverty were observed among 
young adults who were either inactive or unemployed (57% and 54% respectively), followed 
by that among students (43%), part-time employed (25%) and full-time employed (12%), 
clearly reflecting a steep gradient in employment status. As of December 2016, the youth 
unemployment rate in the UK favourably compared to many countries in Europe and it was at 
a six-year low at 12.6% vs. 18.6% which is the EU average.1 However, the current situation 
with regards to poverty and unemployment only documents a short-term relationship, leaving 
the medium term and long term perspective outside of focus. 
In addition to income based poverty measures which are discussed above, this study also 
considers poverty in the form of bill arrears, material deprivation and one’s perception of their 
current financial situation. Turning first to arrears, data collected by the DWP suggests that 
while only 5% of working families are behind with their bills, some 21% of workless familiies 
are in arrears2 (poverty.org.uk).  
In 2011, 5.1% of UK households were classified as being severely materially deprived3, this is 
significantly below the EU average for the same year which is 8.7% (ONS 2013). With regards 
to the subjective measure of poverty, Evans, Macrory and Randall [ONS] (2015) analyse 
national well-being in the UK and find that in the financial year ending 2013 10.1% of the UK 
population find it difficult to get by financially. This figure constitutes a decline from when the 
data was first collected in 2010 when the figure was 12.3%4. The authors highlight that in 2013 
9.7% of those aged 16 to 24 and 12.6% of those aged 25 to 44 report that they are finding it 
quite or very difficult to get by financially. 
In the UK, around 40% of those who are unemployed are under 25. While across all developed 
countries the youth labour market is more sensitive to prevailing conditions, the UK is one of 
the worst in this respect, as the youth unemployment rate disparity runs at nearly four times 
                                               
1
 https://www.statista.com/statistics/266228/youth-unemployment-rate-in-eu-countries/  
2
 Data comes from the Family Resources Survey and is the three-year average over the period 2006/07 
to 2008/09. 
3
 An individual is classified as being materially deprived if they cannot afford at least four of the following: 
1) to pay their rent, mortgage, utility bills or loan repayments, 2) to keep their home adequately warm, 
3) to face unexpected financial expenses, 4) to eat meat or protein regularly, 5) to go on holiday for a 
week once a year, 6) a television set, 7) a washing machine, 8) a car, 9) a telephone. 
4
 Data from Understanding Society, The UK Household Longitudinal Study. 





that of those aged 25+. Furthermore, young people have been the ones hit the hardest by the 
recent recession, and have benefited disproportionately less in the recovery: the employment 
rates of those aged 18 to 24 falling by nearly 10 percentage points in the last decade, yet from 
the 1 million jobs the UK economy has added over the last two years just 40,000 have been 
among the under 25s (Gregg 2014). 
A broader measure of labour market exclusion, in addition to unemployment, contains other 
categories and is referred in the literature as NEET – those not in employment, education, 
training. While the UK has avoided the dramatically high NEET rates of 20 per cent or more 
among youth - that characterise countries such as Italy, Greece and Spain - it still remains 
unacceptably high with nearly one million young people (963,000), 16.5 per cent classified as 
NEET in 2015. This rate is notably higher than in other Northern and Western European 
countries (e.g. Netherlands: 7.8 %, Denmark 8.4 % and Germany: 9.5%). Noting that most 
youth unemployment occurs between leaving full-time education and finding sustained work, 
the UK government has not only sought to extend education and training participation, but also 
to accelerate the recruitment of young people into jobs and give some work experience to 
those not making successful transitions quickly (Gregg 2014). From this there has been a 
marked drop in the number of 16 and 17 years old classified as NEET (down to just 4.5% in 
Q4 2013). Yet, the NEET numbers have changed very little for those aged between 18 and 19 
(Rokicka et al 2016). 
Even though the labour market exclusion of youth in the UK is about average compared to the 
rest of the EU, job insecurity may trigger a similar, albeit smaller, impact on poverty outcomes 
in later life, and in this regard the situation in the UK is quite serious. From just over 15 % of 
employees being low paid workers in 1975, their proportion peaked at 23% in 1996 (Corlett 
and Whittaker 2014: 6). Since then, the proportion has changed little – as one in five 
employees (22%, or just over five million individuals) in the UK earned less than the low-pay 
threshold in 2013 (Ibid) . According to the OECD Statistics (2015), the proportion of low-paid 
work in the UK has been greater than in the other Western European countries over the past 
two decades and has remained rather stable over time. Furthermore, the number of workers 
earning less than a living wage – the amount that is supposed to provide a full-time worker 
(average aross household types) with the means to achieve a minimum standard of living as 
defined by members of the UK public – has increased from 3.4 million (14% of all employees) 
in 2009 to 4.9 million (20%) in April 2013 (Whittaker and Hurrell 2013). Moreover, the 
proportion of young people who are defined as low-paid has more than trippled over the past 
four decades (Pennycook, 2012). This means that many workers, particularly young people, 
have found that gains from work have not kept pace with the increase in overall economic 
output and productivity over time. (Dynan et al. 2007). Furthermore, women, ethnic minorities, 
long-term disabled people, part-time workers, lone parents, seasonal workers, casual workers, 
and temporary agency workers have been disproportionately affected by low pay (Clegg 
2016). The job characteristics associated with low-pay were manual work, work in 
private/voluntary secors and retail and wholesale trade, work in establishements with no trade 
union recognition and work in small establishments (under 25 employees) (Ibid). In addition, 
Pennycook et al. (2013) argue that those who are in low pay employment are more likely to 
have a zero-hours contract than those who are not. Since a zero-hours contract is a type of 
employment contract under which an employer is not required to offer an employee any 
defined number of working hours, those low-paid workers are at a higher risk of being in 
vulnerable positions in the labour market with income insecurity, job instability and poor 
working conditions (Dynan et al. 2007, Pennycook et al. 2013) 





As low pay continues to be one of the important features of employment in the UK, the 
phenonmenon of the ’working poor’ has been attracting greater attention in the recent years. 
An individual is defined as being a member of the working poor if they are in employment but 
remain below a defined poverty threshold. The Office for National Statistics indicates that in 
2013 the proportion of all paid employees (working at least 15 hours per week) who are ’poor’ 
(below a low-income threshold of 60% of the national median equivalised income) is 8% of 
people in employment, equivalent to around 3 million people.In this paper, we focus on the 
United Kingdom as a country which has some important differences to other countries which 
may have an effect on the relationship between labour market exclusion and insecurity and 
later poverty outcomes. The main difference in the legal system (common law in the UK versus 
civil law in the continental Europe), is the employment protection legislation (EPL) and 
educational system, the differences in whichcan help shed some light on the strength of the 
relationship between labour market exclusion and insecurity and poverty outcomes in the 
medium term. Compared to the rest of the European Union the employment regulation in the 
UK is the least restrictive5 scoring only 1.6 for permanent workers and 0.5 for temporary 
workers on a scale ranging from 0 (least restrictive) to 6 (most restrictive) for the OECD EPL 
indicator. For a comparison, the most restrictive EPL is in Belgium (2.99 for permanent 
workers) followed by Germany (2.84), and the least restrictive after the UK are Estonia, 
Hungary and Ireland (both at 2.1), albeit the EPL for temporary workers in these countries is 
much higher than in the UK (Ireland 1.2, Hungary 2.0, Estonia 3.0).  
Yet, the UK scores well in terms of workplace related characteristics when workers are 
surveyed about various aspects of their jobs, suggesting that both the common law system 
and actual workplace practices may compensate for weaker regulations (CIPD 2015). 
However, the same report indicates that where the UK scores badly compared to the EU-28 
is in terms of productivity, low pay and integration of young people into the labour market 
(Ibid.). For the latter the literature highlights the importance of the features of the educational 
system such as stratificatification and standardisation. The first one is best represented by the 
case of Germany where a high degree of stratification enables the country to equip young 
people with skills and knowledge which closer match the demands of the labour market. At the 
same time, the high digree of standardisation sends clear signals about job candidates’ 
abilities which facilitate the most beneficial job match. The education system in the UK is more 
liberal, i.e. exhibiting low levels of stratification and weak standardisation. Furthermore, once 
a labour market exclusion episode occurs, what is imporatnt is the avilability of both active and 
passive labour market policies which can mitigate the consequences of the labour market 
shock and facitlitate re-integration. Yet, on this count the UK again stands out compared to the 
EU-28 with total expenditure on both active and passive labour market policies being amongst 
the lowest at 0.68% of GDP (last available data from 2010) compared to 2.13% for EU-28 in 
the same year.6  
This paper uses a unique opportunity offered by the new longitudinal study “Understanding 
Society” (2009-2014) and its life history module to analyse medium-term consequences of 
youth unemployment in terms of poverty. Using a number of both subjective and objective 
poverty measures, as well as job-related intermediate outcomes, we test the following 
hypothesis: 












Past accummulated unemployment experience at the start of the working life (16-34 y.o.) 
undermines one’s socio-economic position irrespective of measure (relative poverty, 
persistent poverty, current bill arrears,degree of material deprivation, or subjective 
evaluation of current financial situation) in the medium term (at age 35-45). 
Hypothesis 2: 
Part of the medium-term effect of past accummulated unemployment experience is 
explained by undermined employement prospects, lower future personal income, and 
downward occupational mobility. 
Hypothesis 3: 
Individual socio-economic position is undermined not only by the length of past 
unemployment experience but also by the number of unemployment spells. 
Hypothesis 4: 
The effect of past accummulated unemployment experience is non-linear with the 
duration in excess of 1 year having most detrimental impact on the individual socio-
economic position in the medium term. 
Hypothesis 5: 
The medium-term effects of the past unemployment experience are particularly 
detrimental for men relative to women. 
Hypothesis 6: 
Labour market exclusion and/or insecurity (measured in terms of temporary or part-time 
employment) is associated with higher poverty outcomes even four years into the future 
and this effect is not entirely explained by individual heterogeneity. 
2. Research Design 
2.1 Data 
The data is constructed from the six waves of the Understanding Society dataset, the UK 
Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS), which has been built on the success of the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This is a new longitudinal prospective survey following up 
annually all members aged 16+ from around 40,000 household interviewed in wave 1. The 
panel started in 2009 and data runs until 2014 for six waves. Individuals (aged 16+) are re-
interviewed annually and are followed up even when they leave the original households to 
form new ones. The survey covers a significant number of topics to enable interdisciplinary 
research on such aspects of life as health, wellbeing, and a range of specific behaviours, 
supplemented by biomarkers for a sub-sample of individuals. 






The analysis relies on three methodological approaches7:  
i. Probit for binary outcomes and OLS for continuous dependent variables to examine 
the impact of employment history between the ages of sixteen and thirty-four on 
poverty related outcomes between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five. The sample for 
this approach consists of those aged between 35 and 45 in waves one and five of 
Understanding Society who are present in the employment history module. 
ii. Probit for binary outcomes and OLS for continuous dependant variables to examine 
the impact of unemployment and job insecurity today (wave one) on measures of 
poverty five years hence (wave six). The data used for approach two consists solely of 
those aged between 16 and 35 in wave one who are also observed in wave six. 
iii. First-difference estimator to uncover the impact of unemployment and job insecurity 
today on poverty outcomes in four years’ time taking into account time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity based on the linear probability model. The data used for this 
approach consists of those aged between 16 and 35 in wave one who are also 
observed in wave five and similarly those aged between 16 and 35 in wave two who 
are also observed in wave six. Ideally, one would have liked to have repeated 
observations for a five year gap, but due to the limitations imposed by data we are 
using a four year gap for the first-difference type estimator in approach three. 
As with all studies in this volume, we are concerned with the impact of adverse labour market 
outcomes when young on poverty in the medium term and therefore model this directly as 
described in approaches two and three. However, due to the unique nature of the data 
available for the UK in Understanding Society an additional approach one is adopted. We 
exploit the fact that in the first and fifth wave of the study the full employment history of a subset 
of the sample is collected.  
For the first approach we follow Nizalova et al. (2016) and use the following specification to 
estimate the impact of unemployment on poverty: 





 + +  ,  (1) 
where  represents a poverty measure (discussed in the next sub-section) for individual  , 
	
ℎ is a vector of variables representing experience of unemployment when young, 
	
ℎ
 is the number of months for which the individual has been in education, 
	
ℎℎ is the number of months for which the individual has had a labour market status 
that is not education, employment or unemployment,  is a vector of key controls (including 
the accummulated number of months in education and economically inactive between ages 
16 and 34),  controls for the year effect (since we pool together individuals from two waves 
when the life history data has been collected) and  is the error term. 
The vector of variables representing unemployment experience from 16 to 34 takes three 
forms: (i) overall accumulated experience of unemployment over the period (converted into 
years for the sake of convenience with reporting the estimates), (ii) the same measure as in 
(i) supplemented by a number of indicator variables describing the number of spells of 
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unemployment experienced in the past (one, two, three, four and more) to allow for capturing 
the effect not only of length of unemployment experience but that of churning in an out of 
employment, and (iii) a vector of indicator variables splitting the duration of accumulated 
unemployment into three categories – 0 months8, 1 to 12 months, 13 months and above – to 
allow for potential non-linearities in the effect. 
Acknowledging the criticism related to the use of one-time current poverty measure (Jenkins 
and Van Kern 2014), we construct two measures of persistent poverty and analyse how they 
are affected by the experience of youth unemployment while young: whether over the course 
of six waves of the survey the individual was in poverty for three or more consecutive waves, 
and the number of waves in which the individual was observed below the poverty line. 
The analysis is performed for the overall sample and separately by gender. When the outcome 
is binary, a probit model is used and rather than reporting the coefficient values the marginal 
effects are calculated9. In all specifications, we apply robust standard errors clustered at the 
household level.  
The second group of estimates approach two: 
,"# =  + $	%, + 
, + &' (, + )*+,	-, + #+,	-, +
, + , (2) 
In this equation, ,"# is the measure of poverty for individual   five periods after the 
observation of the current labour market status. The current labour status can fall into one of 
six categories: $	%, which is represented by a binary variable taking the value of 
one if individual   is unemployed at time . 
, which takes the value of one if the 
respondent reports that they are in education at time . &' (, which indicates that an 
individual is economically inactvie. *+,	-, which captures those in employment on a part-
time basis. +,	-, which takes the value of one if the respondent is employed on a 
temporary contract, and finally, the omitted category which is those employed on a full-time 
basis with a permanent contract. Given this definition the coefficients  to # report the impact 
of the respective labour market status at time  on the poverty measure at time  + 5 relative 
to those who were employed on full-time basis with a permanent contract. , is the vector of 
controls for individual   at time . 
Even though we are analysing the poverty status as a function of past unemployment and job 
insecurity, there is still a possibility that such a relationship is spurious, being determined by 
an unobserved third factor, such as family background. People coming from poor families may 
be lacking work-related habits which make them less employable in the labour market and 
also being more likely to continue on the path of poverty. Such an omitted variable would lead 
to an overestimation of the impact of unemployment on poverty (as low socio-economic family 
background would have a positive effect on poverty status and positive effect on probability of 
being unemployed). Yet, the socio-economic family background is pre-determined before the 
survey takes place and, therefore, can be treated as time invariant unobserved effect . Given 
the data limitations, in this set-up we are only able to estimate the effect of current labour 
market status on poverty outcomes in four years’ time (rather than in five as discussed before). 
Therefore, the corresponding equation takes the following form: 
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 The marginal effects are computed using the margins, dydx(*) command in Stata. 





") =  + $	% + 
, + &' (, + )*+,	-, + #+,	-, +
 +  +  +   ,  = 1,2          (3) 
Applying first difference to equation (3) results in the following: 
∆") = ,"# − ,") = 3∆$	% + 3∆
 + 3∆&' ( + 3)∆*+,	- +
3)∆+,	- + 4∆

 +  + ∆
   (4) 
In words, this equation analyses the change in poverty status between wave five and wave six 
as a function of the one period change in employment status between wave one and wave 
two. This allows for differencing out the time invariant unobserved characteristics which may 
be correlated with the unemployment history and poverty simultaneously (Wooldridge 2010). 
3. Measures  
3.1 Dependent variables 
In this paper poverty is measured in four ways. Firstly, a binary variable which takes the value 
of one if the respondent’s household equivalised income is less than 50% of the median for 
the relevant period10.  
The second measure of poverty used is a binary variable taking the value of one if the 
respondent reports that they are behind with paying their bills. The question states that 
“Sometimes people are not able to pay every household bill when it falls due.” Then asks 
“…are you up to date with all your household bills such as electricity, gas, water rates, 
telephone and other bills or are you behind with any of them?” 
The third measure is that of material deprivation which is a simple count of the number of items 
from a standard list which a respondent fails to report ownership of11. The items which feed in 
to this measure are as follows: colour television, video recorder/DVD player, satellite dish/sky 
TV, cable TV, deep freeze or fridge freezer, washing machine, tumble drier, dish washer, 
microwave oven, home PC, CD player, landline telephone, and mobile telephone. This differs 
from the Eurostat definition since we are unable to identify the reason for a lack of ownership. 
The final measure is subjective, a binary variable taking the value of one if individuals report 
that they are currently just about managing (or better) given their current financial situation. 
Individuals are asked how well would you say you yourself are managing financially these 
days? Responses fall into the following categories: would you say you are… a) living 
comfortably, b) doing alright, c) just getting by, d) finding it quite difficult, e) finding it very 
difficult. 
To supplement these core measures of poverty and try to understand causal pathways, two 
other intermediate outcome variables are considered: the log of total personal income and the 
probability of having one of the considered labour market statuses. To estimate the impact of 
youth unemployment on the latter, the multinomial logit models are used as described in the 
previous section and the average marginal effects are reported only for the one category: those 
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 Estimates based on the poverty line of 60% of the equivalised household median income do not differ 
significantly and are available upon request. The poverty line is estimated using the Understanding 
Society sample and the weights to ensure that it is representative of the national population. 
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respondents are asked: Could you please tell me which of the following items you have in your (part of 
the) accommodation. 





who are unemployed as compared to those employed on a full-time basis with a permanent 
contract.12 
3.2 Variables of interest 
The data used to construct a measure of past unemployment comes from the employment 
history modules present in waves one and five of the Understanding Society dataset. In these 
modules, each individual provides a complete history of his/her employment from entering the 
labour market until the day of the interview. This paper exploits this information to calculate 
two key variables: a count of the number of times that the individual has been unemployed, 
and the sum of the number of months that the individual has been unemployed.  
Since the focus of this study is on youth unemployment, these calculations are restricted 
accordingly. Only employment spells that start between the ages of 16 and 34 are included for 
the purpose of this study. Each total number of months is the sum of three constituent parts. 
Firstly, the number of months between two adjacent employment spells if the employment 
status in the first is unemployed and the second is not. Secondly, the number of months 
between the individual’s current job start month, and the previous status start month if this 
previous spell was a period of unemployment. Also, a variable capturing the number of months 
since the respondent completed full-time education is computed, this measure replaces the 
duration of unemployment if the respondent reports that they have never had a job since the 
completion of their studies. 
As a control, the number of months that the individual was in education over this time or having 
a labour market status other than employment, education or unemployment is also calculated. 
For two other approaches, which involve current employment status, we use a set of indicator 
variables to describe individual’s status at wave t such as unemployment, economically 
inactive, education, temporary employed, or part-time employed, so that the impact on poverty 
outcomes at a later time is estimated relative to full-time permanent employment. 
3.3 Control variables 
The richness of the data available allows for a comprehensive vector of controls contained in 
 to be added to the model. These controls are: age and its square, a categorical variable for 
the region of residence, a dummy variable taking the value of one if the respondent has 
children aged under sixteen, a dummy variable taking the value of one if the respondents 
father was unemployed when the respondent was fourteen years old and a similar variable for 
the mother, a binary variable taking the value of one if the respondent had a degree level 
qualification by the time they are aged thirty-five, a binary variable taking the value of one if 
the respondent is female (for the combined sample only), a categorical variable for ethnicity, 
a binary variable taking the value of one if the respondent lives in a rural area (defined as a 
settlement with a population of less than 10,000 people), an indicator variable for whether the 
respondent had been married prior to age thirty-five and a categorical variable for the 
individual’s occupational class. The final variable in this list is not always present and as such 
it will be made clear when the specification includes this control. 
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4.1 Analysis based on employment history data 
 
Table I provides summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis based on the 
employment history data for the individuals aged 35 to 45 observed in waves one and five. As 
can be seen, 9.3% of the sample live in households with equivalised income which is less than 
50% of median equivalised household income. The number of items individuals report not 
having in their possession is close to three, while their monthly personal income is on average 
2,253 pounds in 2015/16 constant prices, with females being slightly less likely to be poor 
based on the household income measure and that of material deprivation, while being more 
likely to report being behind with paying bills and less likely to view their financial situation as 
manageable or better. 79% of individuals in the sample experienced unemployment while 
being young (16-34 years old), with a considerable higher proportion found amongst females 
(82.5% vs. 74.3% amongst males). On average, the accumulated experience of 
unemployment is almost six months (7.6 for males and 4.8 for females), while experience with 
not being economically active is 19.3 months (5.1 months for males and 29.6 months for 
females, reflecting withdrawal from the labour market related to childbearing). Most of the 
unemployment experience comes from one spell (15.5% of the sample) with 3.7% 
experiencing two spells of unemployment, 1.2% - three spells, and only 0.5% having four or 
more spells of unemployment while young (women experience fewer spells of unemployment). 
Most of the individuals in the sample have accumulated unemployment experience of one to 
twelve months 9.1% compared to the 6.5% with an accumulated unemployment experience in 
excess of one year. At the time of the survey respondents are approximately 40 years old, 
42% are male, 18.9% live in rural areas, 69% have children, 32% have obtained at least a 
bachelors’ degree and been married prior to age 35. 7.6% had their father unemployed and 
36.2% had their mother unemployed when being 14 years old. The overall sample consists of 
6,864 individuals – 2,890 males and 3,974 females. 
Table II presents results of the analysis for four measures of poverty, total personal income 
and the probability of unemployed compared to full-time permanent employment at the time of 
the survey for individuals in the 35-45 age group. Positive coefficients imply detrimental effects 
of unemployment for the measures of relative poverty, arrears with bills and material 
deprivation, while for the probability of managing well or better with the current financial 
situation the negative effect means that people are feeling poorer. Odd-numbered columns 
present results without controlling for occupation, while the even numbered columns add 
occupation class to the vector of controls. This approach allows one to test whether the effect 
of youth unemployment is partially explained by downward occupational mobility. Panels (A), 
(B) and (C) correspond to different specifications of past unemployment experience. 
Considering odd numbered columns in the first panel (A), we see that the impact of past 
unemployment is quite consistent across all measures of poverty: longer accumulated 
unemployment prior to age 35 results in a higher probability of being poor and being behind in 
paying the bills, higher material deprivation and lower probability of reporting that they are just 
about managing (or better) given their current financial situation, confirming Hypothesis 1.  
This effect is partially explained by lower personal income and higher probability of landing 
into unemployment at age 35 or later. Odd numbered columns show that the estimated effect 
is partially explained by downward occupational mobility as controlling for current occupation 





at least halves the magnitude of the effect, and it becomes almost zero when the probability 
of having arrears is considered. These three findings confirm Hypothesis 2. 
Panel B of Table II provides a test for Hypothesis 3 by investigating whether the number of 
spells contributes anything to the detrimental effect on poverty above that from accumulated 
length of unemployment experience. Indeed, as column (1) suggests, having 12 months of 
unemployment experience in one go increases an individual’s likelihood of being poor by 2.3 
percentage points (0.004+0.019), while if the same 12 months experience of unemployment 
was accumulated from two spells, the effect is 6.3 percentage points higher likelihood of being 
poor (0.004+0.059), and having four or more spells leads to 10.3 percentage points effect 
(0.004+0.099). A similar situation is observed for other measures of poverty, with the exception 
that for reporting manageable or better financial situation when having three, four or more 
spells does not have any more detrimental effect. At the same time, the analysis of personal 
income and unemployment status shows that the negative effect of the accumulated duration 
of unemployment is exacerbated by churning in and out of employment. Similar to the basic 
case, the estimated effects become smaller once current occupational controls are added or 
completely disappear as in the case for personal income. 
Panel C defines past unemployment experience as a vector of indicators for the duration of 
unemployment 1-12 months, and 13 months and over, to allow for a non-linear impact and 
testing Hypothesis 4. This specification clearly shows that mostly the impact of long 
accumulated unemployment experience (in excess of one year) is preserved in the medium 
term perspective. 
Table III and Table IV repeat the analysis presented in Table II for men and women separately. 
Similarly to the earlier EXCEPT research on health13, the impact of accumulated 
unemployment experience on poverty outcomes is somewhat weaker for women than it is for 
men, but the difference is not statistically significant. Thus, the evidence does not support 
Hypothesis 5. This holds for both findings on the impact of the duration of unemployment and 
the number of spells. 
Figure I through Figure IV summarise the findings for one measure of poverty – relative poverty 
– across the specifications following approach one. 
4.2 Poverty Persistence Analysis 
Table V portrays the results from the estimation of the impact of youth unemployment and job 
insecurity on the persistence of poverty from a medium term perspective. Longer accumulated 
unemployment experience increases the likelihood of being poor in any three consecutive 
waves across the sample period (Column (1)) and increases the number of waves in which 
one is coded as being poor. In both cases, the effect is driven entirely by the impact of 
unemployment experience being longer than one year during the period from 16 to 34 years 
old. 
4.3 Pooled OLS Analysis 
VI combines results for all the poverty outcomes and intermediate outcomes from the 
estimation approach 2, described above. In this approach the labour market status both in 
terms of exclusion and insecurity is related to the poverty outcomes in five years, which means 
that all the coefficients show the impact of a particular status on poverty outcomes relative to 









full-time worker in a permanent position. Again, the odd-numbered columns are reporting 
results without controlling for occupation at time period (t+5), while even-numbered column – 
with. Column (1), for example, reveals that compared to the full-time permanent employment, 
all other statuses with respect to labour market are associated with higher likelihood of poverty 
five years into the future. The impact of having a part-time job is the smallest, increasing the 
likelihood of poverty by 1.6 percentage points an effect which is not statistically significant, 
followed by the impact of temporary employment (3.2 p.p.) and education (4.2 p.p.) with the 
impact of being economically inactive of 4.2 p.p. while being unemployed having a much higher 
6.3 percentage point effect. While the effect of part-time employment is statistically 
insignificant, all other effects are significant at the 5% level. For the probability of having 
arrears on current bills neither education nor insecure jobs have any statistically significant 
effect. For this measure being unemployed has the largest impact, followed by being 
economically inactive (7.5 p.p. vs. 7.0 p.p). Material deprivation is affected the worst by 
unemployment (being deprived of 0.615 more items on average, which being about one 
quarter of the mean), followed by economically inactive (0.427), education (0.213) and 
temporary employment (0.250), with part-time employment having no effect. In terms of 
subjective poverty, only unemployment, being economically inactive and education have 
significant effects. As can be seen from Columns (9)-(11), part of the impact is also explained 
by the lower total personal income and higher likelihood of being unemployed. 
Comparing results in even-numbered columns to those in odd-numbered ones, it is also 
evident, that similar to the findings based on the employment history data, up to half of the 
effect is driven by downward mobility as including occupational controls in period (t+5) results 
in up to 50% smaller sizes of the coefficients, but they never disappear. As before, the effects 
are larger for males than they are for females (see Tables VII-VIII). Figure V summarises the 
findings from Table VITable VIII. In this case, a significant gender difference is observed for 
the unemployment and being inactive compared to having full-time permanent position, with 
men suffering much more negative impact. 
4.4 Fixed Effect Analysis 
Table IX presents the results of the fixed effects estimation of Equation (3). There are two 
variations to these model to be aware of, when comparing these results to the earlier findings. 
First of all, to implement fixed effects approach we switch to (t+4) instead of (t+5) time lag. 
This is to ensure repeat observation for the same individual and allow the differencing out of 
individual specific time-invariant fixed effects. At the moment there are only six waves of the 
Understanding Society survey. So, we fit a change in labour market status from wave 1 to 
wave 2 to the change in poverty status from wave 5 to wave 6. Second, we use the linear 
probability model. As can be seen, the estimates from the FE estimations are not statistically 
significant in almost all of the specifications. And although, as Column (12) shows, there is a 
significant effect of labour market exclusion and job insecurity on future unemployment, this 
does not translate into any effects in terms of poverty outcomes with one exception on the 
probability of reporting a manageable current financial situation as a result of part-time 
employment four years before. This suggests that most of the effect is due to unobserved 
heterogeneity, i.e. that there are time invariant factors because of which people are both 
unemployed and poor in the future. However, disaggregated analysis by gender reveals the 
following: While the general results are preserved for men (odd numbered columns in Table 
X), this is not the case for women: even though there is no effect on female relative poverty 
(Column (2)), unemployment does increase the probability of being behind on paying the bills 
(Column (4)), as well as increases material deprivation (Column (6)) and decreases personal 





income. Being in part time employment also decreases the probability of reporting manageable 
financial situation and personal income. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to support 
Hypothesis 6, as within a four-year timeframe individual heterogeneity does explain a 
significant (all in the case of men) share of the effect. However, these findings are only 
indicative due to the small number of years available and, as a result, small within variation in 
the variables, to estimate medium term effects controlling for unobserved hetergogeneity. 
Thus, more research would be needed in the future along these lines. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the effect of early life labour market exclusion and job 
insecurity (ages 16-34) on a range of medium term poverty measures (ages 35-45) and 
intermediate outcomes. The direction of this effect is not clear a priori and remains an empirical 
question. We tested this in the context of the UK, a country that in recent years compares 
favourably to her EU peers in terms of youth unemployment but has observed an increasing 
level of insecure employment and overall has a history of poor labour market integration of 
youth. 
Making use of the special employment history module of Understanding Society, the most 
recent and comprehensive longitudinal survey, we find evidence in support of the hypothesis 
that early life labour market exclusion and job insecurity are associated with an increased 
poverty in the medium term. Longer accumulated unemployment experience is associated with 
a higher probability of being poor at the age 35-45. Similarly, the greater the number of 
unemployment spells (more instances of entering and exiting the labour market), the higher is 
the probability of being in poverty. The highest effect on poverty is estimated in the case of 
unemployment lasting over a year. The findings are consistent across a range of poverty 
measures, including having income less than the 50% of median equivalised household 
income14, material deprivation, having arrears with paying the bills, and reporting household 
financial situation as being manageable or better. 
We have also explored possible pathways for this effect and found that part of the effect could 
be explained by reduced personal income and higher chances of being unemployed that result 
from early life unemployment. In addition, when controlling for occupation, the estimated effect 
of labour market exclusion (being unemployed or economically inactive) and job insecurity 
(having part-time or temporary job) on medium-term poverty are reduced suggesting that early 
life unemployment is associated with a downward occupational mobility path resulting in 
poverty in the medium-term. 
Youth unemployment experience does not only lead to a greater chance of being poor as 
documented by a snapshot at the time of interview, but also to persistent poverty later in life.  
We have also investigated the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on the estimates, albeit 
the results cannot be applied to the findings based on the unemployment history data, since 
they are only spanning across 4 year period. However, as the association between the labout 
market exclusion and insecurity and poverty four years later is substantially weakened for 
women and becomes not statistically significant for men. This suggests that within this 
timespan both life ooutcomes – unemployment/insecure job and poverty – move together for 
some types of people. Perhaps those who are coming from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Further research is needed to identify casual part of the effect as well as the risk factors which 
determine this double burden. This is particularly important for policy development, as knowing 
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these risk factors may help targeting youth who are at risk of being unemployed when young 
and poor later on with support programmes earlier in their life. 
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TABLE I SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLE BASED ON EMPLOYMENT HISTORY 
Variable 
All Male Female 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Poverty 0.093  0.101  0.087  
Arrears 0.083  0.079  0.085  
Material Deprivation 2.785 1.687 2.852 1.761 2.736 1.629 
Fin Situation manageable 0.852  0.862  0.844  
Personal Monthly Income 2,252.96 1,812.88 2,754.79 2,073.70 1,888.01 1,494.60 
No unemployment experience 0.790  0.743  0.825  
Months Unemployed 5.940 29.859 7.563 33.666 4.759 26.694 
Months Other 19.325 50.729 5.134 27.942 29.645 60.205 
Number of Unemployment Spells 
      
0 0.790  0.743  0.825  
1 0.155  0.119  0.279  
2 0.037  0.180  0.137  
3 0.012  0.052  0.027  
4+ 0.005  0.017  0.009  
Unemployment Category 
      
0 Months 0.844  0.802  0.875  
1 to 12 Months 0.091  0.113  0.075  
13+ Months 0.065  0.085  0.050  
Age 40.184 3.153 40.162 3.133 40.200 3.168 
Male 0.421      
Rural 0.189  0.183  0.193  
Children 0.691 0.462 0.639 0.480 0.728 0.445 
Degree 0.323  0.335  0.314  
Married 0.619  0.654  0.594  
Dad Unemp 0.076  0.072  0.080  
Mum Unemp 0.362  0.378  0.351  
N 6,864 2,890 3,974 
 





TABLE II IMPACT OF CUMULATIVE YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE (16-34) ON POVERTY AT AGE 35-45 
  Pr(Poverty) Pr(Arrears) MatDep Pr(FinSit) LogTotPersInc Pr(Unemp)
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(A) 12m Unemployment
 
0.006*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.047*** 0.020** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.091*** -0.040*** 0.013*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.012) (0.001) 
(B) 
12m Unemployment 
0.004*** 0.003** 0.001 0.000 0.031*** 0.013 -0.004** -0.001 -0.072*** -0.036*** 0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.014) (0.013) (0.000) 
Spell No. 1 
0.019** 0.004 0.028*** 0.012 0.125** 0.034 -0.060*** -0.036*** -0.247*** -0.061 0.155*** 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.056) (0.055) (0.013) (0.012) (0.054) (0.048) (0.011) 
Spell No. 2 
0.059*** 0.029* 0.025 0.000 0.493*** 0.311*** -0.091*** -0.046** -0.424*** -0.065 0.211*** 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.113) (0.111) (0.026) (0.023) (0.122) (0.106) (0.025) 
Spell No. 3 
0.006 -0.017 0.103** 0.069* 0.348* 0.173 -0.076* -0.033 -0.428** -0.081 0.200*** 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.041) (0.036) (0.202) (0.197) (0.042) (0.037) (0.206) (0.182) (0.042) 
Spell No. 4+ 
0.099** 0.055 0.171** 0.111* 0.843*** 0.571** -0.038 0.018 -0.533* 0.010 0.198*** 
(0.049) (0.043) (0.070) (0.060) (0.259) (0.280) (0.064) (0.050) (0.282) (0.244) (0.062) 
(C) 
Dur. 1 to 12m 
-0.003 -0.009 -0.014 -0.017* -0.052 -0.079 -0.004 0.003 -0.128** -0.062 0.090*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.060) (0.060) (0.015) (0.014) (0.061) (0.053) (0.013) 
Dur. 13m+ 
0.066*** 0.029** 0.057*** 0.021 0.546*** 0.317*** -0.097*** -0.042** -0.712*** -0.269*** 0.239*** 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.087) (0.086) (0.020) (0.017) (0.094) (0.081) (0.021) 
 N 6,864 





Table II Note: The results in this table use the following control variables for results labelled with even numbers: months of education between 16 & 34, months 
where employment status not education or employment between 16 & 34, age & it’s square, uk region of residence, number of children under 16, parent’s 
employment status when respondent 14, if the respondent has a degree-level qualification, gender, ethnicity, whether the individual lives in a rural area, whether 
the respondent has ever been married and time effects. Those with odd numbers add the individuals current occupation code to the vector of controls. 
TABLE III IMPACT OF CUMULATIVE YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE (16-34) ON POVERTY AT AGE 35-45, MALES 
  Pr(Poverty) Pr(Arrears) MatDep Pr(FinSit) LogTotPersInc Pr(Unemp)
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(A) 12m Unemployment
 
0.006*** 0.002* 0.004*** 0.000 0.051*** 0.019 -0.010*** -0.003* -0.110*** -0.040** 0.014*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.019) (0.001) 
(B) 
12m Unemployment 
0.004*** 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.033** 0.012 -0.008*** -0.003 -0.086*** -0.035* 0.006*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.021) (0.001) 
Spell No. 1 
0.025* 0.006 0.017 -0.008 0.132* 0.037 -0.043** -0.008 -0.329*** -0.108 0.138*** 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.079) (0.079) (0.018) (0.016) (0.080) (0.069) (0.015) 
Spell No. 2 
0.063*** 0.031 0.032 -0.003 0.526*** 0.359** -0.116*** -0.058** -0.417** -0.053 0.170*** 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.148) (0.147) (0.033) (0.029) (0.168) (0.142) (0.028) 
Spell No. 3 
0.008 -0.019 0.041 0.001 0.372 0.175 -0.049 0.006 -0.579* -0.164 0.230*** 
(0.034) (0.029) (0.043) (0.033) (0.272) (0.271) (0.051) (0.041) (0.299) (0.272) (0.058) 
Spell No. 4+ 
0.101* 0.055 0.129* 0.065 1.100*** 0.821** -0.026 0.038 -0.628* 0.043 0.234*** 
(0.056) (0.050) (0.075) (0.062) (0.325) (0.357) (0.068) (0.046) (0.326) (0.294) (0.077) 
(C) 
Dur. 1 to 6m 
0.002 -0.008 -0.024* -0.034*** 0.042 0.002 -0.016 0.001 -0.196** -0.070 0.097*** 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.088) (0.089) (0.020) (0.018) (0.086) (0.073) (0.018) 
Dur. 13m+ 
0.069*** 0.022 0.067*** 0.011 0.626*** 0.347*** -0.144*** -0.052** -0.777*** -0.148 0.267*** 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.022) (0.018) (0.116) (0.117) (0.028) (0.024) (0.129) (0.113) (0.028) 
 N 2,890 
Note: The vector of controls is identical to the model for both genders with the obvious exclusion of controlling for gender. 





TABLE IV IMPACT OF CUMULATIVE YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE (16-34) ON POVERTY AT AGE 35-45, FEMALES 
  Pr(Poverty) Pr(Arrears) MatDep Pr(FinSit) LogTotPersInc Pr(Unemp)
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(A) 12m Unemployment
 
0.005*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.001 0.041*** 0.019 -0.002 0.001 -0.066*** -0.026* 0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.013) (0.001) 
(B) 
12m Unemployment 
0.004*** 0.003** 0.001 0.000 0.028** 0.014 0.002 0.004 -0.051*** -0.025* 0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.014) (0.001) 
Spell No. 1 
0.016 0.003 0.037** 0.024* 0.122 0.030 -0.076*** -0.055*** -0.195*** -0.012 0.181*** 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.076) (0.074) (0.019) (0.018) (0.070) (0.064) (0.016) 
Spell No. 2 
0.0536* 0.025 0.012 -0.008 0.439** 0.238 -0.045 -0.008 -0.404** -0.026 0.261 
(0.028) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.179) (0.175) (0.037) (0.032) (0.167) (0.148) (0.041) 
Spell No. 3 
0.007 -0.013 0.168** 0.138** 0.336 0.188 -0.101 -0.067 -0.257 0.015 0.169*** 
(0.036) (0.030) (0.068) (0.065) (0.301) (0.279) (0.067) (0.064) (0.262) (0.215) (0.052) 
Spell No. 4+ 
0.123 0.071 0.291** 0.219* 0.094 -0.199 -0.021 0.027 0.220 0.721** 0.096 
(0.102) (0.081) (0.148) (0.132) (0.182) (0.239) (0.132) (0.108) (0.470) (0.342) (0.081) 
(C) 
Dur. 1 to 6m 
-0.005 -0.008 -0.001 -0.002 -0.130 -0.151* 0.004 0.007 -0.079 -0.037 0.079*** 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.081) (0.080) (0.022) (0.021) (0.085) (0.074) (0.018) 
Dur. 13m+ 
0.062*** 0.033* 0.042* 0.019 0.444*** 0.271** -0.036 -0.005 -0.602*** -0.273** 0.212*** 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) (0.131) (0.128) (0.027) (0.024) (0.132) (0.113) (0.029) 
 N 3,974 
Note: The vector of controls is identical to the model for both genders with the obvious exclusion of controlling for gender. 
 
 





TABLE V IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF MONTHS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BETWEEN 16 & 34 ON POVERTY PERSISTENCE BETWEEN 35 & 45 
 Pr(Persistent Poverty)20 
(1)
 






   







Notes: The results in this table use the following control variables: number of months in education between 16 & 34, number of months not in 
employment or education between 16& 34, age & it’s square, uk region of residence, number of children under 16, parent’s employment status when 
respondent 14, if the respondent has a degree-level qualification, gender, ethnicity, whether the individual lives in a rural area, and whether the 
respondent has ever been married.  
  
                                               
20
 Between waves one and six the respondent had an equivalised household income less than 50% of the relevant national median for three consecutive waves. 
21
 Between waves one and six the number of times that the respondent had an equivalised household income that was less than 50% of the relevant national 
median. 





TABLE VI IMPACT OF CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS ON POVERTY FIVE YEARS IN THE FUTURE 
 Pr(Povertyt+5) Pr(Arrearst+5) MatDept+5 Pr(FinSitt+5) LogTotPersInct+5 Pr(Unempt+5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Unempt 
0.063*** 0.044*** 0.075*** 0.045*** 0.615*** 0.504*** -0.076*** -0.039** -0.808*** -0.103 0.187*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.102) (0.105) (0.017) (0.016) (0.093) (0.086) (0.019) 
Econ. 
Inactivet 
0.042*** 0.024* 0.070*** 0.038*** 0.427*** 0.305*** -0.069*** -0.029** -0.967*** -0.164** 0.107*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.076) (0.080) (0.014) (0.013) (0.080) (0.078) (0.016) 
Educt 
0.042*** 0.038*** 0.003 -0.005 0.213** 0.184* -0.033** -0.021 -0.460*** -0.265*** 0.059*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.099) (0.10) (0.015) (0.016) (0.085) (0.074) (0.012) 
Temp Empt 
0.032** 0.031* 0.021 0.022 0.250** 0.228** -0.026 -0.022 -0.382*** -0.288*** 0.017 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.110) (0.111) (0.017) (0.019) (0.101) (0.088) (0.012) 
P-T Empt 
0.016 0.014 0.007 0.002 0.071 0.067 -0.007 0.003 -0.465*** -0.340*** 0.036*** 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.073) (0.073) (0.011) (0.012) (0.063) (0.056) (0.011) 
N 5,407 
Note: The results in this table use the following control variables for results labelled with even numbers: age & it’s square, uk region of residence, number of 
children under 16, parent’s employment status when respondent 14, if the respondent has a degree-level qualification, gender, ethnicity, whether the individual 
lives in a rural area, and whether the respondent has ever been married. Those with odd numbers add the individuals occupation code at t+5 to the vector of 
controls. 
 





TABLE VII IMPACT OF CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS ON POVERTY FIVE YEARS IN THE FUTURE, MALES 
 Pr(Povertyt+5) Pr(Arrearst+5) MatDept+5 Pr(FinSitt+5) LogTotPersInct+5 Pr(Unempt+5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Unempt 
0.113*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.048** 0.802*** 0.645*** -0.110*** -0.048** -1.029*** -0.162 0.262*** 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.152) (0.157) (0.027) (0.023) (0.141) (0.122) (0.032) 
Econ. 
Inactivet 
0.095** 0.065 0.124*** 0.070* 0.974*** 0.761** -0.122** -0.041 -0.874*** 0.379 0.226*** 
(0.045) (0.042) (0.048) (0.040) (0.308) (0.310) (0.048) (0.036) (0.246) (0.247) (0.057) 
Educt 
0.084*** 0.076*** 0.003 -0.005 0.487*** 0.445*** -0.055** -0.030 -0.627*** -0.278** 0.084*** 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.017) (0.017) (0.156) (0.159) (0.026) (0.025) (0.155) (0.130) (0.022) 
Temp Empt 
0.026 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.242 0.216 -0.029 -0.024 -0.308** -0.220** 0.031* 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.165) (0.164) (0.024) (0.025) (0.125) (0.101) (0.018) 
P-T Empt 
0.040 0.033 0.000 -0.008 0.318* 0.256 -0.0592* -0.040 -0.504*** -0.281*** 0.060** 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.022) (0.021) (0.190) (0.190) (0.032) (0.029) (0.128) (0.106) (0.028) 
N 2,090 









TABLE VIII IMPACT OF CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS ON POVERTY FIVE YEARS IN THE FUTURE, FEMALES 
 Pr(Povertyt+5) Pr(Arrearst+5) MatDept+5 Pr(FinSitt+5) LogTotPersInct+5 Pr(Unempt+5) 
 (1) (2)22 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Unempt 
0.030* 0.017 0.071*** 0.042* 0.513*** 0.430*** -0.056** -0.027 -0.546*** 0.105 0.136*** 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.130) (0.132) (0.023) (0.022) (0.121) (0.119) (0.022) 
Econ. Activet 
0.031** 0.017 0.068*** 0.038** 0.345*** 0.253*** -0.057*** -0.026 -0.912*** -0.218** 0.073*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.087) (0.091) (0.017) (0.017) (0.096) (0.092) (0.015) 
Educt 
0.021 0.019 0.003 -0.006 0.066 0.044 -0.019 -0.012 -0.321*** -0.176** 0.051*** 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.123) (0.124) (0.019) (0.020) (0.095) (0.086) (0.014) 
Temp Empt 
0.044** 0.046** 0.023 0.025 0.284** 0.266* -0.020 -0.014 -0.399*** -0.297** 0.011 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.145) (0.146) (0.025) (0.027) (0.153) (0.136) (0.016) 
P-T Empt 
0.009 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.010 0.024 0.010 0.018 -0.434*** -0.321*** 0.028** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.084) (0.085) (0.013) (0.014) (0.080) (0.073) (0.012) 
N 3,317 




                                               
22
 Only 3,285 usable observations due to insufficient variation within occupational code 8. 





TABLE IX IMPACT OF CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS ON POVERTY FOUR YEARS IN THE FUTURE, FE APPROACH 
 Pr(Povertyt+4) Pr(Arrearst+4) MatDept+4 Pr(FinSitt+4) LogTotPersInct+4 Pr(Unempt+4) 
 POLS FE POLS FE POLS FE POLS FE POLS FE POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Unempt 




-0.036 0.167*** 0.379** 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.01) (0.023) (0.070) (0.090) (0.013) (0.024) (0.061) (0.109) (0.012) (0.155) 
Econ. 
Inactivet 




-0.131 0.096*** 0.844 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.019) (0.052) (0.080) (0.011) (0.022) (0.053) (0.090) (0.011) (0.438) 
Educt 
0.024*** -0.024 0.001 -0.031 0.154** 0.045 -0.008 0.016 -
0.739*** 
-0.168 0.059*** 0.271*** 
(0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.021) (0.068) (0.096) (0.010) (0.022) (0.067) (0.129) (0.008) (0.124) 
Temp 
Empt 
0.028** -0.007 0.023* -0.003 0.194*** -0.141* -0.034** 0.007 -
0.385*** 
-0.020 0.020** 0.327** 
(0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.070) (0.081) (0.013) (0.020) (0.070) (0.094) (0.009) (0.186) 
P-T Empt 
0.008 0.003 0.018** -0.013 0.099** -0.052 -0.023** -0.033* -
0.515*** 
-0.111 0.030*** 0.519 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.050) (0.069) (0.009) (0.018) (0.044) (0.082) (0.007) (0.271) 
N  11,562 
Note: For all specifications in this model the following vector of time-variant controls are used: uk region of residence, number of children under 16, if the 









TABLE X IMPACT OF CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS ON POVERTY FOUR YEARS IN THE FUTURE, FE APPROACH, BY GENDER 
 Pr(Povertyt+4) Pr(Arrearst+4) MatDept+4 Pr(FinSitt+4) LogTotPersInct+4 
 Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Unempt 
-0.016 0.016 -0.043 0.063* 0.000 0.203* 0.026 -0.007 0.224 -0.261* 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.032) (0.034) (0.146) (0.110) (0.033) (0.035) (0.168) (0.146) 
Econ. 
Inactivet 
0.038 0.002 -0.120 0.002 0.108 0.082 0.015 -0.029 -0.144 -0.201** 
(0.041) (0.013) (0.082) (0.020) (0.358) (0.088) (0.106) (0.024) (0.393) (0.097) 
Educt 
-0.012 -0.030* -0.016 -0.042 -0.101 0.106 0.035 0.008 -0.033 -0.223 
(0.027) (0.018) (0.032) (0.029) (0.155) (0.120) (0.038) (0.028) (0.195) (0.172) 
Temp 
Empt 
0.003 -0.011 0.029 -0.025 -0.181 -0.112 -0.039 0.035 -0.087 0.043 
(0.030) (0.021) (0.030) (0.016) (0.120) (0.109) (0.032) (0.025) (0.138) (0.126) 
P-T Empt 
0.005 0.003 0.015 -0.014 -0.173 -0.004 0.017 -0.052** 0.146 -0.211** 
(0.028) (0.012) (0.030) (0.017) (0.146) (0.079) (0.031) (0.021) (0.163) (0.096) 
N 11,562 
Note: The vector of controls is identical to the model for both genders. The fixed effect multinomial logit model is only able to use observations for 
which there is within variation. Given the persistent nature of employment status, there is insufficient within variation to estimate the model separately 
for each gender sample. 
  





FIGURE I MARGINAL EFFECT OF CUMULATIVE MONTHS UNEMPLOYED (16-34) ON POVERTY 
AT AGE 35-45 (PANEL A, COLUMN 1, TABLES II, III, IV) 
Notes: In all figures the dot denote the estimated marginal effect and the whiskers capture the 95% 
confidence interval. In figures 3,4 and 5 the 95% confidence interval is plotted only for estimates using 
the full sample. 
 
FIGURE II MARGINAL EFFECT OF CUMULATIVE MONTHS UNEMPLOYED (16-34) ON POVERTY 





























FIGURE III MARGINAL EFFECT OF NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYMENT SPELLS (16-34) ON POV-
ERTY AT AGE 35-45 (PANEL B, COLUMN 1, TABLES II, III, IV) 
 
 
FIGURE IV MARGINAL EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT SPELL LENGTH (16-34) ON POVERTY AT 
































FIGURE V MARGINAL EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT TYPE IN WAVE ONE (16-35) ON POVERTY 




















TABLE I.I: EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SUMMARY TABLE 
Variable 
All  Male  Female 
Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Poverty 0.093   0.101   0.087  
Arrears 0.083   0.079   0.085  
Mat Dep 2.785 1.687  2.852 1.761  2.736 1.629 
Fin Sit 0.852   0.862   0.844  
Inc 2252.96 1812.88  2754.79 2073.70  1888.01 1494.60 
Emp Stat  
        
FT Perm Emp 0.565   0.784   0.405  
Unemp 0.054   0.061   0.048  
Econ. Inactive 0.152   0.053   0.223  
Educ 0.006   0.005   0.007  
Temp FT Emp 0.044   0.044   0.044  
PT Perm Emp 0.180   0.053   0.273  
Occupation Code 
        
0 0.212   0.119   0.279  
1 0.138   0.189   0.101  
2 0.117   0.139   0.101  
3 0.138   0.139   0.138  
4 0.084   0.042   0.116  
5 0.068   0.136   0.018  
6 0.080   0.023   0.121  
7 0.041   0.024   0.053  
8 0.052   0.111   0.010  
9 0.070   0.119   0.064  
Months Unemployed 5.940 29.859  7.563 33.666  4.759 26.694 
Months Other 19.325 50.729  5.134 27.942  29.645 60.205 
Months Education 15.622 38.171  15.860 37.071  15.448 38.955 
Number of Spells 
        
0 0.790   0.743   0.825  
1 0.155   0.180   0.137  
2 0.037   0.052   0.027  
3 0.012   0.017   0.009  
4+ 0.005   0.008   0.002  
Unemployment Category 
        
0 Months 0.844   0.802   0.875  
1 to 12 Months 0.091   0.113   0.075  
13+ Months 0.065   0.085   0.050  
  





TABLE I.I (CONT.): EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SUMMARY TABLE 
Variable All  Male  Female 
Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 






        
















































































Male 0.421  
 -   -  
Ethnicity 
        



































         
N 6,864  2,890  3,974 
 
  





TABLE I.II: EMPLOYMENT STATUS SUMMARY TABLE – POLS 
Variable All  Male  Female 
Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Mat Dep t+5 2.903 1.648  2.897 1.679  2.907 1.628 
Fin Sit t+5 0.918 0.274  0.928 0.259  0.913 0.283 
Poverty t+5 0.067 0.250  0.078 0.269  0.060 0.237 
Inc t+5 1909.38 1626.10  2341.07 1918.73  1637.38 1341.65 
Arrears t+5 0.077 0.266  0.061 0.239  0.087 0.281 
Emp Stat t+5 
        
FT Perm Emp 0.537 0.499  0.760 0.427  0.396 0.489 
Unemp 0.068 0.251  0.076 0.265  0.062 0.241 
Econ. Inactive 0.153 0.360  0.027 0.163  0.232 0.422 
Educ 0.038 0.191  0.033 0.179  0.041 0.198 
Temp FT Emp 0.050 0.219  0.051 0.220  0.050 0.218 
PT Perm Emp 0.155 0.362  0.052 0.222  0.219 0.414 
Occupation Code t+5 
        
0 0.258 0.438  0.136 0.343  0.335 0.472 
1 0.101 0.302  0.144 0.351  0.075 0.263 
2 0.122 0.328  0.145 0.352  0.108 0.310 
3 0.142 0.350  0.157 0.364  0.133 0.340 
4 0.074 0.262  0.050 0.218  0.090 0.286 
5 0.055 0.227  0.123 0.329  0.011 0.105 
6 0.082 0.275  0.025 0.156  0.118 0.323 
7 0.063 0.243  0.058 0.234  0.066 0.249 
8 0.037 0.188  0.080 0.271  0.010 0.098 
9 0.065 0.246  0.082 0.274  0.054 0.227 
Emp Stat t 
        
FT Perm Emp 0.433 0.496  0.594 0.491  0.396 0.489 
Unemp 0.080 0.271  0.093 0.291  0.071 0.258 
Econ. Inactive 0.151 0.358  0.025 0.157  0.230 0.421 
Educ 0.168 0.374  0.182 0.386  0.159 0.365 
Temp FT Emp 0.052 0.222  0.059 0.236  0.048 0.213 















TABLE I.II (CONT.): EMPLOYMENT STATUS SUMMARY TABLE – POLS 
Variable All  Male  Female 
Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 26.815 5.800  26.627 5.946  26.933 5.704 
UK Region 
        
1 0.048 0.214  0.056 0.231  0.098 0.202 
2 0.112 0.316  0.111 0.314  0.113 0.317 
3 0.098 0.298  0.099 0.298  0.098 0.297 
4 0.080 0.271  0.078 0.267  0.081 0.273 
5 0.094 0.292  0.102 0.303  0.089 0.285 
6 0.081 0.273  0.080 0.272  0.082 0.274 
7 0.155 0.362  0.156 0.363  0.154 0.361 
8 0.116 0.320  0.115 0.319  0.116 0.321 
9 0.072 0.258  0.068 0.252  0.074 0.262 
10 0.045 0.208  0.041 0.198  0.048 0.214 
11 0.055 0.229  0.056 0.229  0.055 0.229 
12 0.043 0.203  0.039 0.194  0.046 0.208 
Children 0.417 0.493  0.288 0.453  0.499 0.500 
Dad Unemp 0.091 0.288  0.080 0.271  0.098 0.298 
Mum Unemp 0.330 0.470  0.323 0.468  0.334 0.472 
Degree 0.294 0.456  0.299 0.458  0.292 0.455 
Male 0.387 0.487  - -  - - 
Ethnicity 
        
1 0.770 0.421  0.778 0.416  0.765 0.424 
2 0.155 0.362  0.164 0.370  0.150 0.357 
3 0.044 0.205  0.034 0.182  0.050 0.218 
4 0.031 0.173  0.024 0.154  0.035 0.183 
Rural 0.168 0.374  0.159 0.366  0.173 0.378 
Married 0.343 0.475  0.316 0.465  0.360 0.480 
         
















TABLE I.III: EMPLOYMENT STATUS SUMMARY TABLE – FE 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 
Mat Dept+4 overall 2.983 1.667 
 between  1.619 
 within  0.546 
    
Arrearst+4 overall 0.079 0.270 
 between  0.250 
 within  0.124 
Inct+4 overall 1838.87 1541.21 
 between  1474.04 
 within  504.94 
Povertyt+4 overall 0.077 0.266 
 between  0.256 
 within  0.101 
Fin Sitt+4 overall 0.900 0.300 
 between  0.281 
 within  0.140 
EmpStat=1t+4 overall 0.522 0.500 
 between  0.479 
 within  0.163 
EmpStat=2t+4 overall 0.065 0.247 
 between  0.231 
 within  0.114 
EmpStat=3t+4 overall 0.157 0.363 
 between  0.344 
 within  0.131 
EmpStat=4t+4 overall 0.053 0.224 
 between  0.219 
 within  0.084 
EmpStat=5t+4 overall 0.051 0.219 
 between  0.195 
 within  0.113 
EmpStat=6t+4 overall 0.152 0.359 
 between  0.332 
 within  0.143 
Region 1 overall 0.044 0.206 
 between  0.202 
 within  0.011 
Region 2 overall 0.115 0.318 
 between  0.316 
 within  0.024 
Region 3 overall 0.094 0.291 
 between  0.289 
 within  0.019 





Region 4 overall 0.081 0.273 
 between  0.271 
 within  0.017 
Region 5 overall 0.089 0.285 
 between  0.285 
 within  0.017 
Region 6 overall 0.083 0.276 
 between  0.276 
 within  0.024 
Region 7 overall 0.159 0.365 
 between  0.371 
 within  0.033 
Region 8 overall 0.119 0.324 
 between  0.321 
 within  0.030 
Region 9 overall 0.072 0.258 
 between  0.253 
 within  0.024 
Region 10 overall 0.045 0.208 
 between  0.206 
 within  0.016 
Region 11 overall 0.058 0.233 
 between  0.234 
 within  0.013 
Region 12 overall 0.042 0.200 
 between  0.201 
 within  0.000 
Rural overall 0.167 0.373 
 between  0.369 
 within  0.050 
Married overall 0.341 0.474 
 between  0.466 
 within  0.088 
Degree overall 0.292 0.455 
 between  0.450 
 within  0.049 
Children overall 0.422 0.494 
 between  0.486 
 within  0.098 
Wave 1 overall 0.562 0.496 
 between  0.325 
 within  0.419 
Wave 2 overall 0.438 0.496 
 between  0.325 
 within  0.419 





Occ_code1t+4 overall 0.275 0.447 
 between  0.429 
 within  0.150 
Occ_code2t+4 overall 0.097 0.296 
 between  0.289 
 within  0.078 
Occ_code3t+4 Overall 0.117 0.321 
 between  0.308 
 within  0.076 
Occ_code4t+4 overall 0.132 0.339 
 between  0.326 
 within  0.097 
Occ_code5t+4 overall 0.074 0.262 
 between  0.253 
 within  0.074 
Occ_code6t+4 overall 0.056 0.230 
 between  0.225 
 within  0.051 
Occ_code7t+4 overall 0.083 0.276 
 between  0.268 
 within  0.070 
Occ_code8t+4 overall 0.064 0.245 
 between  0.235 
 within  0.082 
Occ_code9t+4 overall 0.036 0.187 
 between  0.183 
 within  0.049 
Occ_code10t+4 overall 0.065 0.246 
 between  0.239 

















TABLE I.IV: POVERTY PERSISTENCE SUMMARY TABLE 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Pers Pov 0.086 0.281 
Num Pov 0.597 1.412 
Unemp Cat 
  
0 Months 0.811 0.392 
1 to 12 Months 0.110 0.313 
13+ Months 0.080 0.271 
Months Unemp 9.953 42.266 
Months Other 28.054 64.687 
Months Educ 44.312 52.580 
Age 40.045 3.115 
Region 
  
1 0.043 0.203 
2 0.109 0.312 
3 0.085 0.279 
4 0.075 0.264 
5 0.059 0.235 
6 0.080 0.272 
7 0.142 0.349 
8 0.133 0.340 
9 0.092 0.289 
10 0.042 0.201 
11 0.068 0.252 
12 0.072 0.258 
Children 0.669 0.471 
Dad Unemp 0.072 0.258 
Mum Unemp 0.359 0.480 
Degree 0.341 0.474 
Male 0.420 0.494 
Ethnicity 
  
1 0.822 0.383 
2 0.095 0.293 
3 0.054 0.225 
4 0.029 0.169 
Rural 0.239 0.426 
Married 0.608 0.488 
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1. Labour Market Situation of Youth in Italy and Their Risk of  
Poverty  
With regard to the youth labour market situation, Italy is characterised by structural youth un-
employment. A vast amount of literature argued that, even before the onset of the recent eco-
nomic crisis, the Italian partial and targeted model of labour market deregulation, introduced 
since the 1990s (with the insider-outsider divide that followed and the re-regulating welfare 
and labour market) greatly deteriorated the plight of young people (Barbieri 2011, Barbieri and 
Scherer 2009, Blossfeld et al. 2012). Young people were, in fact, considered the main losers 
of the Italian labour market flexibilisation process – “at the margins” (Barbieri 2011, Barbieri 
and Cutuli 2016, Blossfeld et al. 2011).  
As we know, the national institutional contexts can ‘filter’ the negative consequences of labour 
market exclusion and job insecurity in terms of economic vulnerability, leading to different out-
comes in different contexts (Hofäcker et al. 2010). In this respect, the characteristics of the 
Italian system of employment protection and regulation, as well as unemployment protection, 
play a significant role,  
Considering both the employment protection legislation and social protection system specifi-
cally, the Italian labour market has undergone substantial reforms over the past two decades 
(Barbieri & Scherer 2009, Mussida & Lucarelli 2014, Treu 2013, Fana, Guarascio & Cirillo 
2015). In the 1990s, Italy was among the countries with the highest score on the OECD em-
ployment protection legislation index. However, in 2010, the level changed and became almost 
average (Reyneri 2011). Nevertheless, the reform process was “marginal and asymmetric” 
(Boeri 2012): marginal in the sense that it applied only to new jobs and asymmetric as it af-
fected only a fraction of the population. A very rapid introduction of temporary employment, 
without the creation of an adequate system of new forms of social protection, affected the life 
of young people differently than in other countries, where such changes were slower or ac-
companied by higher levels of social protection (Bertolini, 2011). In a typical “outsiders” and 





“insiders” model, permanent workers often enjoyed a high level of protection when working or 
not (e.g. through state unemployment funds, sick leave arrangements etc.), while there was 
only a low level of social protection for fixed-term workers in terms of not only income but also 
job guarantees.  
The Italian education and vocational training system has to be considered as well. In par-
ticular, two main features have to be highlighted. First, while exhibiting the lowest rate of uni-
versity graduates in the age group 30-34 among EU28 countries (25.3% vs. 38.7% (European 
Commission 2016)), Italy has also been a country with high levels of educational mismatch: 
About 32% of employed population in the working age 16-65 are educational mismatched. 
Among the highest percentage among European countries (Flisj et al. 2017). In a framework 
of extremely weak demand for skilled labour, the labour market was not able to absorb the 
increasing numbers of young people, especially female, exiting the school system with high 
levels of education (Reyneri & Pintaldi 2013). Secondly, the relationship between vocational 
training and businesses is historically very weak in Italy and young people exiting education 
lack the professional knowledge that could facilitate their entry into the labour market. This 
disconnection between education and job-training therefore has made the transition from 
school to work problematic, which has been reflected in very high levels of youth unemploy-
ment and prolonged precarious employment careers. Over the years, according to Ricucci 
(2015: 101) “the demands of the scientific community for an ever-closer partnership have ef-
fectively resulted in experiments, rarely in lasting policies (Barone 2012). Secondary schools 
(mainly at their upper stage) have been placed under observation: firstly, technical and voca-
tional schools have been under-scrutinized, with their mission focussed on educating and train-
ing good technicians (and, of course, a huge variety of skills); then high schools, which are 
nowadays under a profound transformation in order to define their programmes as much more 
interrelated with the socio-economic fabric than they were”. 
More recently, the latest school reform, called “La buona scuola” [the good school], has 
stressed the need for a close (and strong) link between learning and job experiences: training 
activities have now to be developed in all the educational tracks. From the legislator’s point of 
view, the introduction of alternation is considered as an innovation of the traditional learning 
model, moving towards the possibility of introducing the German dual-system into Italy (Bal-
larino 2011, Ballarino & Checchi 2013)1. In this scenario, the weakness of the Italian youth 
condition in the labour market has been exacerbated by the long-lasting economic crisis that 
began in 2008, which disproportionately affected young people. The segmentation across age, 
gender and region was very marked in Italy and job opportunities unevenly distributed among 
the labour force, with strong marginalisation of young people, especially those residing in the 
South (Colombo and Regini 2016, Fernández-Macías and Vacas‐Soriano 2017). The age em-
ployment gap was much wider in Italy than in other EU countries, with employment rates rang-
ing in 2015 from 68.2% in the 25-54 age bracket, to 15.6% for young people (15-24) and 48.2% 
for 55-64, compared to respectively 78%, 33.1% and 53.3% of the EU28 average (Eurostat 
2016c). Even though declining due to the dramatic reduction in male employment, the gender 
gap in employment rates still reached 20% in 2015 compared to 11.6% of the EU28 average 
(Eurostat 2017b).  
                                               
1
 The German model is really far away from the Italian situation: however, at this stage the latest school 
reform tries to shift from an approach based on an individual subject to “a type of wider school community 
in which formal education activities are combined with non-formal and informal learning actions in other 
places of civil society and leads to an acquisition of recognizable skills” (Indire 2013: 23). 





Between 2008 and 2013, the employment rate of youth aged 15-24 dropped by 8 percentage 
points to reach 16.3% in 2013, and the unemployment rate increased by about 20 percentage 
points to reach the dramatic figure of 42.4% in January 2014, an unprecedented level in Italy 
(ISTAT 2016a). After a deep and long recession, Italy seems to have started to recover, alt-
hough recovery remains weak, and productivity continues to decline (ISTAT 2016a, OECD 
2017). The unemployment rate is decreasing, but remains seriously high among young people. 
The high level of unemployment has led to discouragement and inactivity among young peo-
ple: the incidence of NEET reaches in Italy one of the highest values in Europe. In 2015 25.7% 
of young people aged 15-29 was NEET (6.4 percentage points above that of 2008) compared 
to 14.8% of the EU28 average (Eurostat 2016b).  
Unemployment and low pay are the most relevant risk factors for poverty among young people: 
in Italy, they are the most likely to be at risk of poverty and social exclusion. In 2015, the 
percentage of young Italian people aged 16-24 at risk of poverty and social exclusion2 was 
36.5% (+ 5.4 p.p. compared to 2007 and + 5.6 p.p. compared to EU28). Among young people 
aged 25-29, this reached 36.8%, 10 percentage points higher than the EU28 average (Euro-
stat, 2016a). In comparison with the risk of poverty of other age groups, such as people aged 
60 or over (20%), or with overall poverty risk (28.7%), youth disadvantage has become partic-
ularly evident. 
Poverty and social exclusion do not affect only those who are economically inactive or unem-
ployed. Considering the Italian in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate by age in 2015, those aged 25-
29 were in the most serious condition with 12.6%, more than 4 p.p. higher than in 2007, and 
3.4 p.p. above that of EU28. The greater vulnerability to poverty of young workers had to do 
with the fact that they were more likely to hold short-term, atypical labour contracts, and tended 
to be more exposed to employment loss, even when they held permanent contracts (Eurostat 
2016). As stressed by existing literature, atypical employees experienced considerable risk of 
remaining trapped in a secondary, sub-protected labour market. In addition, they were less 
paid and faced higher unemployment risks and lower upward mobility chances (Barbieri 2011). 
Looking at ISTAT (National Institute of Statistics) data, during the long recession, the incidence 
of absolute and relative poverty steadily decreased for people aged 65 and over, while it sig-
nificantly increased among minors and young people. In 2015, the total incidence of absolute 
poverty3 was 6.1% in terms of residing households. Considering the absolute poverty incidence 
(for households) by the reference person’s age class, it is evident that it has declined over the 
last few years with age. In 2015, it reached 10.2% if the reference person was 18-34 years old, 
the highest value regarding all the age ranges, while in 2007 – before the crisis – it was 3%. 
Between 2007 and 2015, the household relative poverty incidence, if the age of the reference 
person was up to 35 years old, increased by more than 3 p.p., while it decreased for older 
persons (ISTAT 2016b).  
In the absence of a minimum income scheme, young Italian people often needed to rely on 
their families, creating a phenomenon of hidden youth poverty, as well as increased deprivation 
for their families. This enforced dependency on parents, disguised the lack of opportunities 
and the poverty faced by young people (Saraceno 2015). Having to provide for one’s children 
for longer was not only an increased financial burden on parents, but also created obstacles 
                                               
2
 According to Eurostat definition “At risk of poverty or social exclusion, abbreviated as AROPE, refers 
to the situation of people either at risk of poverty, or severely materially deprived or living in a household 
with a very low work intensity” (Eurostat Glossary 2017). 
3
 In the ISTAT definition, absolute poverty defines as poor “a household with a consumption expenditure 
lower or equal to the monetary value of a basket of goods and services considered as essential to avoid 
severe forms of social exclusion”. 





to youth autonomy, perpetuating a cycle of family poverty (Ghigi and Impicciatore 2015, Sara-
ceno 2015).  
However, the Italian family, the main social safety net of the Italian welfare model, has shown 
worrying signs of inadequacy in dealing with the crisis in the last few years. Family solidarity 
was able to shoulder the loss of income and employment among family members in the first 
period of the crisis, making use of savings. Nevertheless, as the crisis persisted, it showed 
weaknesses: the decline in both disposable income and the purchasing power of households 
and, at the same time, the increase in debt in the last few years, which undermined the im-
portant role of family redistribution (Banca D’Italia 2013). Therefore, the impact of the family 
pooling of income in reducing generational inequalities has recently run down.  
Human capital was still an important protective factor but in Italy, income earned was still 
strongly linked with the socioeconomic (family) background, a link that tended to impede social 
mobility processes (ISTAT 2016a). Among the OECD countries, Italy is, after the UK and the 
US, the country where the intergenerational transmission of economic conditions is particularly 
pronounced. The influence of the family of origin on income levels reached by children is illus-
trated by people who belong to a high-status family and can benefit from greater opportunities 
in terms of human capital, social capital and wealth. In particular, parent’s educational qualifi-
cations are discriminatory in Italy: individuals who at 14 had at least one parent with university 
or upper secondary school education, have today, at over 30 years old, incomes at their dis-
posal 29% and 26% higher with respect to those individuals who had parents with a lower level 
of education (Istat 2016a, Franzini and Raitano 2013). 
The process of welfare reforms undergone by Italy in the last decades safeguarded the older 
cohorts of insiders and pensioners, producing a surplus of social protection for the elderly. 
Specific attention has been devoted to national anti-poverty policies. Data on the risk of poverty 
before and after social transfers (excluding pensions) were used to evaluate if welfare systems 
could prevent people from the risk of falling into this condition (Fernández-Macías and Va-
cas‐Soriano 2017). According to this data, the social protection system in Italy is among the 
least effective in Europe: social transfers reduced poverty by 5.3% compared with a European 
average of about 9%. The Italian transfer system’s (excluding pensions) efficacy in reducing 
the risk of poverty among younger segments of the population was below the European aver-
age and, in any case, unable to counterbalance the trend of constant impoverishment (Fer-
nández-Macías and Vacas‐Soriano 2017, OECD 2017). In this situation, public opinion polls 
and surveys revealed widespread concerns among Italian people about their current and future 
income trends and the increased perception of being exposed to the risk of impoverishment. 
According to the last Italian Report of Eurispes (2017), the perception of poverty is on the rise, 
especially among young people. About one person in four says that he/she feels ‘quite’ (21.2%) 
or ‘very’ (3%) poor. Many young people declared that they had to implement anti-crisis strate-
gies, such as returning to the parental home (13.8%), getting economic help (32.6%), or re-
ceiving help for their children from the grandparents by not having to pay for private nursery 
schools or babysitters (23%).  
The phenomenon of subjective socioeconomic insecurity, the perception of risk and fear of job 
loss and income stability, was widely discussed in current public debates in Italy; however, it 
was little investigated in academic research. While much of the relevant research focuses on 
objective conditions of poverty or risk of poverty, little is known about how labour market ex-
clusion and job insecurity impacts youth’s individual feelings of insecurity. Most researchers 





attribute young people’s heightened socioeconomic insecurities to labour market changes, 
welfare state retrenchment and competitive pressures stemming from an increasingly global-
ised economy (Gautié and Schmitt 2010). As argued, in Italy young people were particularly 
exposed to the risk of not achieving stability over the course of their lives and not maintaining 
or reaching a socioeconomic status allowing them to create plans for the future (Busetta and 
Milito 2010, Ranci 2011). It thus is interesting to explore their subjective feelings of being poor.  
Subjective poverty 
Subjective poverty is generally defined as people’s overall subjective evaluation of their own 
financial/material situation. This definition is based on individual feelings, i.e. those who say 
that they feel poor represent subjective poverty. This notion was formulated in the 1970s (But-
tler 2013, Goedhart et al. 1977). Whereas income poverty was based on external criteria, sub-
jective poverty was based on individual perceptions and evaluations of external circumstances 
(Goedemé and Rottiers 2011). It was defined as a considerably low level of satisfaction with 
one’s life situation or with particular life domains, such as income, health, leisure time, envi-
ronment or social integration (Böhnke 2008, van Praag and van der Sar 1988).  
Like the relative income definition, subjective poverty had a relative component as well. It was 
shown that not only does objective reality influence the evaluation of one´s living situation, but 
the comparison with other people’s living standards also played a role (Delhey and Kohler, 
2008). Subjective poverty was operationalised in different ways: for example, (Whelan and 
Maître 2009) as “subjective economic stress”, and (Goedemé and Rottiers 2011) as “a feeling 
that you do not have enough to get along”.  
Research showed the existence of a high cross-country variation in subjective poverty and 
social exclusion (Böhnke 2008, Mau et al. 2012, Nolan and Whelan 2010). Some researchers 
showed that money did not have a uniform effect on subjective well-being across different 
countries, problematizing predefined income poverty thresholds. Buttler (2013), for example, 
investigated the importance of income poverty relative to the national and EU wide income 
distribution in explaining subjective poverty, showing that the relevance of monetary resources 
in determining subjective poverty varied substantially across EU countries. He found a high 
cross-country variation: those countries generally perceived as affluent, such as Scandinavian 
and Continental European countries, had lower subjective poverty rates, while those perceived 
as less prosperous had higher subjective poverty rates, especially in Eastern European and 
some Southern European countries (Bulgaria with the highest value, 63%, followed by Greece 
with 61%). In Italy, the rate of subjective poverty was around 38% compared to the EU rate of 
29%. However, Buttler also found that the majority of people who felt subjectively poor were 
not affected by national income poverty. In prosperous countries, like Germany, Norway or the 
Netherlands, the national poverty threshold seemed to be a better predictor of subjective pov-
erty than in less affluent countries. This could be explained by the relatively high standard of 
living. In less affluent Eastern and Mediterranean countries, absolute income seemed to be a 
better predictor.  
Some studies showed that the extent to which a social situation is perceived as being secure 
depends on cultural factors, such as distant or close family ties, and cultural patterns of ac-
ceptance of complaints about income (Buttler 2013), while others demonstrated that it de-
pended on the way individuals were accustomed to (in)security and the capacity to cope with 
insecurity (Tulloch and Lupton 2003). However, it was also argued that institutional and socio-
economic factors mattered (Mau et al. 2012). 
Several empirical studies showed how and to what extent in Europe self-perceived poverty 
was associated with household size and type, with available household resources (Castilla 





2010, Ravallion and Lokshin 2002, van Praag and van der Sar 1988), with individual and 
household socioeconomic characteristics (i.e. gender, age, employment status, education, 
tenure status and area of residence) (ISAE 2009, Ravallion and Lokshin 2002, Stanovnik and 
Verbič 2004). Guagnano and Santarelli (2013) showed, through a cross-country comparative 
analysis, to what extent self-perceived poverty in European countries was associated with spe-
cific household socioeconomic characteristics and aspects of household/community social 
capital endowment. 
Special Eurobarometer data from 2011 on perceptions and attitudes towards poverty and so-
cial exclusion, revealed that in Europe, in 2009, gender, education and respondents’ employ-
ment situations all made a difference with regard to how widespread poverty was thought to 
be.  
More often than men, women believe poverty was widespread. In terms of age, the largest 
difference was noted between young respondents and those aged 40-54, while those who 
stayed in full-time education the longest, considered it to be less widespread than those who 
left school earlier. The most striking differences, however, were recorded among people with 
different working situations: 82% of unemployed respondents believed poverty was wide-
spread in their country (compared to 69% of managers and 64% of students).  
Regarding Italy, the ISAE (Institute of Study and Economic Analysis) revealed that, in 2007, 
three out of four Italians felt they were poor (ISAE 2009). The disadvantage perception was 
most prevalent among households where reference people had low levels of education, were 
manual workers, unemployed or housewives. Subjective poverty affected, more often, those 
who had a fixed-term contract than those with a permanent one, and those who lived in rented 
accommodation. Compared to the 2004 survey, perceived subjective poverty in Italy had risen 
in 2007 by 11 percentage points.  
More recently, statistics on the evaluation of Italian families about the adequacy of family re-
sources showed that in 2016 about 39% of Italian families defined the available economic 
resources of their family as scarce or insufficient (Istat 2016). This proportion was higher 
among households with one single component (43%) and among large households with five 
(48%) or more components (62%). In addition, the figures remained quite stable across the 
years, with values about 42% just before the economic crisis, in 2007, to up to 50% in 2013, 
and then decreasing to 39% in the most recent year (2016). 
Filandri and Parisi (2012) investigated whether the relationship between objective and subjec-
tive poverty varied in the early years of the crisis in European countries, because of increased 
uncertainty due to the weakening of social protection. They showed that, comparing 2007 and 
2009, the strength of the relationship between income and the perception of its adequacy did 
not change in the early years of the crisis, even for those traditionally disadvantaged segments 
of the population such as single parents with children. They hypothesised that the amount of 
time analysed and its close placement to the start of the crisis were not enough to appreciate 
the changes that had taken place: families seemed unaware of the degree of deterioration in 
place, probably because of their general difficulty to recognise the change due to, perhaps, 
inertia and perceptual delays. Further research should address more the role of other variables 
besides household composition, identifying the primary risk factors among the individual and 
household socioeconomic and contextual characteristics, and understanding, in more depth, 
the link between objective and subjective poverty. 
In this framework, the paper investigates the medium-term relationship in Italy between labour 
force status and job insecurity at the time of the end of education and the level of subjective 
poverty that individuals experience five years later. The characteristics of the dependent vari-
ables are outlined above. With regard to the key traits of the main independent variables – 





unemployment, inactivity and objective job insecurity – we already mentioned that young co-
horts of entrants into the labour market are increasingly interested by insecure fixed-term con-
tracts with little job or income protection and experience a high risk of prolonged entrapment 
in precarious careers. This was also confirmed by the most recent statistics showing that in 
2015 about 41% (vs. 32.8% of the EU28 average) of youth aged 15-29 had fixed-term employ-
ment. As far as labour market exclusion is concerned, the proportion of inactive youth aged 
15-29 was almost double the EU28 average (15% vs. 7.9%); the unemployment rate in the 
same age group was 29.9% (vs. 16.1% of EU28); and youth long-term unemployment rate 
(more than 12 months) was three times higher than the corresponding figure for the EU28 
average (16.4% vs. 5.9% EU28) (Eurostat, 2017). 
2. Operationalisation, Data and Method 
The main research question leading the empirical analysis presented in this section is about 
the medium-term consequences of entering the labour market with precarious forms of em-
ployment or being excluded completely from the labour market regarding the risk of (subse-
quent) subjective poverty among youth in Italy. Second, we also investigate whether this rela-
tionship worsened further with the advent of the economic crisis. Finally, we also take into 
account the interaction with individual level factors such as education. In line with other country 
studies presented in this report, we test how the extent of the employment conditions at the 
time of entry to the labour market affected the risk of being in a situation of subjective poverty 
in the medium-term horizon, namely five years after having left education. 
In more detail, we test two main hypotheses, built by combining the general framework outlined 
in the introduction of this report with the particular features of the Italian case illustrated in the 
previous section. 
Objective job insecurity and labour market exclusion  
H1a: Entering the labour market with an atypical job (temporary but also other atypical forms 
of self-employment – semi-dependent, collaborator etc.) increases the chances of being sub-
jectively poor in the following five years. 
H1b: Remaining excluded from the labour market after the end of education (e.g. unemployed 
or inactive) negatively affects the chances of being subjectively poor in the following five years. 
H1c: The number of job interruptions collected by the individual in the five years after the end 
of education is positively associated with a higher risk of feeling subjectively poor, since this 
was representative of fragmented careers that might have undermined income stability and 
thus the perception of poverty.  
Consequences of the economic crisis 
H2: The chances of feeling poor for individuals who entered the labour market with atypical 
jobs further increased for those who were interviewed just after the economic crisis, in 2009. 
Although the consequences of the crisis took a couple of years to fully appear on the Italian 
labour market (highest peak of youth unemployment in Italy was in 2014 and 2013, in the EU), 
we expected that the worsening of the general economic conditions very soon impacted neg-
atively on the perception citizens had about their available economic resources. 
With respect to data, the potential of longitudinal analyses for Italy was restricted due to the 
very limited availability of appropriate databases on the national level. Among the very few 
longitudinal datasets available, some of them were outdated and others did not cover the in-
formation needed for this type of analysis on employment history and poverty. Nonetheless, 





we identified the national dataset Family and Social Subjects (Famiglia e Soggetti Sociali) pro-
vided by the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), as a suitable candidate for the type of anal-
ysis we intend to perform. The dataset contains – among others – retrospective information 
about the end of education and the entire working career for a representative sample of Italian 
population. The survey was repeated in three time points, 1998, 2003 and 2009. For this work, 
we selected the two most recent waves (2003, 2009), which contained comparable items about 
the situation of subjective poverty4, while the first wave did not contain any information on the 
topic. All the variables used in this analysis regarding the characteristics of the individual at t0 
were collected retrospectively. For each wave, the sample was composed of individuals who 
had attained their highest level of education five years prior to the survey (e.g. 1998 for people 
interviewed in 2003, and 2004 for individuals in the 2009 survey) and started their first job in 
the same year or following years, including those who never started working (i.e. were students 
or unemployed). Namely, we excluded those from the sample who had started their first job 
before attaining their highest level of education. 
The dependent variable was whether the individual was in a situation of subjective poverty at 
the moment of the interview (t5). This was detected in the survey with the question, ““Regarding 
the last 12 months, and considering the needs of all family components, how have the family’s 
overall economic resources been?”. The choice was among excellent, good, scarce or insuffi-
cient. We operationalised the variable subjective poverty as a dichotomous variable with value 
1 if the individual replied scarce or insufficient, and 0 otherwise. 
The three independent variables of interest referred to the: 
• characteristics of the first job obtained after the end of education (t0), namely if it was 
a permanent, temporary or self-employed job. The database provides detailed infor-
mation about the type of contract, grouped together as follows:  
Dependent worker with permanent contract   permanent 
Dependent worker with fixed-term contract,  
Semi-dependent worker (contracts of collabo-
ration on a project or on an occasional task),  
cooperative members   
 
 temporary & semi-dependent 
Self-employed, entrepreneur, professional   autonomous; professional 
For those who had never started working, the situation of labour market exclusion (being inac-
tive or a student) was considered 
• number of job interruptions collected by the individual during the 5 years taken into 
consideration 
• cohort: a dummy variable coded 1 if the interviewee belonged to the third wave of 
the survey (collected in 2009) and 0 if they belonged to the second wave (2003). 
Although the third wave of the survey was collected just one year after the economic 
                                               
4
 Information on actual income of the family was collected but was not available for researchers outside 
the ISTAT. Thus investigating objective poverty was not possible with the dataset. Nor was it possible 
to investigate material deprivation since the items included in this dataset did not match the Eurostat 
definition of material deprivation.  





crisis of 2008, when the consequences on the labour market were not yet fully visi-
ble, the general context of negative expectations might have anyhow affected the 
perception of the interviewee’s own economic condition 
A first group of control variables referred to factors of particular interest for the object of study, 
such as the characteristics of the family. These variables were: 
• number of household components: research showed that large families tended to 
be more exposed to objective and subjective poverty (Eurobarometer 2011, ISTAT 
2016b), thus a high number of family members might have negatively affected the 
perception of poverty 
• reference person: a dummy variable coded 1 if the interviewee was the reference 
person for the family in the survey. Indeed, information for all household components 
was collected through a reference person who was generally the head of the house-
hold. This variable was introduced in an attempt to control the fact that the depend-
ent variable was collected at family level while the independent variables at t0 re-
ferred to the individual level 
Other variables were the “typical” controls associated with the characteristics of the individual:  
• sex: a dummy variable coded 1 for females 
• education: a three-dummy variable (lower secondary or less, upper secondary and 
tertiary education) indicating the level of education attained (at t0) 
The methods used for the empirical analysis included cross-tabulations for descriptive statis-
tics of the sample and logistic regressions for the probability of being subjectively poor after 5 
years since the end of education, conditional on the characteristics of the first job obtained 
after the end of education and some control variables. 
  






3.1 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, we present the distribution of the dependent and independent variables and a 
cross-tabulation between dependent and independent variables. In our sample of individuals 
who finished education five years prior to the survey data, the proportion of individuals who 
perceived that the family’s economic resources were not adequate (i.e. scarce or insufficient) 
at the time of the interview was about 34% (Table I).  
In our sample, the groups of employed people with permanent and temporary or semi-depend-
ent forms of contract were equally represented (Table II), while some other forms of employ-
ment covered a very low proportion of the sample. As mentioned before, we also considered 
the situation of labour market exclusion, for which we included: quite a relevant group of people 
who was still in education (39%), a small proportion (10%) of individuals who had never started 
working and were unemployed, and an even smaller proportion of inactive people (housewives 
or other types of inactive people). As far as the second independent variable was concerned, 
the number of job interruptions, the great majority of individuals who were employed after the 
end of education had never experienced a stop in their working career (71%). Among the oth-
ers, 16% had one interruption and 7% had two interruptions in the last five years (Table II). 
Other characteristics of the sample are summarized in Table I.I in the appendix. 
The cross-tabulation of the characteristics of the first job after the end of education (or a con-
dition of LM exclusion) vis-a-vis the dependent variable, shows that the main divide ran across 
individuals in the labour market, and individuals who were excluded (Table IV). Indeed, the 
proportion of individuals who felt subjectively poor is greater among those who had never 
worked and were unemployed or inactive (56% and 49%), followed by students (36%). On the 
contrary, the proportions of individuals who perceived that the family’s economic resources are 
inadequate are very similar for different groups of employed individuals: about 25% among 
temporary and self-employed workers, and about 30% for individuals with permanent con-
tracts. This trend is confirmed in Table V, where the proportion of individuals who felt subjec-
tively poor was greater among individuals who had never worked. However, contrary to what 
was expected, the two variables were inversely correlated: as the number of job interruptions 
collected in the five years increases, the perception of subjective poverty decreases. In the 
next section, we test further these descriptive results with a logistic regression for the associ-
ation between labour market exclusion and objective job insecurity and the perception of sub-
jective poverty.  
TABLE I DISTRIBUTION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Subjective poverty No. % 
no 835 65.7 
yes 436 34.3 
Total 1,271 100 
Source: own elaboration on Family and Social Subjects, ISTAT (2003 and 2009) 
 
 





TABLE II DISTRIBUTION OF THE LM STATUS AT T0 
status at t0 No. % 
permanent 272 21.4 
temporary or semi-dependent 273 21.5 
autonomous; professionals 45 3.5 
unemployed (never worked) 135 10.6 
inactive (never worked) 45 3.5 
student (never worked) 495 38.9 
missing 6 0.5 
Total 1,271 100 





TABLE III DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT SPELLS 
number of job interruptions No. % 
0 419 70.8 
1 96 16.2 
2 41 6.9 
3 23 3.9 
4 10 1.7 
5 1 0.2 
6 2 0.3 
Total (for employed individuals only) 592 100 
people excluded from the LM (never worked) 679  
Total 1,271  
Source: own elaboration on Family and Social Subjects, ISTAT (2003 and 2009) 
  










status at t0 no yes total no yes total 
Permanent 191 81 272 70.2 29.8 100 
temporary or semi-dependent 205 68 273 75.1 24.9 100 
autonomous; professionals 34 11 45 75.6 24.4 100 
unemployed (never worked) 60 75 135 44.4 55.6 100 
inactive (never worked) 23 22 45 51.1 48.9 100 
student (never worked) 318 177 495 64.2 35.8 100 
Missing 4 2 6 66.7 33.3 100 
Total 835 436 1,271 65.7 34.3 100 
Source: own elaboration on Family and Social Subjects, ISTAT (2003 and 2009) 
 







no yes total no yes total 
Zero 297 122 419 70.9 29.1 100 
1 or two 105 32 137 76.6 23.4 100 
three or more 29 7 36 80.6 19.4 100 
never worked 404 275 679 59.5 40.5 100 
Total 835 436 1,271 65.7 34.3 100 
Source: own elaboration on Family and Social Subjects, ISTAT (2003 and 2009) 
3.2 Logistic regression 
The estimates of the logit model for the association between the labour market condition of the 
individual after having left education (t0), the number of job interruptions collected and the sit-
uation of subjective poverty after five years (t5) are presented in Table VI. All models included 
the control variables presented in the data section and all the individuals in the sample. Model 
1 only considers the first main independent variable; Model 2 also includes the number of job 
interruptions. As emerged in the descriptive results, the major divide in subjective poverty 
arises between people in the labour market (whatever the contract) and individuals excluded 
from the labour market. Indeed, individuals who had never started working and were searching 
for a job at the time of the interview (as they declared themselves as unemployed at t5), have 
a higher log odd of feeling subjectively poor compared to individuals who were employed with 
a permanent contract. The same can be said for individuals who are not employed and not 





looking for a job (pure inactive, mainly self-defined as housewives). On the other hand, stu-
dents do not perceive a higher feeling of subjective poverty compared to employed individuals 
in a permanent position, which might be associated to the fact that people who could afford to 
invest in education could count on their family or their own resources that guaranteed an ade-
quate standard of living (in addition to positive expectations about future earnings). Therefore, 
we can say that H1a, assuming a positive association between entry to the first job with a 
temporary or atypical contract and subjective poverty in the medium-term, is not supported by 
our data. However, H1b, regarding a negative association between labour market exclusion 
and subjective poverty, is confirmed for unemployed and inactive individuals.  
When introducing the number of job interruptions (Model 2), differences associated to the type 
of contract or exclusion from the labour market are no longer observable. The number of job 
interruptions itself is not statistically significant at the 95% level, although the first category 
(from 1 to 2 job interruptions) is slightly significant at 90% confidence interval (see Table III in 
the appendix). This indicates a reduction of subjective poverty for those who experienced no 
more than two interruptions after their first job (compared to those who never interrupted the 
first job after the end of education). This contrasts with what was hypothesised in H1c. How-
ever, this result may highlight that job interruptions may also reflect attempts of upward mobility 
in the labour market, which work through job changes to (hopefully) better jobs than being 
locked in one single job episode. Indeed, collecting several job experiences after the end of 
education might be considered a strategy for improving one’s own position towards better jobs 
(in terms of pay and working conditions). This interpretation of the results is also supported by 
the fact that, when considering statistical significance at 90%, as in Table I.II in the appendix, 
individuals who found a temporary or semi-dependent contract after the end of education, are 
less likely to be subjectively poor than their counterpart with permanent contracts. This is prob-
ably because they had more chance of mobility through different jobs. Indeed, when introduc-
ing the control for the number of job interruptions (Model 2), this relationship is no longer sig-
nificant, meaning that when the presence of job stops is controlled for, temporary or semi-
dependent workers (at the beginning of the career) did not feel more or less subjectively poor 
after five years than their counterpart with permanent contracts.  
With respect to the second hypothesis, it is interesting to note that there is a positive, significant 
and robust association across models, between subjective poverty and the period of observa-
tion, since individuals interviewed in 2009 tended to have a higher log odd of feeling subjec-
tively poor. This supports H2, which assumed a negative effect on the perception of poverty 
among individuals, already observable soon after the start of the crisis, in 2008. 
Finally, among control variables, we can see a significant protective role played by education, 
indicating that a higher educational level decreases the perception of poverty and, lastly, that 
being the reference person in the survey (compared to being a son/daughter or other relative 
in the household) increases significantly the log odd of feeling that the resources of the family 
are inadequate. No gender differences associated to the perception of subjective poverty 
emerged from our analysis. 
As regards further controls, we also replicated the same analysis on the subsample of individ-
uals who got a job after the end of education (t0), introducing the total number of months of job 
interruptions cumulated by the individual in the five years considered. However, since the latter 
information was available for a very limited number of individuals, the final sample size was 
reduced to 146 observations only, and estimates were not statistically significant. We also 
introduced an interaction effect between LM status at t0 and the level of education attained 
(Table I.III in the appendix), but the estimates did not show significantly different estimates 
between high and low education within the same job position. 





In conclusion, Figure I plots the average marginal effect of different LM status at t0, compared 
to being employed with a permanent contract, as emerged from the estimates of Model 1. It 
can be seen that, without controlling for the number of job interruptions, being unemployed 
and inactive increases significantly the log odd of being subjectively poor by, respectively, 20 
p.p. and 15 p.p., compared to being employed with a permanent contract. On the other hand, 
having a temporary or semi-dependent contract slightly decreases the risk of feeling poor by 
about 7 p.p. (considering a 90% confidence interval).  
Figure II plots together the average marginal effect of the main independent variables of inter-
est, as emerged from Model 2 (see Table I.IV in the appendix for exact values). As mentioned 
above, labour market status changed and became non-significant once we included the num-
ber of job interruptions, while having one or two maximum job stops reduces the log odds of 
feeling subjectively poor by 9 p.p. (compared to not having any interruption), as well as being 
interviewed in 2009 (compared to 2003) increases the probability of feeling poor by about 9 
p.p..  
TABLE VI LOGIT REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (ALL INDIVIDUALS) 
 
(1) (2) 
LM status at t0 (ref= employed, perma-
nent)   
temporary & semi-dependent  -0.363 -0.220 
(collaborators; cooperative members) (0.201) (0.212) 
autonomous; professional, freelance -0.0791 -0.109 
 (0.386) (0.387) 
unemployed (n.w.) 0.926*** 1.656 
 (0.229) (1.859) 
inactive (n.w.) 0.681* 1.409 
 (0.343) (1.877) 
student(n.w.) -0.121 0.605 
 (0.181) (1.854) 
missing -0.196 0.211 
 (0.889) (1.448) 
number of job interruptions (ref= zero)   
one or two  -0.441 
  (0.254) 
three or more   -0.663 
  (0.458) 
missing  -0.806 
  (1.844) 






Table VI continued 
third wave (2009) 0.384** 0.429*** 
 (0.127) (0.130) 
Age 0.000763 -0.00108 
 (0.0398) (0.0398) 
female (vs. male) -0.131 -0.122 
 (0.127) (0.127) 
education (ref= lower secondary or less)   
upper secondary -0.752** -0.747** 
 (0.246) (0.246) 
tertiary -1.621** -1.633** 
 (0.503) (0.503) 
number of household members 0.0720 0.0718 
 (0.0627) (0.0628) 
reference person 0.851** 0.877** 
 (0.301) (0.302) 
Constant -0.528 -0.433 
 (0.838) (0.841) 
Observations 1,271 1,271 
Pseudo R2 0.0731 0.0759 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: own elaboration on Family and Social Subjects, ISTAT (2003 and 2009) 
 





FIGURE I AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECT OF LM STATUS (TABLE VII, MODEL 1) 
 
Source: own elaboration on Family and Social Subjects, ISTAT (2003 and 2009) 
 
FIGURE II AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECT OF MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (TABLE VII, 
MODEL 2) 
 


























































































In this country study, we investigated the medium-term relationship between entering the la-
bour market with precarious forms of employment (e.g. temporary contract) or being excluded 
from the labour market (e.g. being inactive) and the risk of subsequent subjective poverty 
among youth in Italy. We also tested whether the occurrence of the economic crisis in 2008 
had an impact on the perception of subjective poverty after five years since the end of educa-
tion, as well as some individual factors such as the educational attainment of individuals. The 
dependent variable, subjective poverty, was defined as a considerably low level of satisfaction 
with one’s economic situation. In particular, in this work we looked at the individual’s evaluation 
of the amount of resources available to the family (composed either of a single person or of 
more components). We analysed the relationship between the characteristics of the first job 
found after the end of education (or the exclusion from the labour market after the end of 
education) and the perception of subjective poverty after five years, conceived as the percep-
tion that economic resources available to the family were scarce or insufficient. Although lim-
ited to a small sample size and potentially exposed to measurement errors due to retrospective 
data, the empirical analysis showed that first, the feeling of being poor was more diffused 
among young people who were excluded from the labour market (namely unemployed or in-
active). The descriptive analyses and the regression confirmed that individuals who had never 
started working and were searching for a job or were inactive at the moment of the interview 
(t5), had a higher log odds of feeling subjectively poor compared to individuals who were em-
ployed with a permanent contract (H1b). This result was confirmed in both international and 
national literature on poverty: unemployed people were at a higher risk of not only experiencing 
income poverty but also feeling subjectively poor. In particular, as Italy has a very low level of 
generosity of passive labour market policies, being unemployed coincided with not having ac-
cess to other forms of social income. This can increase the feeling of not having the possibility 
to satisfy one’s own needs. With respect to the type of contract (H1a) after the end of education 
and the perception of poverty, there were no differences across job contracts, with the excep-
tion of a small and slightly significant value for temporary and semi-dependent contracts, which 
decreased their perception (five years afterwards) of subjective poverty of about 7 p.p. com-
pared to those who had a permanent contract after the end of education. Literature stressed 
that temporary workers were more vulnerable in Italy in the face of the economic crisis be-
cause, as mentioned in the introduction, they were more likely to lose their job and, at the same 
time, were less protected by the social security cushion (Barbieri et al. 2014, Brandolini 2009). 
This result can be explained by several factors. First, we might consider that even young peo-
ple employed with a permanent contract may be exposed to the risk of poverty and, in partic-
ular, could fall into the category of working poor due to their low pay. Research showed that 
mean real earnings declined over the 1986 – 2004 period with a reduction in the entry wage, 
which was not compensated by faster subsequent wage growth (Rosolia and Torrini 2007). 
But this could also be due to the fact that entering the labour market with a temporary contract 
was very common and not associated to any idea of being poor, rather the expectation of future 
earnings was positive (Barbieri and Scherer 2005). Third, this could also be the result of sub-
sequent steps in the labour market. Indeed, once we controlled for the number of job interrup-
tions, the relative advantage of temporary and semi-dependent contract changed and was no 
longer significant. We might consider that job interruptions reflected attempts of upward mo-
bility in the labour market, which worked through job changes towards (hopefully) better jobs 
compared to being locked in a one single-job episode. Indeed, collecting several job experi-
ences after the end of education might be considered a strategy for improving one’s own po-
sition towards better jobs (in terms of pay and working conditions). Moreover, having more job 
episodes may be a way to secure income continuity, even if in a situation of contract disconti-
nuity, which in the end might help young people not to feel poor. Indeed, when job stops are 





kept under control, individuals who, at the beginning of their career, were temporary or semi-
dependent five years later, did not feel more or less poor than their counterparts who had 
started with permanent contracts. Besides, this is coherent with the result of control variables, 
by which there was a significant protective role played by education: a higher educational level 
decreased the perception of poverty5. In fact, literature underlined that, in Italy, having a high 
level of education did not increase the chances of entering the labour market with a permanent 
contract and a better position, but increased the chances of a better future career (Bertolini 
2012, Franchi 2005, Reyneri 2011). Moreover, it is interesting to note that being the reference 
person in the survey (compared to being a son/daughter or other relative in the household) 
increased significantly the log odds of feeling that the family resources were inadequate. This 
result was consistent with the vast amount of literature that from time to time stressed one of 
the Italian patterns of poverty characteristics: it mainly concerned households, especially large 
households and those with minor children. Thus, having family responsibilities increases the 
feeling of being poor. Finally, as regards some considerations on the effect of the crisis, despite 
the consequences of the 2008 crisis taking a couple of years to fully appear on the Italian 
labour market (the highest peak of youth unemployment in Italy was in 2014), the worsening 
of the general economic conditions seemed to have impacted negatively on the perception 
that citizens had about their available economic resources (HP2). In fact, individuals who were 
interviewed in the third wave of the survey, which took place in 2009, tended to have a higher 
log odds of feeling subjectively poor compared to their fellow interviewees in 2003. 
                                               
5
 Although interaction between education and the type of contract does not provide a clear indication 
about the highly educated entering their first job with a temporary or semi-dependent contract being less 
exposed to subjective poverty than low-medium educated (which, on the other side, might be also due 
to the small sample size). 






TABLE I.I CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE   
Variable   
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 23.2 4.3 
 N % 
Sex 
male 629 49.5 
female 642 50.5 
 1,271 100 
Educational Level 
lower secondary or less 467 36.7 
upper secondary 610 48.0 
tertiary 194 15.3 
 1,271 100 
Number of household components 
1 45 3.5 
2 103 8.1 
3 353 27.8 
4 494 38.9 
5 212 16.7 
6 or more 64 5.0 
 1,271 100 
Year of the survey (wave) 
2003 767 60.3 
2009 504 39.7 
Total 1,271 100 
Reference person 
no 1,193 93.9 
yes 78 6.1 
 1,271 100 
Source: own elaboration on Family and Social Subjects, ISTAT (2003 and 2009) 
 





Table I.II Logit regression coefficients (90% confidence interval) 
 (1) (2) 
LM status at t0 (ref= employed, permanent) 
temporary & self-dependent  -0.363+ -0.220 
(collaborator; cooperative members) (0.201) (0.212) 
autonomous; professional, freelance -0.0791 -0.109 
 (0.386) (0.387) 
unemployed (n.w.) 0.926*** 1.656 
 (0.229) (1.859) 
inactive (n.w.) 0.681* 1.409 
 (0.343) (1.877) 
student(n.w.) -0.121 0.605 
 (0.181) (1.854) 
missing -0.196 0.211 
 (0.889) (1.448) 
no. of job interruptions (ref= zero)   
one or two -0.441+ 
  (0.254) 
three or more -0.663 
  (0.458) 
missing -0.806 
  (1.844) 
third wave (2009) 0.384** 0.429*** 
 (0.127) (0.130) 
age 0.000763 -0.00108 
 (0.0398) (0.0398) 
female -0.131 -0.122 
 (0.127) (0.127) 
education (ref=lower secondary or less)   
upper secondary -0.752** -0.747** 
 (0.246) (0.246) 
tertiary -1.621** -1.633** 
 (0.503) (0.503) 
number of household members 0.0720 0.0718 
 (0.0627) (0.0628) 





Table I.II continued 
reference person 0.851** 0.877** 
 (0.301) (0.302) 
Constant -0.528 -0.433 
 (0.838) (0.841) 
Observations 1,271 1,271 
Pseudo R2 0.0731 0.0759 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: own elaboration on Family and Social Subjects, ISTAT (2003 and 2009) 
 
  





TABLE I.III LOGIT REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (MODEL WITH INTERACTION BETWEEN LM STA-
TUS AND EDUCATION) 
 (beta) (se) 
LM status at t0 (ref=employed, permanent)   
temporary; semi-dependent -0.429* (-1.97) 
autonomous; professional -0.318 (-0.63) 
unemployed (n.w.) 0.812*** (3.31) 
inactive (n.w.) 0.544 (1.48) 
student (n.w.) -0.223 (-1.19) 
missing -0.402 (-0.45) 
age -0.103*** (-4.53) 
female -0.155 (-1.23) 
high education -0.760+ (-1.82) 
LM status at t0 & education   
temporary&high (vs. temporary&low/m) 0.543 (0.97) 
autonomous&high (vs. autnomous&low/m) 0.770 (0.96) 
unempl&high (vs.unem&low/m) 0.776 (1.19) 
inactive&high (vs. inactive&low/m) 1.255 (1.35) 
student&high (vs. student&low/m) 0.0575 (0.05) 
missing&high (vs. missing&low/m) omitted  
number of household members 0.0874 (1.39) 
third wave (2009) 0.375** (2.95) 
reference person 0.979** (3.15) 
Constant 1.369* (2.21) 
   
Observations 1271  
R2 0.0694  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: own elaboration on Family and Social Subjects, ISTAT (2003 and 2009) 
  
 





TABLE I.IV AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES ON 
SUBJECTIVE POVERTY (TABLE VII, MODEL 2) 
 dy/dx Std. Err. Z P>z [90% Conf. Interval] 
LM status at t0 (ref=employed, permanent)    
temporary; semi-dependent -0.04 0.04 -0.93 0.351 -0.105 0.029 
autonomous; professional -0.02 0.07 -0.28 0.777 -0.130 0.092 
unemployed (n.w.) 0.36 0.35 1.03 0.303 -0.215 0.936 
inactive (n.w.) 0.31 0.37 0.84 0.403 -0.295 0.906 
student(n.w.) 0.12 0.36 0.34 0.737 -0.473 0.717 
missing 0.04 0.27 0.15 0.883 -0.405 0.485 
no. of job interruptions       
1 or two -0.09 0.05 -1.76 0.079 -0.175 -0.006 
three or more -0.13 0.09 -1.54 0.124 -0.275 0.009 
missing -0.16 0.33 -0.48 0.632 -0.706 0.388 
age 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.978 -0.014 0.013 
female -0.02 0.03 -0.96 0.336 -0.067 0.018 
education (ref= lower secondary or less)     
upper secondary -0.17 0.06 -2.99 0.003 -0.257 -0.075 
tertiary -0.31 0.08 -3.78 0.000 -0.449 -0.177 
no. household members 0.01 0.01 1.15 0.252 -0.006 0.036 
wave 2009 0.09 0.03 3.34 0.001 0.044 0.130 
reference person 0.18 0.06 2.94 0.003 0.079 0.279 
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There is ample evidence that unemployment experience has a scarring effect on later work 
life, both in terms of higher unemployment occurrence and lower earnings. Results for several 
Western European countries, such as e.g. Great Britain, Sweden and Germany, as well as for 
the US similarly suggest that unemployment experiences have a damaging effect on post-
unemployment earnings (Arulampalam 2000; Gregg and Tominey 2004; Nordström Skans 
2004; Schmelzer 2012; Gangl 2006). However, the magnitude of the impact of unemployment 
on the work pattern differs by welfare state regimes both in terms of subsequent unemployment 
occurrence and wage penalty (Brandt and Hank 2014; Gangl 2006; Albæk et al 2002). Gangl 
(2006) offers a macro-level explanation of these differences, arguing that the negative effects 
of unemployment on workers’ subsequent earnings are mitigated through either generous un-
employment benefit systems or strict labour market regulation.  
Indeed, the diminishing future prospects of youth due to problems in getting a foothold in the 
labour market are on a very high agenda in the recent global crisis (Rokicka et al 2015). Estonia 
was hit especially hard by the recent recession reaching one of the highest levels of youth 
unemployment rates in Europe in 2010 (32.9% in Estonia vs 21% in EU-28). This evokes a 
serious concern: is this a generation who carries the scars of unemployment also years later? 
Two key mechanisms are at play relevant to explain the possible scarring effects of bad labour 
market start: (1) A resource-related mechanism that links scarring to workers’ loss or depreci-
ation of skills during periods of unemployment; and (2) a signalling-related mechanism that 
links unemployment scarring to the stigma attached to it (see also Gangl 2006, Mooi-Reci and 
Ganzeboom 2015). 
Estonia exhibits one of the highest unadjusted gender pay gaps in Europe (Eurostat, 2017a). 
In general, gender pay gap is much lower for new labour market entrants and tends to widen 
with age (ibid.). Maybe part of it can be explained by a different meaning of early unemploy-
ment for men and women on the later career outcomes? In sum, we are aiming to explore if 
early unemployment enforces the socio-economic inequalities between men and women in the 
medium-run. Furthermore, we will also analyse whether the early unemployment is more det-
rimental for ethnic minorities. 
Education is the main resource youth have while looking for a job. Do the consequences of 
unemployment vary between youth with different educational resources? It might be that highly 
educated are more shielded due to the more general skills they possess which are less prone 





to the depreciation. On the other hand, early unemployment might be more harmful for voca-
tional school graduates with more specific skills which might become more rapidly obsolete. 
However, if the unemployment scarring is explained mainly by the stigma associated with it, 
then tertiary graduates can lose more as employers might perceive them more stigmatized as 
they are less expected to experience unemployment. 
The current analysis looks at youth who graduated at the peak of economic crisis in 2010 in 
Estonia and follows their work career for five years until 2015. We concentrate on possible 
scars of early unemployment on monthly wage five years later. First, we look at the association 
between early unemployment and later risk of poverty. Second, we scrutinize how much the 
later wage gap can be attributed to early unemployment experience. The analysis is based on 
registry data and concentrates on school leavers with vocational secondary and tertiary edu-
cation. We use the occurrence of unemployment after obtaining education, its duration as well 
as later episodes of unemployment to provide a nuanced view of unemployment effect on po-
tential poverty risk and wage loss five years later. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, the specifics of the Estonian institutional context 
and hypothesis are presented. This is followed by a short description of operationalisation, 
data and methods. Finally, we outline the results and conclude with a short summary. 
1. Institutional Context and Hypothesis 
In the following, we present the specificity of Estonian educational system, employment pro-
tection legislation, social welfare system, and recent labour market developments. This is sub-
sequently followed by hypotheses for the Estonian case  
In Estonia, similarly to other Baltic countries, the percentage of upper secondary school stu-
dents enrolled in vocational education is substantially lower than in other Central Eastern Eu-
ropean (CEE) countries, and an expansion of tertiary education has taken place. Very little 
coordination exists between schools and employers and both remain relatively uninvolved in 
students’ entry into the labour force (Unt 2011).  
Labour market legislation was higher than OECD average before 2009, however, turbulent 
times of economic crisis were accompanied by the change in labour market regulations (ibid.). 
A key change was the reduction of the cost of terminating an employment relationship through 
a reduction in the notice period and the amount paid in severance payments. As in most CEE 
countries, the Estonia welfare regime is not very well developed. The employment benefit sys-
tem is conditional on previous work career. Traditional institutions of protection against labour 
market risks (trade unions, employment contracts law, and social security transfers) are weak. 
Low levels of social expenditure have been one of the main arguments to allocate Baltic coun-
tries to the liberal welfare regimes (Toots & Bachmann 2010). 
The Estonian labour market has gone through tremendous fluctuations during the last decade. 
After reaching one of the highest levels of the youth unemployment rate in Europe (32.5% in 
Estonia vs 20.6% in EU-28 in 2010) during the financial crisis, the situation stabilized fast. The 
share of youth searching for a job is lower in comparison to most other European countries 
(13.1% in Estonia vs 20.3% in EU-28 in 2015)1. In the period of 2010-2015, there were 13% 
more employees, suggesting that decreasing unemployment rates are indeed due to the cre-
ation of new workplaces. Despite the fast recovery, the level of youth unemployment in Estonia 
remains higher than before the crisis and is more widespread for youth as compared to the 
                                               
1
 Source: Eurostat (yth_empl_100) 15-24-years old 





prime-age population, indicating the presence of barriers for youth in entry to the labour mar-
ket.  
The success story of Estonia is also clouded by the worrisome fact of the above-EU-average 
level of long-term unemployment among youth. In 2010, almost half of unemployed youth was 
looking for a job for more than a year. Between 2011 and 2013, two out of five unemployed 
young persons in Estonia had been unemployed for more than one year. This share has re-
mained almost unchanged despite of the overall quick recovery from the crisis. Similar to many 
other European countries, both unemployment and NEET risks among school leavers in Esto-
nia remain strongly related to the attained level of education – more than half of the graduates 
from lower secondary education are NEET during the early career stage, whereas among the 
highly educated, the figure is about three times lower. In contrast to the general European 
trend, the educational gap has not widened much in Estonia over recent years (Krusell 2015). 
One explanation for why the low-educated in Estonia have managed better relative to their 
European peers is the rapidly decreasing size of youth cohorts and the recovering economy 
which has created labour shortages in low-paid, low-skilled positions (ibid.). In addition, one 
tenth of low educated Estonian youth has found a workplace abroad (Krusell 2015). Thus, low-
educated manage to enter employment, but are still at a great risk of ending up in low-paid 
jobs. 
Youth graduating during the recession is under a strong pressure to accept any jobs as the 
social security transfers are very low in Estonia and therefore, the early unemployment expe-
rience may be a trigger for later inequality in terms of increased poverty risk as well as in terms 
of lower future earnings. We thus hypothesise: 
H1a: Early career unemployment is a trigger for poverty risk and lower earnings in the 
medium-term, i.e. up to five years later. 
It is important to take into account the particular socio-economic environment in which unem-
ployment spells are experienced (Lupi and Ordine 2002). Evidence based on panel data from 
Italy shows that, while in the northern regions there is evidence of scarring effect from unem-
ployment, in the southern area of the country – where overall unemployment is much more 
widespread - the impact is not significant because unemployment is more common and thus 
stigmatises less (ibid.). Also Petreski et al (2016) do not find a wage scar in Macedonia during 
the period of very high overall unemployment. Similarly, we may assume that during a severe 
recession, unemployment experience is perceived as "normal" and does not necessarily signal 
poor quality of the worker. However, this is only true in case of short unemployment spells. We 
thus hypothesise: 
H1b: Short term early unemployment during the economic recession is not harmful for 
future outcomes.  
Stevens (1997) argues that the main mechanism underlying the wage penalty for unemploy-
ment might be the higher risk of multiple job losses associated with the initial trigger event. 
Thus, if individuals succeed to avoid falling into unemployment more than once, they will have 
a better chance of recovery. In similar vein, Gregg and Tominey (2004) show that the impact 
of youth unemployment on later wages depends on the repeated occurrence of unemployment. 
However, the penalty of early unemployment is still present. Based on the National Child De-
velopment Survey in England, Scotland and Wales of those born in 1958, they demonstrate 
that the impact of unemployment during youth is having an impact upon the wage of individuals 





up to twenty years later with a magnitude of 12% to 15% at age 42. However, this penalty is 
lower, at 8% to 10%, if individuals avoid the repeated incidence of unemployment (ibid.). 
H1c: We expect the wage penalty and especially the poverty risk to be reduced substan-
tially if initially unemployed school leavers succeed to avoid falling into unemployment 
later. 
It has been argued that unemployment may have a different impact on different educational 
groups and signalling models might be more appropriate for predicting outcomes for low-edu-
cated people or people with less transferable/vocational knowledge (Schmelzer 2011). High-
educated workers might choose unemployment over a low-paid job as a means of signalling 
their productivity, while a prolonged job search for low-educated workers might be interpreted 
by employers not as a signal of their high aspirations, but of their low productivity. In addition, 
highly-educated young people may wait longer for a better job offer than those with lower ed-
ucation, who get fewer offers and are under greater pressure to accept them (ibid.). The insti-
tutional context potentially enforces the effect as low unemployment benefits in Estonia expose 
unemployed workers to economic pressure to accept the arriving job offer regardless of its 
quality (see Gangl 2006 similar arguments for the UK context). Schmelzer (2011) tested the 
argumentation on the likelihood of losing or gaining status upon re-entry in early career and 
found indeed that high-educated people gain status while low-educated entrants lose status 
upon re-entering the labour market after unemployment in the UK (ibid.). 
H2a1: The unemployment scar is stronger for vocational graduates compared to tertiary 
graduates. 
However, the alternative mechanism is also possible: It could be argued that in the Estonian 
context – where the unemployment risk is considerably lower for highly educated – the ‘cost’ 
of it might be higher too. In the eyes of employers, the unemployed highly educated might be 
perceived more stigmatized as these are least likely (expected) to experience unemployment. 
H2a2: The unemployment scar is stronger for tertiary graduates compared to vocational 
graduates. 
Mooi-Reci and Ganzeboom (2015) point out that if a resource-related mechanism prevails – 
which links scarring to workers’ loss or depreciation of skills during periods of unemployment 
– then no differences across gender should occur. However, if employers do not base their 
hiring decisions mainly on educational resources, then stigma drives unemployment scarring. 
In this case scarring effects should aggravate among specific disadvantaged groups (e.g. gen-
der, ethnicity etc.). Estonia stands out having the highest gender pay gaps in Europe and most 
of it stays unexplained after accounting for vertical and horizontal segregation, educational 
choices and other relevant factors (Anspal et al. 2010). Therefore, looking whether and how 
unemployment scarring varies by gender offers a valuable possibility to shed additional light 
into the issue.  
H3a: Early unemployment is more scarring for women. 
In terms of ethnic cleavages, in addition, we may assume that unemployment experience may 
be more detrimental for minorities during the scarcity of jobs and tightened competition due to 
smaller networks available to receive information about the vacancies. Unemployment figures 
tend to be much higher for non-Estonians compared to Estonians and this did not change 
during the crisis either. Moreover, the unemployment gap between Estonians and non-Estoni-
ans widened after the crisis (Krusell, 2015). This puts them under a greater pressure to accept 
any offer in the context of the very weak Estonian welfare system.  





H3b: Early unemployment is more scarring for minorities. 
2. Operationalisation, Data and Methods 
The following analysis is unique in that it has been made possible due to an interlinking of 
several register data for years 2010 - 2015:  
• from the Estonian Education Information System: the graduation from vocational or 
tertiary education 2010-2015 including information on education level (ISCED 97) and 
curriculum (included in which language);  
• from the Tax Office 2010-2015: annual employment duration (months) data and re-
ceived wage;  
• from the Public Employment Registry: annual information on registered unemployment 
(number of days). 
The analysis is concentrated on those who graduated in 2010, either with vocational or tertiary 
education. As the interest is on young school leavers, we concentrate on the age group 16-29, 
excluding 15% of graduates who were older than 29.  
Our dependent variables are as follow: 
• an indicator for being at the risk of poverty, earnings below 60% of median income in 
2015,an indicator of monthly earnings (ln) in 2015 
We apply OLS for monthly (ln) earning and logistic regression for poverty models. 
There are several data restrictions which should be pointed out. Firstly, we are able to track 
only those being officially registered unemployed and do not have information about those who 
were looking for a job, but did not sign up at Public Employment Office. Furthermore, while 
salary was measured at the individual-level; we do not have information about either household 
level income or any social transfers. 
3. Results 
In the analysis, we concentrate on those who have received a salary in 2015. Are those expe-
riencing unemployment after graduation also more likely to be out of employment five years 
later and thus stay out from our sample? There are rather small differences between those 
having no unemployment experience after graduation versus those being unemployed up to 
one year. Namely, 76% of those not having unemployment experience versus 74% of those 
having up to six months and 73% up to one-year unemployment do have a salary five years 
later. Still, those who have been unemployed for more than a year after graduation, are sub-
stantially less likely to work five years later: 67% of them have a salary in 2015.Thus, the 
likelihood to be in employment is lower among those who have stayed out of the labour market 
for longer than one year after graduation. Thus, we might underestimate their poverty risk and 
potential wage scar.  
Looking at descriptive data, there are clear differences in employment outcomes five years 
later by the occurrence and duration of the unemployment experience shortly after the gradu-
ation. Being at risk of relative poverty five years after the graduation is 11% for those having 
no early unemployment experience and 3-8% points higher for those being unemployed less 
than a year. The risk of poverty is extremely high for those who were enrolled in public em-
ployment office for longer than a year – one third of them are receiving salary below 60% of 
the average median income in Estonia. The wage penalty of early unemployment is also visible 





five years later in descriptive data. The average salary of all graduates with no early unem-
ployment experience is 1226 EUR in 2015. In comparison, the average salary is approximately 
20% smaller for those who experienced unemployment for a short term, 30% smaller of those 
who experienced it for a medium term and 40% of those who had unemployment experience 
for more than one-year unemployment after graduation. 
TABLE I DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
 Early unemployment in 2010-2011 
  No up to 6 6-12 month over 1 year 
In relative poverty in 2015 11% 14% 18% 33% 
Average monthly salary in 2015, EUR 1226 987 857 708 
N 7419 1856 1033 357 
Source: Pooled Registry Data, Estonian Statistical Office. 
After controlling for gender, age, education, the language of curricula and grades from state 
exams, the early unemployment scar is still visible. People being more than six months in 
unemployment, are still at a higher poverty risk (Table II, Model 1). However, the short-term 
unemployed do not differ anymore from those who did not experience unemployment. The 
overall earnings loss is clearly visible for all. But the magnitude varies by the duration (Table 
III, Model 1). For short-term unemployed, the wage gap is 5%, for medium term 17% and for 
long term 28%.  
However, once we control for unemployment occurrence and duration two to five years later 
for both outcomes, the early unemployment scar is substantially reduced being only 0-3%-
point difference (Table II & III, Model 2). Apparently, the early unemployment scar is mediated 
through the later work pathway. In case school leavers succeed to avoid falling into unemploy-
ment later, they neither do face a significantly higher poverty risk nor a reduced earning ca-
pacity. In contrast, it is visible that especially those who experience early unemployment are 
more prone to experience unemployment also later.  
Once later labour market vulnerability is accounted for, early unemployment does not matter 
for earnings loss. However, what is the effect of unemployment occurrence and duration oc-
curring 2-5 years after school graduation? 11% from those who were not unemployed between 
2012 and 2015 were at poverty risk in 2015. This risk does not differ for those experiencing 
only short-term unemployment. The longer unemployment spells are more harmful, increasing 
poverty risk up to 19% for those being unemployed for 6-12 months and 29% for those unem-
ployed more than a year. However, even the short unemployment experience 2-5 years after 
graduation results in an earnings loss reflected in 11% lower earnings compared to those not 
falling into unemployment. The drop is bigger for those being longer in unemployment; 24% 
and 37% respectively for those being unemployed for up to half a year or more than a year 
(Table II & III, Model 2). 
The effect of early unemployment experience does not differ by educational level (Table II & 
III, Model 3) in terms of the poverty risk. However, the graduates with MA who are looking for 
a job more than one year face a later wage penalty. Females on average do not face higher 
scarring effects than men (Table II & III, Model 4). However, these women are especially fe-
male MA graduates who suffer from the wage penalty of long-term unemployment.2 At the 
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same time, those who graduated from curricula taught in Russian and experienced long-term 
early unemployment face less earnings loss (Table II & III, Model 5). 
TABLE II AT-THE POVERTY RISK IN 2015 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5 
   b    b    b    b    b 
Early UE experience 2010-2011 (ref = no) 0.0668  -0.0753  -0.114  -0.0463  -0.0992    
   up to 6 months 0.293**  -0.153  -0.413  -0.218  -0.102    
   6-12 months 0.956***  0.146  0.335  -0.0452  0.239    
   over 1 year 
         
Gender 
         
   Female  0.700***  0.651***  0.650***  0.627***  0.652*** 
Age 0.0254  0.0250  0.0253  0.0245  0.0246    
Education (ref = ISCED 5A: BA) 
         
   ISCED 2C, 3C 1.112***  1.085***  0.934***  1.090***  1.084*** 
   ISCED 3B 0.584***  0.566***  0.612***  0.566***  0.563*** 
   ISCED 4B 0.502***  0.513***  0.417***  0.508***  0.508*** 
   ISCED 5B 
-0.111  -0.0821  -0.113  -0.0846  -0.0831    
   ISCED 5A: MA 
-0.315**  -0.289*  -0.281*  -0.289*  -0.289*   
Language of curricula (ref = Estonian) 
         
   Russian 0.442***  0.340***  0.336***  0.337***  0.372*** 
Grades from state exams (ref= average+-SD) 
         
   Below average 0.180*  0.156  0.156  0.158  0.160    
   High performers 
-0.173  -0.153  -0.155  -0.151  -0.151    
   Have not taken state exams 0.134  0.102  0.0935  0.0950  0.0994    
UE duration 2012-2015 in total (ref = no) 
         
   up to 6 months 
  0.111  0.105  0.110  0.107    
   6-12 months 
  0.700***  0.701***  0.703***  0.695*** 
   over 1 year 
  1.238***  1.248***  1.238***  1.243*** 
Education#Early UE (ref = ISCED 5A: BA# no UE) 
        
   ISCED 2C, 3C#up to 6 months 
    0.486                 
   ISCED 3B#up to 6 months 
    -0.0123                 
   ISCED 4B#up to 6 months 
    0.186                 
   ISCED 5B#up to 6 months 
    -0.160                 
   ISCED 5A: MA#up to 6 months 
    -0.0988                 
   ISCED 2C, 3C#6-12 months 
    0.0760                 
   ISCED 3B#6-12 months 
    0.133                 
   ISCED 4B#6-12 months 
    0.415                 
   ISCED 5B#6-12 months 
    0.633                 
   ISCED 5A: MA#6-12 months 
    0.135                 
   ISCED 2C, 3C#12+ months 
    0.104                 
   ISCED 3B#12+ months 
    -0.407                 
   ISCED 4B#12+ months 
    0.166                 
   ISCED 5B#12+ months 
    -0.276                 
   ISCED 5A: MA#12+ months 
    -0.662                 





Table II continued 
Language#Early UE (ref = Estonian# no UE) 
                     
   Russian#up to 6 months 
      -0.0562               
   Russian#6-12 months 
      0.110               
   Russian#12+ months 
      0.319               
Gender#Early UE (ref = Male# no UE) 
                     
   Female#up to 6 months 
        0.0767    
   Female#6-12 months 
        -0.161    
   Female#12+ months 
        -0.230    
Adjusted R2 0,05   0,06   0,05   0,05   0,06 
N 10667   10667   10667   10667   10667 
 
         
 
TABLE III THE AVERAGE MONTHLY SALARY IN 2015 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  exp(b)   exp(b)   exp(b)   exp(b)   exp(b)   
Early UE experience 2010-2011 (ref = no) 
   up to 6 months 0,95 ** 1,02  1,03  1,03  1,01  
   6-12 months 0,83 *** 0,98  0,98  0,98  0,97  
   over 1 year 0,72 *** 0,97  0,97  0,97  0,91  
Gender 
          
   Female  0,71 *** 0,72 *** 0,72 *** 0,72 *** 0,72 *** 
Education (ref = ISCED 5A: BA) 
   ISCED 2C, 3C 0,64 *** 0,65 *** 0,65 *** 0,65 *** 0,65 *** 
   ISCED 3B 0,74 *** 0,74 *** 0,74 *** 0,74 *** 0,74 *** 
   ISCED 4B 0,76 *** 0,76 *** 0,76 *** 0,76 *** 0,76 *** 
   ISCED 5B 1,00  0,99  0,99  0,99  0,99  
   ISCED 5A: MA 1,16 *** 1,15 *** 1,15 *** 1,15 *** 1,15 *** 
Language of curricula (ref = Estonian) 
   Russian 0,87 *** 0,90 *** 0,90 *** 0,90 *** 0,88 *** 
Grades from state exams (ref= average+-SD) 
   Below average 0,93 *** 0,94 *** 0,94 *** 0,94 *** 0,93 *** 
   High performers 1,10 *** 1,10 *** 1,10 *** 1,10 *** 1,09 *** 
   Have not taken 
state exams 0,90 *** 0,91 *** 0,91 *** 0,91 *** 0,91 *** 
UE duration 2012-2015 in total (ref = no) 
   up to 6 months 
  0,89 *** 0,89 *** 0,89 *** 0,89 *** 
   6-12 months 
  0,76 *** 0,76 *** 0,76 *** 0,76 *** 
   over 1 year 
  0,63 *** 0,63 *** 0,63 *** 0,63 *** 
Education#Early UE (ref = ISCED 5A: BA# no UE) 
   ISCED 2C, 3C#up to 6 months 0,95      
   ISCED 3B#up to 6 months 1,05      
   ISCED 4B#up to 6 months 0,97      
   ISCED 5B#up to 6 months 1,02 
      





Table III continued 
   ISCED 5A: MA#up to 6 months 0,95      
   ISCED 2C, 3C#6-12 months 1,03      
   ISCED 3B#6-12 months 1,06      
   ISCED 4B#6-12 months 0,98      
   ISCED 5B#6-12 months 0,93      
   ISCED 5A: MA#6-12 months 0,94      
   ISCED 2C, 3C#12+ months 0,97      
   ISCED 3B#12+ months 1,06      
   ISCED 4B#12+ months 0,93      
   ISCED 5B#12+ months 0,85      
   ISCED 5A: MA#12+ months 0,79 *     
Language#Early UE (ref = Estonian# no UE) 
   Russian#up to 6 months 
  1,05    
   Russian#6-12 months 
  1,04    
   Russian#12+ months 
  1,18 *   
Gender#Early UE (ref = Male# no UE) 
   Female#up to 6 months 
    0,98  
   Female#6-12 months 
    1,00  
   Female#12+ months 
    1,00  
Adjusted R2 10669   10669   10669   10669   10669   
N 0,17   0,18   0,16   0,16   0,16   
Source: Pooled Registry Data, Estonian Statistical Office. 
4. Summary 
The aim of the chapter was to answer whether the graduates of the global recession still suffer 
from the scarring effect of unemployment five years later. Summing up, we can conclude that 
the early career unemployment is not a direct trigger for poverty risk and income loss five years 
later if job search lasts no longer than a year. However, we also need to underline that those 
who experience early unemployment are more likely to lose their job later. Therefore, the good 
scenario only manifests itself if initially unemployed school leavers succeed to avoid falling into 
unemployment later, thus confirming the mechanism outlined by Stevens in 1997 and demon-
strated by Gregg and Tominey (2004). However, compared to Gregg and Tominey’s (2004) 
study on wage scars 20 years later in the UK, we do not only see a reduction of the penalty, 
but it´s almost complete disappearance in Estonia (being 0-3% depending on duration of un-
employment). This finding may provide further evidence that unemployment is less stigmatis-
ing during the economic downturn as employers do not to use it as a signal of lower productivity 
in line with findings for Macedonia from the last crisis (Petreski et al 2016). 
However, later unemployment experiences are much more detrimental for labour market out-
comes than early unemployment, raising the risk of at poverty risk and substantial salary loss.   
Still, it seems that the long unemployment period after graduation lasting longer than a year 
leaves a scar for some groups. From this group, only 67% work five years later. Thus, income 
poverty can be considerably higher than wage poverty, taking into account the low level and 
weak coverage of social benefits in Estonia. The analysis revealed that especially females with 
MA degree and early long-term unemployment experience are facing a higher wage penalty 
also five years later. The same was not true for other educational levels. This might indicate 





that the unemployment scar is stronger for highly educated, but the borderline is not between 
vocational and tertiary graduates, as could be expected based on previous literature. In the 
context of expansion and feminisation of tertiary education, the borderline is inside higher ed-
ucation and the most qualified with MA degree are the most likely to bear the stigma in case 
they do not find a job within a year.  
The long-term unemployment effect differs for those graduating from curricula taught in Rus-
sian. Once they stay in job search for more than a year in the beginning of their work career, 
the wage gap is reduced somewhat. However, the overall salary of graduates from curricula 
taught in Russian is already 10% lower ceteris paribus and the positive interaction might be 
due to the floor effects stemming from the minimum wage barrier. 
Overall, our research evidence based on registry data suggests that at least officially registered 
early unemployment lasting less than a year during the Great Recession does not leave scars 
on the labour market outcomes of graduates five years later in Estonia, in case youth manages 
to avoid a repeated unemployment.  
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1. Introduction 
This country study examines the consequences of unemployment and different types of em-
ployment uncertainty on socio-economic disadvantage among youth in Germany from a  
medium-term perspective. While short-term consequences refer to the immediate effect of un-
certain employment for young people’s socio-economic situation – e.g. the affectedness by 
low income or deprivation when being unemployed or atypically employed – medium-term con-
sequences focus on what happens within a time span of around five years after the affected-
ness by such employment statuses. The guiding question in this report thus is not whether 
insecure employment conditions immediately entail negative socio-economic consequences 
for youth. Instead, we ask whether young people in Germany that are initially affected by such 
labour market disadvantages, are able to escape states of poverty or deprivation within the 
subsequent few years.  
In line with the theoretical groundwork of the working package (Hofäcker and Neumann 2016; 
see also the introduction chapter to this report), we study socio-economic consequences from 





a multidimensional perspective, differentiating between income-based versus deprivation-
based measures, on the one hand, and subjectively vs. objective measures, on the other hand: 
• Objective Income poverty represents the most commonly used indicator of socio- 
economic disadvantage, also frequently adopted by international statistical organiza-
tions such as Eurostat (2016) or the OECD (2015). It considers individuals as being 
poor when they fall below a certain income threshold which is considered to be indis-
pensable when maintaining an adequate standard of living. There are different ways in 
which such thresholds can be defined, which are often exchangeably used in social 
reporting (Strengmann-Kuhn 2003). The German statistical office has long relied on 
administratively defined absolute measures of income poverty, which were based on 
certain pre-defined “baskets-of goods” considered to reflect the basic needs of an  
average German households. This approach has in more recent years been challenged 
by the standard relative measure of poverty, according to which individuals are being 
considered as poor when remaining under an income reflecting 60% of a country’s 
median equivalised household income. Given its more recent use in German statistics 
and better cross-national comparability, we refer to this second measure in our analysis 
of income-based socio-economic disadvantage.  
 
• A measure that has often been alternatively used is that of relative deprivation where 
being poor is not directly linked to monetary resources, but related to using a scale of 
daily goods a household can afford (see Eurostat 2016). This measure considers that 
financial resources may be spent in very different ways, and that daily goods may be 
available at different prices in different regions. In measuring relative deprivation, Ger-
man statistical offices have overtaken the standard Eurostat indicator1 to which we will 
also refer in the following (see Sikorski and Kuchler 2011). 
 
• Measures of subjective poverty assume that poverty may not be adequately captured 
by the objective categories set by scientific and/or political experts, which can divert 
from the individual´s own perception of being poor. They assume that poverty is only 
relevant if it is perceived as such by individuals. As shown in earlier project contribu-
tions (Neumann-Schmidt et al. 2016), such subjective measures may substantially dif-
fer from objective measures, so that we shall consider this dimension of socio-eco-
nomic disadvantage in the following analyses as well. In doing so, we will refer to stand-
ard indicators of subjective financial deprivation, frequently used in German social sur-
veys. 
In our analyses, we will relate these different dimensions of socio-economic disadvantage to 
different types of labour market uncertainty, including both unemployment and atypical em-
ployment. With regard to the latter, we will particularly focus on fixed-term employment – whose 
importance has increased considerably among young labour market entrants in Germany 
throughout recent decades and concurrently makes up for around 20 to 40 per cent of youth 
employment (depending on the age-bracket used; see Seils 2016). In addition to this, we will 
also look at the so-called “minijobs” which were politically promoted after the turn of the mil-
lennium as a further means of labour market flexibilisation and which have considerably grown 
in numbers since then (Eichhorst et al. 2012). Minijobs describe a type of employment with low 
wages that are exempted from employees’ social security contributions and taxes. The social 
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 The Eurostat indicator considers nine different dimensions of expenses of standard goods, including 
expenses for rent, adequate food, a car, a washing machine, a color TV, a telephone and reserves for 
unexpected expenses. 





consequences of both types of employment have been discussed controversially in the litera-
ture, highlighting that its effects may be ambiguous, and may vary between different target 
groups (such as higher or lower-educated, first and secondary earners etc.). In our analyses, 
we will thus not only look at the overall effects of these work forms on young people as one 
unique group, but also analyse in detail how these affect different groups of youth on the Ger-
man labour market. 
Any consideration of employment types needs to acknowledge the relevant institutional context 
into which they are embedded and which may mitigate or amplify their consequences. Before 
turning to the actual empirical analyses, the following section thus will provide a stylized sketch 
of the relevant institutional context for youth employment in Germany. Subsequently, section 
3 will describe both the incidence as well as the characteristics of unemployment and atypical 
employment among German youth.      
The empirical part of our analyses comprises the next two sections. Section 4 first provides a 
concise overview of the longitudinal dataset that we use for our analyses, the German Socio- 
Economic Panel (GSOEP) as well as the way in which key concepts and variables were oper-
ationalized in it. Section 5 then presents results of bivariate as well as multivariate statistical 
analyses investigating the relationship between insecure employment and it socio-economic 
consequences for youth in a medium-term perspective. A final summary of the main results as 
well as the conclusions that may be drawn from the German case complete this country study.      
2. The labour market situation of youth in Germany: Institutional 
background 
In the following, we provide a stylized overview of the relevant institutions governing the situa-
tion of youth on the German labour market. In doing so, we focus on three different types of 
institutional context: 
• The system of education and training defines the preconditions under which young 
people in Germany enter the labour market. It defines the chances and risks that young 
people experience in their early career phase. Insufficient performance in the education 
and training system may prevent young people from getting a (good) job and thus may 
equally affect their socio-economic situation in the medium-term. In the following, we 
discuss both the characteristics of the educational system in general as well as the 
German system of vocational training, often described as “the dual system”. 
 
• While educational attainment influences the initial chances of job placement, labour 
market policies play an important role in the early career phase. Particularly active la-
bour market policies (ALMP) promote processes of labour market integration through 
direct or indirect support. For those young people that have not fared well in the edu-
cational system, ALMP promote the chances of finding a safe and adequate job on the 
German labour market. In the subsequent overview, we thus will discuss both basic 
aspects of these policies and their coverage of young people. 
 
• Finally, the regulation of the labour market may be of pivotal importance for young 
people’s early career success (see the introduction chapter, in this report). In the fol-
lowing, we will reconstruct the basic conditions of employment regulation in Germany 
and particularly pay attention to in how far such patterns may promote young people’s 
situation as either “insiders” or “outsiders” of the labour market.  





2.1. The German system of education and training 
Germany’s education system has been described as exhibiting a high degree of both stand-
ardization and stratification (Allmendinger 1989, Müller and Shavit 1998). Stratification refers 
to the fact that selection in the educational system takes place at a comparatively early stage. 
Students are sorted at the age of 10 (i.e. after the completion of primary education) into differ-
ent educational tracks of another four (finishing with a lower secondary “Hauptschule” degree), 
six (finishing with a middle school degree) or eight to nine years (finishing with a high school 
certificate, the so called “Abitur”). Mobility between the different educational tracks is practically 
very restricted. Selection into the different tracks is highly consequential as the attainment of 
educational certificates often makes up the basis for the pursuit of later occupational careers: 
The taking up of specific occupations may for example depend on at least possessing a middle 
school degree while academic education and training is only available to those with high school 
degrees. Educational degrees themselves are highly standardized, i.e. the standards govern-
ing the attainment of the different educational degrees are the same nationwide throughout 
Germany. Based on the attainment of different degrees, employers thus receive reliable sig-
nals about the qualifications that students possess. In other words, there exists a “tight cou-
pling between educational attainment and labour market outcome” (Allmendinger 1989: 239). 
While this coupling may be beneficial for adequate job placement for those with higher de-
grees, it simultaneously discriminates against those with lower degrees. Early educational dif-
ferences thus often make up the basis for long-lasting social inequalities within the German 
youth labour market. 
Another particular feature is the German system of vocational education and training, the 
so called “dual model” (Blossfeld and Stockmann 1999). Unlike in many other European coun-
tries which concentrate either on theoretical learning in schools or on-the-job training, the Ger-
man system effectively combines theoretical training in vocational schools with practically 
guided learning in firms. Certificates that are given to successful young individuals upon com-
pletion of their traineeship are highly standardized. It is this high informative value of certifi-
cates as well as the opportunity of employers to assess trainees throughout their firm-based 
traineeship that has contributed to the frequently observed smooth entry of young labour mar-
ket entrants at positional levels that largely reflect the qualifications of the applicant (Bellmann 
and Hartung 2010). This feature again may be beneficial for the job placement of those that 
successfully complete their occupational studies; recent research indeed has indicated that 
participation in the dual system improves job placement and income chances (Cahuc et al. 
2013). At the same time it may discriminate against those that fail to do so. Recent research 
has shown that there is a strong link between the educational and the occupational system, 
i.e. particularly youth with no or low educational education find it hard to acquire a place in the 
occupational training system and subsequently are largely excluded from the primary labour 
market (BIBB 2010, Caliendo 2011). In this sense, the occupational system thus exacerbates 
initial inequalities in schooling levels. 
Taken together, education can be considered as both a valuable asset as well as a conse-
quential discriminator for later career progression within the German labour market. It deter-
mines the chances with which young people are able to establish themselves within safe and 
secure employment or the risk with which they find themselves in precarious atypical employ-
ment or unemployment. At the same time, it may also affect the chances to leave such types 
of disadvantageous positions within the German labour market or to be caught within them 
more permanently.  





2.2. Active labour market policies for youth in Germany 
With around 0.7 per cent of GDP, the share of expenditure on active labour market policies in 
Germany ranges around the European average. After active labour market policies for youth 
have expanded in the 1990s, they have grown to an impressive bundle of different measures. 
The German Government invests comparatively high shares of its budget into various youth-
related measures. Key components of current active labour market policies in Germany are 
the following: 
• Measures to support the qualification of unemployed youth: There exist numerous 
qualification measures that range from short-term training aimed at transferring key 
competences in job applications (such as the “Maßnahmen zur Aktivierung und 
Eingliederung § 46 SGBIII”) to long-term measures lasting up to three years aiming 
at training for an entirely new occupation (such as the “Maßnahmen zur beruflichen 
Weiterbildung § 77ff. SGBIII”). 
 
• In addition to this active employability measures, youths’ integration into employ-
ment is fostered by financial incentive schemes provided by the states. Targeted 
wage subsidies (“Eingliederungszuschüsse” § 217ff SGBIII), for example, are 
granted at 50% of wages to employers that employ disadvantaged youth for a pe-
riod of up to one year. While this program aims at the integration into dependent 
employment, there are also start-up subsidies (“Gründungszuschuss”; § 57 SGBIII) 
for young people aiming to start a business of their own that provide both a certain 
starting capital as well as cover social security payments throughout the first year. 
 
• There are also measures aiming at the direct creation of jobs (“Arbeitsbeschaf-
fungs-/ Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen”) that create temporary employment op-
portunities in the public non-profit sector to maintain the long-term employability of 
participants in such schemes. 
 
• Age-specific measures for youth: While the afore-mentioned measures are age-
neutral and thus provided to all individuals in need, there are some measures that 
aim to enhance the job prospects of youth. These include occupational in firm-train-
ing schemes (such as the “Einstiegsqualifizierungsprogramme”), job search 
measures as well as short- and long-term training programmes.  
Active labour market policies for youth have often been evaluated positively (e.g. Caliendo et 
al. 2011, Caliendo and Schmidl 2016). They cover large parts of youths with a considerable 
number of them participating in more than one program. Most measures actually display  
positive effects on later job placement, in either the short or the medium term.2 At the same 
time, evaluation results also show that the effect of educational attainment also extends into 
active labour market policies as they either do not sufficiently target lower-educated youth or 
have a lower employment impact for them. Youth that do not fare well in the school system 
often have lesser access to ALMP/training measures. Even when entering into labour market 
programs, there is a negative selection effect into (differently successful) types of programs.  
                                               
2
 The only notable exception are public job placement programs which even have proven to be harmful 
in the medium and long run. 





2.3. The regulation of the German labour market:  
Youth as outsiders? 
In previous literature (e.g. Blossfeld et al. 2005, 2008), Germany frequently has been described 
as exhibiting a modestly high level of employment protection, ranging between the highly reg-
ulated Southern European countries and the largely deregulated countries of the Anglo-Saxon 
world. Once individuals enter into a permanent contract, this contract is safeguarded by em-
ployment law and can only be terminated under relatively restricted conditions. The flipside of 
this high protection for insiders is that outsiders are caught in a secondary labour market with 
significantly lower wages and job security (Sengenberger 1987). Throughout recent decades, 
this secondary labour market of atypical employment has expanded significantly, increasingly 
undermining the German model of a continuous and permanent “normal employment relation-
ship” (Mückenberger 1989). Previous research (e.g. Buchholz 2008) has shown that this  
flexibilisation of work forms particularly has affected youth, and mostly in the form of fixed-term 
employment (see also section 3.2 below). In contrast, flexible employment has spread far less 
among mid-career male workers and older employees in Germany (Blossfeld et al 2006a, b). 
In that sense, youths entering the labour market can indeed be regarded as “outsiders”.  
However, there are also differentiations within youth concerning the “outsider status”. Besides 
educational attainment which was discussed earlier, it has also been shown that young people 
with a migration background, often perform less well in the regular school system, are less 
often found in higher educational strata and find it less easy to enter into vocational training 
(Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2006). Owing to differences in the overall economic 
situation, unfavourable labour market circumstances and labour demand deficiencies often 
make it harder for young people in East Germany to enter the labour market (Brenke 2013). 
The key question with regard to labour market disadvantage and exclusion is whether this 
outsider status just resembles an initial marginalization on the German labour market that is 
overcome as youth increasingly establish themselves on the labour market and gradually be-
come insiders. Or does initial disadvantage translate into a permanent exclusion from the pri-
mary labour market and related income opportunities? We shall discuss this issue in the fol-
lowing section when looking at particular types of labour market exclusion and atypical em-
ployment in Germany.   
3. Unemployment and atypical employment and unemployment 
among German youth  
In the following, we look at unemployment and different types of atypical employment in Ger-
many. We consider both the question, in how far both types of labour market uncertainty have 
spread among German youth. As we are interested in the socio-economic consequences of 
these work forms, we also discuss ideal-typically the material and financial consequences of 
each of these types of exclusion. Finally, from a longitudinal perspective, we additionally ask 
in how far the afore-mentioned statuses of labour market uncertainty are just a temporary phe-
nomenon or whether youth – and if so: which groups of youth – are able to escape from these 
work forms and establish themselves safely on the German labour market.  
3.1. Youth Unemployment in Germany  
In comparison to other European countries, the youth unemployment rate for recent school 
leavers in Germany has been traditionally low. While it takes values of around 20 percent in 
the EU on average and of more than 30% in some Southern European countries, it has re-
mained at values of less than 10 per cent in Germany. This picture has remained remarkably 





stable even throughout the recent economic crisis; with German youth unemployment becom-
ing the lowest in the European Union by the year 2013 (see Figure I).  
FIGURE I: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE FOR RECENT SCHOOL LEAVERS (AGED 15-29) AND POPU-
LATION AGED 30-59 IN 2013 
 
Source: Rokicka et al. 2015 
There are numerous factors that have been held responsible for this positive performance of 
the German labour market. Without much doubt, the favourable overall economic situation 
since the millennium turn and the relative stability of the German economy throughout the 
economic crisis play a role in this respect. Furthermore, the described characteristics of the 
educational and vocational training system in Germany ensure a close matching of employers’ 
demands and employees’ qualifications and thus are often held responsible for the positive 
employment performance among German youth.  
German youth not only are rarely affected by unemployment, they also spend only relatively 
short time in it. The average duration of youth unemployment in Germany is low by European 
standards: only around 41 per cent of youth remain unemployed for longer than six months; a 
value still almost twice as high than that of Scandinavian countries (such as Denmark or Swe-
den where long-term unemployment makes up only around 24 per cent). Yet, it certainly re-
mains below that of many other European countries, particularly the Southern and Eastern 
European where long-term unemployment is almost as double as high (Dietrich 2016).  
For those youth that become (long-term) unemployed, however, there may be severe conse-
quences connected with it. Even though the German unemployment and social insurance sys-
tem ensures that the unemployed can maintain a sufficient standard of living, there are detri-
mental effects of early unemployment on future employment and earnings, often discussed as 
“scarring effects” (e.g. Gangl 2004, Arulampalam 2001). As, for example, Manzoni and Mooi-
Reci (2011) demonstrate, initial unemployment has negative cumulative effects as it harms 
future employment chances and thereby “breeds future unemployment” (ibid: 346) respectively 
destabilizes future careers. Möller and Umkehrer (2014) show, that these career instabilities 
are closely related to earnings losses in the future, even though the effect differs between 
higher earners (who are able to offset temporary earnings losses) while those with lower earn-
ings suffer more persistent losses.  





3.2. Fixed-term employment 
While permanent exclusion from the labour market is a comparatively rare phenomenon on 
the German labour market, the flexibilisation of work forms has taken place to a similar degree 
as in many other countries representing the conservative welfare state model. As indicated by 
Figure II, the incidence of fixed-term employment in Germany ranges at around 25% among 
recent school leavers, a value that clearly surpasses the average incidence rate among mid-
career workers. In international comparison, incidence rates of fixed-term employment among 
German youth come close to the overall European average, but clearly remain below those of 
Southern European countries that are almost as double as high.  
FIGURE II: FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT RATE FOR RECENT SCHOOL LEAVERS AND POPULA-
TION AGED 30-59 IN 2013 
 
SOURCE: ROKICKA ET AL. 2015 
The question whether fixed-term employment may help individuals to enter into safe employ-
ment or whether it permanently marginalizes individuals remains contested in the literature. 
Scherer (2004) has argued that fixed-term employment may indeed act as a “trap” which keep 
employees outside the “core labour market”. On the one hand, the fixed-term nature of the 
contract by itself bears the risk of becoming unemployed afterwards. On the other hand, ex-
clusion from the core labour market may also occur when one fixed-term job is succeeded by 
another, thus building “chains” of fixed-term employment (Giesecke and Groß 2002). Yet, 
fixed-term employment may not necessarily imply a marginalization, but also can act as a 
“stepping stone” that allows for a gradual entry into the labour market (Scherer 2004). Gebel 
(2013), for example has shown that the chances of entering into permanent employment as 
well as future wages are better for fixed-term employees than for those in unemployment who 
directly aim to enter into a permanent position. Employers may treat fixed-term employment 
as an “extended probation period” in which they screen the qualifications and abilities of a 
potential young future employee and hire him/her upon positive evaluation. The question 
whether fixed-term employment leads to entrapment or acts as a stepping stone is closely 
linked to educational attainment. As Schmelzer and others (2015) demonstrate, those with 
higher degrees find it easier to enter permanent employment afterwards, while for lower edu-
cated employees, the flexibilisation of their employment is of a more permanent nature.    





Concerning its effects on socio-economic well-being, previous literature has highlighted the 
negative income effects of fixed-term as compared to continuous employment (Giesecke and 
Groß 2004; Mertens and McGinnity 2005). Wage gaps between the two types of work are 
higher among those in low-paid sectors of the labour market than among those in the middle 
respectively upper parts of the income distribution (Pfeifer 2012). Even though there are clear 
income disadvantages for those in temporary employment (as compared to permanent em-
ployment), the financial situation often turns out to be clearly better than that of the unem-
ployed. Still Seils (2016) finds that - as compared to permanent employees - the poverty risk 
of youth in fixed-term employment is significantly higher. Socio-economic disadvantage not 
only may appear at the objective income level: Gundert and Hohendanner (2014), point out 
that also subjectively, fixed-term employees may also feel more excluded subjectively than 
permanent employees due to their instability of their careers, their lower pay and less promis-
ing career prospects. At the same time, though, feelings of social exclusion are less pro-
nounced among fixed-term employees as compared to the unemployed (ibid.) 
3.3. Minijobs 
The so-called “minijobs” describe employment relationships in which employees can earn a 
maximum wage of up to 450€ (400€ until 2013) per month without being obliged to pay social 
security contributions. This type of jobs was particularly fostered since 2003 in order to make 
minor employment more attractive, and it substantially gained popularity in the years thereaf-
ter, making up for about 7.5 million employees by the year 2012 (Eichhorst et al. 2012). Users 
of such employment contracts are a heterogeneous group, including young mothers, students 
and pupils, pensioners and individuals in receipt of unemployment benefits (Bäcker and 
Neuffer 2012). Young people make up a considerable share of such jobs with about 6.7 per 
cent being younger than 20 years, and another 18.8 per cent being between 20 and 30 years 
old (Eichhorst et al. 2012). Officially, there is no hour limit to minijobs, but virtually no such 
employee works more than 20 hours per week, while the majority is employed at less than 10 
weekly hours. Most minijobs are offered in the retail sector, catering and hospitality and in the 
health and social sector. Even though most user of minijobs possess a school degree (and 
often also an occupational degree), the activities performed in these kind of jobs are usually 
lower skilled and do not match the qualifications of the respective employees (ibid.).  
Minijobs were intended to provide a “top-up” income for these usually low- (or even none-) 
earning income groups, that can rely on other sources of income (such as that of the partner 
or parents). Due to their low wage-levels, such jobs do not provide sufficient income security 
as a stand-alone solution: As shown by the German Statistical Office, hourly wage levels for 
minijobbers are among the lowest of all atypical work forms in Germany (Statistisches Bun-
desamt 2012). Furthermore, they do not themselves establish the legal basis for health insur-
ance claims and incur only minor social security payments by the employer, thus also endan-
gering material security in the long run (Voss and Weinkopf 2012). 
While the short-term financial consequences of minijobs can be considered as critical when no 
other income sources are available, it may be argued that minijobs– similar to fixed-term con-
tracts – can in the medium-term act as pathways out of unemployment and stepping-stones 
into later continuous employment. Evidence on this “bridgehead function” of minijobs again is 
mixed. The majority of the literature suggests that the effects may be less positive than for 
fixed-term employment. Admittedly, there is some evidence that minijobs may improve future 
employment chances after a period of unemployment and may also prevent dequalification 
effects (Caliendo et al. 2012). Pott et al. (2007) even report, that about a fifth of minijobbers 
makes the transition into the primary labour market. At the same time, however, other literature 





argues that transitions into the primary labour market cannot be considered as the conse-
quence of minijobs, given their perception as a type of “add-on employment” and their often 
low qualification levels (Fertig et al. 2005, Steiner, 2008). Dingeldey and others (2012) thus 
summarize that minijobs in sum may rather function as a top-up benefit for the permanently 
excluded than as a bridge into regular employment. 
3.4. Summary and Hypotheses  
What hypotheses can be inferred from the previous overview for the subsequent analyses of 
the medium-term effects of employment uncertainty on socio-economic consequences for Ger-
man youth?  
We assume that the most negative impact of all three types of employment uncertainty will be 
exerted by unemployment. Unemployment not only drastically reduces a person’s own in-
come, but also harms its future career opportunities through scarring effects and thus impedes 
an individual’s opportunity to move into a safe and adequately paid job. We expect that the 
effect of unemployment will be cumulative, i.e. the longer the time an individual spends in 
unemployment, the more likely it will imply negative socio-economic consequences. Such con-
sequences may extend beyond mere income poverty (or deprivation) to subjective poverty, 
assuming that being in (long-term) unemployment fosters the self-perception of being ex-
cluded, considering the established insider-outsider structure of the German labour market. 
Effects of minijobs on poverty and deprivation will be less severe than for unemployment. Yet 
given the clearly lower income and career prospects associated with minijobs, we still assume 
an increasing risk of poverty and deprivation. The subjective feeling of being poor will depend 
on the way in which the individual is using minijobs. In case of their perception as being just a 
temporary solution or as a top-up on other income, subjective poverty may be of lesser im-
portance than for those where minijobs make up the only main income source. 
Least severe effects are expected for fixed-term employment for two reasons. First, particu-
larly for young people at the onset of their careers, such types of jobs may act as an “extended 
internship” and thus function as stepping-stones into safe and continuous employment. Sec-
ondly, even though existing research has identified income gaps, income differences may not 
be always large enough to justify a fall into poverty or substantial deprivation. More likely neg-
ative socio-economic consequences may be expected in the subjective dimension, i.e. the self-
perception of individuals as being subjectively poor, e.g. due to the lower career respectively 
income prospects.               
Finally, we assume that the effects of the afore-mentioned work forms on socio-economic out-
come may differ between educational groups. First, the above overviews have shown, that 
particularly those with higher educational degrees have a higher earnings potential and career 
prospects on the German labour market. Secondly, the above overviews have shown that 
those with higher human capital are better able to escape from permanent marginalisation 
through either unemployment or fixed-term employment. The negative socio-economic conse-
quences arising from these work forms are thus expected to be less severe for the higher than 
for the lower educated.  
4. Data and Methods 
To test the outlined hypotheses, we use data from the German Socio Economic Panel 
(GSOEP), a longitudinal data set frequently used in social and economic research on Germany 
(see Wagner et al. 2007). The GSOEP is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study of 
private households, located at the German Institute for Economic Research, DIW Berlin. Every 





year, there are nearly 11,000 households, and about 30,000 persons sampled by the fieldwork 
organization Kantar Public (formerly: (TNS) Infratest Sozialforschung). 
The data provide information on Germans, foreigners and recent immigrants to Germany living 
in the Old and New German Federal States. Some of the many topics include household com-
position, occupational biographies, employment, earnings, health and satisfaction indicators 
The GSOEP was started in 1984 and has been continued as a panel survey on a yearly basis 
up to present years.  
The main focus of our analysis lies on a five year perspective to show if and how unemploy-
ment, temporary contracts and minijobs influence the risk of poverty of young adults. We fixed 
two observation points: at the first (t=0) we set our independent variables while at the second 
observation point (t=+5) we set our dependent variable poverty status. The population we in-
cluded encompassed all respondents which were aged 30 or younger at the first observation 
point and therefore no more than 35 years old at the second observation point.  
Table I below provides a schematic overview of all variables that were used as well as their 
respective operationalization. To consider the multidimensional nature of socio-economic dis-
advantage, we use different concepts of poverty: the risk of household income poverty (apply-
ing a threshold of 60% of the median equivalised household income), household material dep-
rivation (reflecting the non-affordability of at least three items from the standard Eurostat scale) 
and subjective poverty (reflected by the individual satisfaction with one’s own personal in-
come). For the latter dimension, an individual (instead of a household indicator) was purpose-
fully chosen to better approximate the individual feeling of disadvantage due to one’s own 
employment and income situation. For our analysis, we used data from the most recently avail-
able five-year time horizon, namely the period from 2008 to 2013. For the analysis using Stata 
we employed logistic regression models as all our dependent variables are dummy coded.  
In order to account for different labour market statuses, we differentiate between fully em-
ployed, part-time employed, occupational education, marginal employed, not employed and 
unemployed. To allow for differentiations in the length of unemployment (and thereby to test 
our assumption of a cumulative effect), we also control for the length of unemployment,  
measured by a count variable for the analysed five-year time span differentiating four catego-
ries: 0-6 months, 7-12 months, 13-24 months and more than 24 months of unemployment. A 
finer grading was applied in the bottom categories of the scale, as it can be assumed that 
particularly very short-term unemployment may be less harmful in terms of its medium-term 
socio-economic consequences. Fixed-term employment and minijobs are controlled for by 
metric variables measuring how many months were spent in the respective types of employ-
ment. 
To control for basic socio-demographic influences, we control for the gender of respondents, 
the residence in either East or West Germany, living in the parental home and the question 
whether respondents have moved out of that home in the observed timeframe. Given the hy-
pothesized central importance of education, it is included directly (using a six-step) as well as 
in interaction with the categories of unemployment, fixed-term employment and minijobs. All 
effects have been calculated as average marginal effects (AMEs) in order to better be able to 













Household income risk of 
poverty 
Household net income as 60% of the median household net 
income 
 Binary-coded: Poor yes/no 
 
Material deprivation Can´t afford 3 out of 9 items: 
Financial savings, one week vacation, new furniture, inviting 
friends for dinner, car, house in good condition, good housing 
area, warm meal, coloured TV 
 Binary-coded: deprived yes/no 
 
Subjective Poverty Satisfaction with personal income (11 point scale: 0 “low” to 
10 “high”), scale recoded to binary variable (scale points 0 to 
4 “dissatisfied”, 5 to 10 “satisfied”) 





Demographics • Sex: female / male  
• Region of residence: east / west 
• education in 2008: inadequately/general elementary/ mid-
dle vocational/Vocational and Abitur/Higher Vocational 
/Higher education 
• living with parents since 2008: not living with parents / 
move out / still living with parents  
 
Contract • Permanent or temporary contract in 2008 (yes/no) 
• Number of years with a temporary contract in a 5 year pe-
riod  metric 
 





• Registered as unemployed in 2008 (yes/no) 
• Number of unemployment months in a 5 year period  
 metric 






Table I continued 
 
Employment status in 2008 fully employed, part-time employed, occupational education, 
marginal employed, not employed, unemployed 
Source: Own illustration 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Descriptive results 
Table II starts by giving a descriptive overview of the incidence of the afore-mentioned 
measures of negative socio-economic consequences among the young population aged 30 
and lower. As figures show, about a quarter of young people in Germany appear to be living 
in income-poor households, a figure slightly surpassing that of earlier studies (Groh-Samberg 
and Voges 2014). Figures indicate a modest increase around the financial crisis, but until 2013, 
poverty rates largely have returned to initial values again. Deprivation measures are reported 
two to seven percentage points below the income poverty level, indicating that not every young 
person that reports to be in an income-poor household actually experiences a substantial dep-
rivation in necessary everyday goods. 
TABLE II: INCIDENCE OF NEGATIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES: RELATIVE INCOME 
POVERTY, DEPRIVATION AND SUBJECTIVE POVERTY  
Year % poor % deprived % dissatisfied 
2003 (Ntotal = 1,239) 24.37    
2004 (Ntotal = 1,123) 23.78   
2005 (Ntotal = 1,022) 23.19  21.04 35.13 
2006 (Ntotal = 924) 24.68  33.98  
2007 (Ntotal = 837) 25.69  21.03  33.09  
2008 (Ntotal = 733) 26.33  33.70  
2009 (Ntotal = 638) 26.65  36.68  
2010 (Ntotal = 535) 25.98   35.14  
2011 (Ntotal = 443) 25.51  18.74  28.22  
2012 (Ntotal = 368) 22.55  25.82  
2013 (Ntotal = 300) 24.67 19.00  26.67  
Source: GSOEP 2003-2013, own calculation 
Notably however, the subjective satisfaction with the respective income appears to be low. In 
the early 2000s, subjective dissatisfaction rates exceeded poverty rates at about 10 percent-
age points, but the gap has narrowed significantly since then.  
 
 






TABLE III: MEDIUM-TERM EFFECTS OF POVERTY, BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 2008-2013 



















Income poor 15.04 31.48 13.97 18.48 22.88 
Deprived   11.52 35.19 12.70 15.07 19.49 
Subjectively poor  23.84 35.19 18.10 25.34 25.42 
Source: GSOEP 2008/2013, own calculation 
While Table II focuses on the entire young population (irrespective of their labour market posi-
tion), Table III shifts the attention to the effects of unemployment and employment type and 
adds a longitudinal dimension to the analyses. In order to identify the medium-term effects of 
labour market uncertainties, being in unemployment, fixed-term employment or a minijob in 
2008 is compared to negative socio-economic outcomes (income poverty, deprivation and 
subjective poverty) five years after that date. What becomes evident from Table III is that par-
ticularly unemployment seems to be connected to negative socio-economic consequences, 
irrespective of the chosen indicator. While about 15% of youth being in employment report 
income poverty five years later, this is the case for more than the double share of those in 
unemployment. This picture is even more pronounced for relative deprivation (three times as 
high among the unemployed) while the gap is smaller (but still clearly observable) for subjec-
tive poverty. 
Even though differences can also be observed with regard to the type of contract, they are 
clearly less distinct. For individuals with a fixed-term contract, poverty and deprivation rates 
are only two to four percentage points higher than for those in safe permanent employment. It 
thus is particularly the exclusion from employment as such that leads to poverty and depriva-
tion. Being in atypical employment seems to be far less disadvantageous, confirming our as-
sumption of its potential “stepping stone” or “bridgehead effects”.  
Incidence rates of income poverty, deprivation and subjective poverty for those with minijobs 
fall between those of temporary contracts and unemployment. Due to their additional earnings, 
mini-jobbers apparently are less often affected by income poverty than those in unemployment 
are, particularly when this income functions a “top-up” to already existing income sources. 
They are also less often affected by severe deprivation and less often feel dissatisfied with 
their income. Yet, figures also show that compared to individuals starting in (presumably higher 
paid) fixed-term employment, minijobbers fare wors ein objective dimensions.     
4.2 Multivariate results 
The meaningfulness of mere bivariate results is, however limited. The below tables thus report 
results of multivariate logistic regression analyses predicting the occurrence of income poverty 
(Table IV.I), deprivation (Table IV.II) and subjective poverty (Table IV.III). All regression models 
are constructed in a similar way, with Models M1 and M2 first introducing the afore-mentioned 
control variables. Models M3 to M6 then separately introduce the three main explanatory var-
iables – unemployment, fixed-term employment and minijobs – while Model 7 combines their 
influence in one joint model. Model M8 additionally introduces the state of income poverty in 
the starting year to investigate in how far developments in the five-year time span have been 
dynamic or represent rather stable constellations. Models M9 to M12 finally introduce interac-
tion effects with education in order to investigate in how far the effects of unemployment, fixed-
term employment and minijobs are education-specific.    





TABLE IV.I: LOGISTIC REGRESSION, DETERMINANTS OF OBJECTIVE INCOME POVERTY, 5-YEAR TIME SPAN 2008 (INDEP. VAR.) TO 2013 (DEP. VAR.), AME IN % 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12 
Sex and Region of residence (references: Male, West Germany) 
  Female -4.03+ -1.05 -1.08 -0.98 -1.72+ -1.05 -1.69+ -0.84 -1.02 -0.89  -0.87 
  East Germany 11.23** 4.86* 4.18* 4.72* 6.44** 2.42 3.74+ 2.40 2.86 3.95+  2.75 
Changes in living Conditions between 2008 and 2013 (reference: not living with parents) 
  Still living with parents -11.40*** -3.93*** -3.78*** -3.75*** -4.22*** -3.80*** -4.02*** -2.43* -2.94* -2.60* -2.91* -2.77* 
  Move out 6.78 2.40 1.84 2.14 2.64 4.18* 3.72+ 9.76** 11.13** 10.23** 11.16** 10.80** 
Educational level in 2008 (reference: Higher education (ISCED 97)) 
  Inadequately  53.32** 51.85* 53.52** 47.83* 37.23 33.93 16.15 17.23 18.37 18.02 27.83 
  General elementary  27.81** 22.58** 27.42** 27.58** 13.67+ 13.12+ 11.41+ 11.59 11.31+ 12.37 15.24* 
  Middle vocational  18.55* 16.44* 18.29* 15.66* 13.78* 9.51+ 7.09 8.19 7.81 8.02 7.69 
  Vocational and Abitur  8.95 9.48 8.92 6.50 8.02 5.46 3.47 4.10 3.90 4.03 3.67 
  Higher vocational  6.60 6.72 6.50 5.95 6.29 4.32 2.64 3.11 2.44 3.08 2.90 
Employment status in 2008 (reference: Full-time employment) 
  Part-Time employed   -2.03    -6.08+ -5.56+ -2.96* -2.44+ -2.93* -2.81* 
  Occupational education   3.53    8.66 6.39 4.25 3.79 4.18 4.10 
  Marginal employed    2.17    -2.15 -2.67 -1.59 -1.46 -1.54 -1.69 
  Not in employment   1.44    0.12 -0.41 -0.28 -0.24 -0.25 -0.35 
  Registered unemployed   5.06    -4.61 -6.66** -3.50*** -2.96** -3.43*** -3.23** 
Number of years between 2008 and 2013 with… 
  Temporary contract    0.59   0.25 -0.63 -0.61 -0.59 -0.65 -0.66 
  Minijob/Midijob     3.27***  2.97*** 2.35** 2.33** 2.45** 2.34** 2.61** 
Number of months in unemployment between 2008 and 2013 (reference: 0 to 6 months) 
  7 to 12 months      1.60 1.56 0.81 1.03 0.63 0.97 0.78 
  13 to 24 months      9.81+ 11.46+ 8.30+ 9.14+ 14.31+ 9.52+ 9.61+ 
  25 months and more      23.80** 30.68** 21.90** 23.40** 30.94** 24.52** 23.51** 
Income poverty in 2008 (reference: not poor) 
  Poor household        20.43*** 20.32*** 20.37*** 20.45*** 20.27*** 
Interaction effects  
(No/low educated * unemployment of 13 months and more / Years in temporary contract / Years in Minijob or Midijob, East Germany * unemployment of 13 months and 
more) 
  Low educ*unemp 13+         2.31    
  East Germ*unemp 13+          -5.83*   
  Low educ*Temporary           0.27  
  Low educ*Mini/Midi            -4.39 
Pseudo-R2 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25 





Table IV.I continued 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BIC -290.57 -275.97 -272.21 -275.76 -270.35 -259.74 -251.68 -231.02 -230.96 -229.90 -231.01 -230.05 
LogLikelihood 607.23 610.61 635.69 616.72 605.90 597.71 627.22 592.43 598.83 596.70 598.93 597.00 
N 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 
Data Source: GSOEP 2008-2013, own analysis. 
Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  





TABLE IV.II: LOGISTIC REGRESSION, DETERMINANTS OF RELATIVE DEPRIVATION, 5-YEAR TIME SPAN 2008 (INDEP. VAR.) TO 2013 (DEP. VAR.), AME IN % 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12 
Sex and Region of residence (references: Male, West Germany) 
  Female 1.09 0.85 1.39 0.85 0.64 0.93 1.09 1.09 1.39 1.22 1.42 1.40 
  East Germany 10.30** 3.35* 2.08+ 3.35* 3.79* 1.13 0.92 0.91 1.23 1.89 1.18 1.18 
Changes in living Conditions between 2008 and 2013 (reference: not living with parents) 
  Still living with parents -6.97** -1.87*** -1.66** -1.87*** -1.92*** -1.63*** -1.24** -1.24** -1.62** -1.40** -1.62** -1.60** 
  Move out -4.44+ -1.21* -0.76 -1.21* -1.24* -0.58 -0.24 -0.23 -0.35 -0.26 -0.29 -0.30 
Educational level in 2008 (reference: Higher education (ISCED 97)) 
  Inadequately  81.24*** 80.99*** 81.23*** 80.57*** 76.80*** 74.34*** 74.26*** 80.22*** 79.74*** 80.06*** 80.32*** 
  General elementary  30.61*** 23.27** 30.62*** 30.48*** 12.66+ 10.73+ 10.72+ 10.30 12.11+ 13.01 13.67+ 
  Middle vocational  17.41* 17.77* 17.41* 16.23* 11.07+ 9.91+ 9.89+ 13.13+ 11.92+ 12.39+ 12.37+ 
  Vocational and Abitur  5.31 5.11 5.31 4.54 4.14 2.85 2.84 3.82 3.51 3.61 3.61 
  Higher vocational  3.49 3.60 3.49 3.26 2.00 1.81 1.81 2.33 2.09 2.33 2.32 
Employment status in 2008 (reference: Full-time employment) 
  Part-Time employed   -0.26    -1.45 -1.45 -0.46 -0.28 -0.42 -0.42 
  Occupational education   -1.05    -2.38 -2.38 -0.72 -0.62 -0.70 -0.69 
  Marginal employed    0.96    0.76 0.76 0.22 0.15 0.24 0.23 
  Not in employment   -1.11**    -5.82*** -5.82*** -1.23*** -1.05*** -1.21*** -1.21*** 
  Registered unemployed   5.99*    0.43 0.41 0.00 0.20 0.10 0.13 
Number of years between 2008 and 2013 with… 
  Temporary contract    -0.01   -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.11 -0.06 
  Minijob/Midijob     1.55  0.87 0.87 0.83 1.00 0.87 0.88 
Number of months in unemployment between 2008 and 2013 (reference: 0 to 6 months) 
  7 to 12 months      7.53* 4.95+ 4.94+ 6.94+ 5.18+ 6.36+ 6.30+ 
  13 to 24 months      7.51* 4.91+ 4.89+ 5.55 9.64+ 6.29+ 6.27+ 
  25 months and more      19.49** 15.31* 15.24* 17.19* 24.62* 19.49* 19.15* 
Income poverty in 2008 (reference: not poor) 
  Poor household        0.12 0.07 0.29 0.16 0.12 
Interaction effects  
(No/low educated * unemployment of 13 months and more / Years in temporary contract / Years in Minijob or Midijob, East Germany * unemployment of 13 months and 
more) 
  Low educ*unemp 13+         6.21    
  East Germ*unemp 13+          -5.66*   
  Low educ*Temporary           0.32  
  Low educ*Mini/Midi            -0.12 
Pseudo-R2 0.03 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 






Table IV.II continued 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BIC -267.39 -241.11 -230.25 -241.11 -239.94 -217.18 -212.77 -212.77 -212.40 -211.52 -212.76 -212.77 
LogLikelihood 560.85 540.90 551.78 547.42 545.08 512.60 549.41 555.93 561.70 559.95 562.43 562.45 
N 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 
Data Source: GSOEP 2008-2013, own analysis. 
Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  





TABLE IV.III: LOGISTIC REGRESSION, DETERMINANTS OF SUBJECTIVE INCOME DISSATISFACTION, 5-YEAR TIME SPAN 2008 (INDEP. VAR.) TO 2013 (DEP. VAR.), 
AME IN % 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12 
Sex and Region of residence (references: Male, West Germany) 
  Female 9.84** 6.41** 5.01* 6.47** 5.91** 6.57** 5.76* 5.87* 5.10* 5.12* 4.83* 5.03* 
  East Germany 3.83 2.45 2.16 2.47 2.90 0.80 1.68 1.61 1.39 1.29 1.25 1.31 
Changes in living Conditions between 2008 and 2013 (reference: not living with parents) 
  Still living with parents 8.07+ 3.45 2.40 3.51 3.72 3.81 3.66 4.05 3.51 3.53 3.74 3.47 
  Move out -1.42 -1.08 -1.99 -1.05 -1.08 -0.37 -1.76 -1.50 -1.29 -1.29 -1.25 -1.21 
Educational level in 2008 (reference: Higher education (ISCED 97)) 
  Inadequately  28.87+ 24.87 28.76+ 26.83 17.69 17.59 16.71 14.63 14.78 18.85 11.04 
  General elementary  21.29** 16.56* 21.39** 21.06** 12.50+ 12.72+ 12.67+ 11.09 11.40+ 21.57* 9.21 
  Middle vocational  14.08** 11.41* 14.12** 13.15* 11.35* 9.51+ 9.38+ 8.44+ 8.41+ 8.26+ 8.59+ 
  Vocational and Abitur  8.41+ 8.90+ 8.38 7.27 7.81 7.91 7.73 6.79 6.78 6.94 7.11 
  Higher vocational  2.34 2.02 2.31 2.05 1.76 0.78 0.82 0.70 0.71 0.84 0.79 
Employment status in 2008 (reference: Full-time employment) 
  Part-Time employed   -0.57    -1.95 -1.89 -0.87 -0.88 -0.86 -0.84 
  Occupational education   9.61    22.30* 22.22* 13.48+ 13.54+ 13.71+ 13.84+ 
  Marginal employed    0.07    -2.82 -2.89 -1.31 -1.31 -1.30 -1.09 
  Not in employment   6.60+    10.27* 10.21* 6.29+ 6.33+ 5.89+ 6.50+ 
  Registered unemployed   6.08    -1.58 -1.91 -0.91 -0.90 -0.04 -0.98 
Number of years between 2008 and 2013 with… 
  Temporary contract    -0.24   -0.97 -1.06 -1.06 -1.07 -0.25 -1.07 
  Minijob/Midijob     1.82  1.80 1.76 1.75 1.74 1.78 1.39 
Number of months in unemployment between 2008 and 2013 (reference: 0 to 6 months) 
  7 to 12 months      4.12 6.10 6.09 5.34 5.35 4.82 5.69 
  13 to 24 months      8.32+ 12.77+ 12.43+ 10.87+ 10.55 10.76+ 10.96+ 
  25 months and more      15.01* 20.34* 19.71* 17.47* 17.24+ 14.65* 18.32* 
Income poverty in 2008 (reference: not poor) 
  Poor household        1.88 1.86 1.85 1.22 1.96 
Interaction effects  
(No/low educated * unemployment of 13 months and more / Years in temporary contract / Years in Minijob or Midijob, East Germany * unemployment of 13 months and 
more) 
  Low educ*unemp 13+         0.87    
  East Germ*unemp 13+          1.04   
  Low educ*Temporary           -9.26*  
  Low educ*Mini/Midi  






Table IV.III continued 
            
Pseudo-R2 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 
Prob > chi2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BIC -377.85 -367.73 -361.82 -367.70 -366.50 -359.85 -353.21 -353.10 -353.09 -353.09 -350.40 -352.65 
LogLikelihood 781.77 794.13 814.92 800.60 798.19 797.92 830.27 836.57 843.09 843.08 837.71 842.20 
N 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 
Data Source: GSOEP 2008-2013, own analysis. 
Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 





Table IV.I reports the results for income poverty. Starting with the influence of the con-
trol variables (Models M1/2), it first becomes evident that income poverty is more wide-
spread among young persons in the former GDR, i.e. The East German Länder. The fact 
that this effect becomes insignificant once unemployment is introduced (Models M6ff.) 
suggest that this less favourable performance of Eastern German youth likely is related 
to the higher regional incidence of unemployment. Results also confirm the protective 
function of living with one’s own parents: young people still living in the parental home 
exhibit a lower risk of relative income poverty (Model M1). This shielding effect is largely 
stable and only does not seem to apply when the parental household itself is poor (see 
the interaction with income poverty in 2008 in Model M8). Educational effects (Model 
M2ff.) initially are quite pronounced with particularly those with inadequate or only gen-
eral elementary education exhibiting a high risk of poverty. Significant differences be-
tween the higher educated and those with middle vocational education are also observ-
able, even though to a lesser intensity. Notably, virtually the entire effect of education 
turns insignificant when controlling for unemployment effect in Models M6ff., suggesting 
that it is the higher unemployment risk of lower-educated individuals that makes them 
more vulnerable financially.  
Turning to the main explanatory variables of labour market status, results from Table I.I 
impressively confirm the poverty-reinforcing effect of unemployment. Being in unemploy-
ment significantly increases the risk of income poverty (Model M3ff) and this effect ap-
pears to be cumulative, i.e. the longer a young person is affected by unemployment, the 
more detrimental are its consequences for being affected by income poverty. Negative 
effects are particularly pronounced for those that have been unemployed for more than 
two years within the analysed five-year period (Model M6). Minijobs appear to be harmful 
for medium-term socio-economic security as well, indicated by the poverty-enhancing 
effect of the years being employed in such types of jobs (Model M5). Nonetheless, the 
magnitude of their effect remains well below that of unemployment. Notably, there seems 
to be no clearly observable effect of fixed-term employment (Model M4), corroborating 
our assumption that wage differences compared to permanent employment may be prev-
alent, but are not sufficiently large to be the cause of income poverty.   
Having been in an already income-poor household in the year 2008 raises the poverty 
risk in 2013, suggesting that income poverty in Germany is rather a persistent phenom-
enon (Model M8). Yet, the finding that virtually all other effects remain largely stable after 
the introduction of this variable suggests that this persistency is largely independent of 
socio-demographic controls and labour statuses. Finally, no effect is found for any of the 
interactions terms between labour market status and educational attainment. Concluding 
that there are no differences between educational groups in the effect of unemployment, 
however, may be too premature, considering the rather modest sample size in relation 
to the number of variables.    
Table IV.III shifts the attention to severe material deprivation. As for income poverty 
(see above), youth in East Germany appear to be more vulnerable (see M1), yet again, 
this may be attributable to the higher incidence of unemployment in this area (see M6 ff.) 
Parental protection apparently also shields German youth from deprivation, considering 
economies of scales in a joint family household (M2). Yet, moving out of the parental 
home does not appear to change poverty risks, suggesting that most youth only move 





out of the parental home when they can afford at least most basic goods for their every-
day life. Educational effects again are prevalent (M3), with poverty risks again being 
clearly highest among those with inadequate or only elementary education, moderate 
among the medium vocationally-educated and clearly lowest among the higher educa-
tional strata. The stronger educational effects may imply that individuals at different ed-
ucational levels not only have different financial resources at their disposal (income pov-
erty) but that they also exhibit different consumption styles (e.g. higher relative expendi-
ture and less savings among the lower-educated), even though it would require further 
data to substantiate this conclusion. 
Turning to the medium-term effects of different labour market statuses, results confirm 
the clearly negative and cumulative effect of early career unemployment (M6). Particu-
larly those that were affected by long-term employment in the five-year observation pe-
riod are at a high risk to be deprived in basic goods. In contrast, those with only short-
term unemployment are apparently better able to avoid material deprivation, likely due 
to better possibilities to compensate for temporary income losses, e.g. by savings. Ef-
fects for the other two labour market statuses are clearly less pronounced, with no sig-
nificant relationships observable (M4/5). 
Turning finally to subjective poverty (Table IV.III), it first becomes evident that there no 
longer is an East-West difference among German youth. In addition, results indicate that 
women are more likely to subjectively feel poor than men (M1). Effects of the parental 
household are not consistently significant (M2). This seems reasonable, given that the 
question used here for the dependent variable did not inquire the satisfaction with the 
income security of the entire household, but the individual income, which more likely is 
related to individual-level factors. This interpretation is corroborated by the effects for 
different employments statuses (M3) which indicate that it is particularly those still in the 
educational system that are dissatisfied with their income situation. Subjective dissatis-
faction with household income is also most widespread among those with lower educa-
tional degrees (M2), a finding in line with their higher income poverty and deprivation 
risks in the earlier regressions. 
Results furthermore show that the unemployed not only are at a higher risk of being 
income-poor or deprived; their disadvantage also extends to the subjective dimension 
as those with more than one year of unemployment, and particularly those with more two 
years of unemployment in the observation period report a subjective feeling of dissatis-
faction (M6). Higher subjective poverty is also found among those initially in minijobs 
(M5), a finding confirming earlier findings for income poverty and studies highlighting 
their more frequent feelings of social exclusion (see section 3.3.). Again, no such effects 
are found for those affected by fixed-term employment (M4) and minijobs (M5), suggest-
ing that not only the financial and material hardship but also their feeling of being disad-
vantaged does not differ substantially from those in permanent employment. The mod-
estly significant interaction between fixed-term employment and lower education (M11) 
seems to suggest that lower-educated individuals may feel less-disadvantaged through 
a temporary job, given the opportunity to avoid unemplyoment and their generally lower 
income prospects. 





In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, first difference models were also calcu-
lated for all three analytical dimensions. As a matter of fact, these could only consider 
individuals changing their values in the variables considered in between the two time 
points. Analyses thus were restricted to a limited number of variables respectively re-
spondents. Results remained largely inconclusive with only very low shares of variance 
explanation (below 5%); they are thus not shown here. Occasional effects seemed to 
confirm the shielding function of the parental household, particularly for avoiding income 
poverty, and the cumulatively negative effect of unemployment. 
5. Discussion  
The results of the previous analyses provide insights into medium-term socio-economic 
risks arising from employment uncertainty among Germany youth. They clearly demon-
strate that negative effects of employment uncertainty for poverty and deprivation are 
not restricted to immediate short-term effects but that they equally are important in a 
medium-term perspective of five years. Individuals that experience periods of employ-
ment uncertainty also bear a higher risk of being affected by poverty and deprivation five 
years after that data than young people in permanent employment. 
Our results indicate that most severe effects on socio-economic outcomes are found for 
unemployment. German youth experiencing unemployment are either confronted with a 
high risk of being income poor or even deprived in their basic needs five years after that 
date. This effect is cumulative, i.e. the longer young people spend in a state of unem-
ployment the worse are their income prospects in the observed period. These results 
corroborate the description of Germany as an insider-outsider labour market in which the 
unemployed outsiders are permanently disadvantaged in various aspects of life. Indeed, 
our analyses show that disadvantage arising from unemployment does not remain re-
stricted to objective dimensions (income poverty and deprivation), but that it also nega-
tively effects subjective income satisfaction. Unemployed youth thus may not only find it 
more difficult to make ends meet, they also more often may feel disadvantaged as com-
pared to their employed counterparts, a feeling that may provoke further negative out-
comes (such as physical or mental health). 
The significance of minijobs has increased considerably on the German labour market 
in recent years. Our results indicate that due to their low wage levels, these kind of jobs 
also increase the risk of objective income poverty. Yet, the magnitude of the negative 
effects of minijobs clearly remain below those of unemployment, presumably due to the 
fact that they are associated with at least some minimum income and furthermore are 
often used as top-ups on other existing income. Notably, their effect on severe depriva-
tion in everyday needs is not significant, suggesting that though minijobs may lead to 
negative income consequences (as compared to normal continues employment), these 
income losses are not large enough to cause severe material deprivation. Furthermore, 
due to the often only temporary use of such jobs, there seems to be no subjective feeling 
of being disadvantaged among youth. Nonetheless, the effects of minijobs on the income 
situation of youth remains negative, suggesting that the use of such types of jobs within 
the youth labour market would need to be critically reconsidered. 





In our analyses, no significantly negative effects were found for fixed-term employment 
in Germany for any of the dimensions of socio-economic consequences analysed. With-
out much doubt, fixed-term employment frequently leads to lower career and income 
prospects in the medium term. Yet, these income disadvantages do not appear large 
enough to lead to severe economic disadvantages among youth. Furthermore, fixed-
term employment contracts frequently function as stepping stones or bridgeheads into 
permanent employment. By these means, existing socio-economic disadvantages in the 
short-term (see Rokicka and Klobuszewska 2016) thus may be outbalanced in the me-
dium term through upward career mobility. 
Finally, our results also confirm the salience of educational degrees in predicting socio-
economic outcomes for youth. It is the better educated that are best able to avoid nega-
tive socio-economic consequences in all dimensions analysed, while those with lower 
education bear a higher risk of poverty and deprivation. Significant effects, however, are 
almost only found for the direct effects of education, not for their interaction with the 
afore-mentioned forms of labour market insecurity (with the sole exception of the mod-
erate interaction for fixed-term employment in Table IV.III). This goes against our hypoth-
esis that effects of such work-forms may be education-specific, i.e. most detrimental 
among the lower educated. Yet, in this respect, the results of the previous analyses need 
to be taken with care, considering the relatively small sample size and breadth of indica-
tors used. Further analyses with other data sets, e.g. the German Mikrozensus, may be 
required to substantiate our findings (even though due to the administrative nature of 
these data sets would only allow for analysis of objective income poverty).  
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In the opening chapter of this report, we have provided a theoretical discussion about 
different types of labour market uncertainties and their assumed effect on the socio-eco-
nomic situation of youth and its subjective perception. Using different data sets, the pre-
vious chapters have investigated this relationship in detail. This final chapter now sum-
marises and critically reflects the results from these empirical analyses. In doing so, we 
turn back to the theoretical introduction chapter and investigate in how far the results 
confirmed our expectations that were developed based on earlier literature (see the in-
troduction chapter). We will highlight congruities, but will also turn to deviations and in-
novative results. Finally, we outline what policy conclusions can be drawn from our em-
pirical analyses. 
1. Early career unemployment 
In the theoretical chapter, we formulated theoretically grounded assumptions about the 
relationship between the experience of early career unemployment and its later-socio-
economic consequences for youth. We assumed that unemployment would have detri-
mental effects not only in the short run, but also will imply “scarring effects” in a medium-
term of around five years, in terms of employment chances and wage income, but also 
in subjective well-being and satisfaction. These effects were assumed to be cumulative 
over time, i.e. negative socio-economic consequences were assumed to increase with 
the length of time spent in unemployment respectively the number of consecutive unem-
ployment spells. Finally, we expected socio-economic consequences to be most pro-
nounced for the lower qualified, while the better educated are in a better position to avoid 
unemployment, and suffer less from its scarring effects. 
 
The results from the empirical analyses corroborate our expectation of a harmful effect 
of unemployment on later career outcomes for youth. In other words: negative conse-
quences of unemployment do not remain restricted to immediate poverty and dep-
rivation – as shown in the earlier EXCEPT work of Rokicka and Kłobuszewska 
(2016) – but also increase the likelihood of socio-economic disadvantage in sub-
sequent years. This conclusion remains valid for both the comparative EU analyses as 





well as the subsequent country studies, and applies to all types of socio-economic out-
comes considered. The comparative study on 24 EU countries (Rokicka, in this report) 
found a negative effect of unemployment experience on all dimensions of socio-eco-
nomic disadvantage: income poverty, material deprivation and subjective poverty. This 
result remained robust, even when controlling for other socio-demographic factors, indi-
cating that the negative effect of unemployment applies to all groups of youth and 
cannot be reduced to its concentration among particular problem groups. The 
country studies for Germany (Hofäcker et al., in this report) and the UK (Nizalova et al., 
in this report) confirmed this result across all dimensions of socio-economic uncertainty 
at the national level. Looking only at subjective financial consequences, Bertolini et al. 
(in this report) could confirm that the main socio-economic divide on the Italian labour 
market runs between the employed and the unemployed, with the latter exhibiting a 
clearly higher risk of poverty. This negative effect was most pronounced among those 
that never worked (as compared to those who are employed with a permanent ontract), 
corroborating the idea of a division alongside the lines of employed “insiders” and com-
plete “outsiders” of the labour market. Finally, the Estonian country study (Unt and Täht, 
in this report) that looked only at income-based consequences, also found evidence for 
a medium-term “scarring” effect of unemployment. 
 
All country studies as well as the comparative study also confirmed that in gen-
eral, the effect of unemployment is cumulative, i.e. its detrimental consequences in-
crease with the length of unemployment. Yet, country studies also showed that the form 
of this cumulative effect is not necessarily linear. Negative effects proved to be low or 
not significant for those with short unemployment periods up to one (Estonia) or two 
years (Germany). Only after reaching these threshold values of long-term or permanent 
unemployment, poverty and deprivation risk increased, but then often did so sharply. 
One possible reason for the only minor disadvantage incurred through short-term unem-
ployment may be that it does not yet lead employers to connect it with lower abilities and 
productivity. As Unt and Täht (in this report) argue, that may be particularly so in times 
of economic crisis where jobs are scarce and unemployment may be hard to avoid – and 
thus appears less stigmatising. Cumulative effects are not only found for the mere 
duration of unemployment spells, but equally apply to the number of subsequent 
(long) unemployment spells. In fact, high numbers of subsequent unemployment 
spells may aggravate the negative signalling effect associated with it. Nizalova et al. 
show for the UK that “the negative effect of accumulated duration of unemployment is 
exacerbated by churning in and out of employment”. At the same time, the length of 
unemployment spells plays a role in this respect: Bertolini et al. demonstrate that a num-
ber of short employment interruptions may even have a positive signalling effect on the 
Italian labour market, as they signal an active search process of young individuals, pos-
sibly connected with intended upward occupational mobility. 
2. Fixed-term employment 
As outlined in the hypotheses in chapter 1, socio-economic consequences of fixed-term 
employment were expected to be less detrimental than that of unemployment. On the 
one hand, we assumed that the income situation of fixed-term employees would be more 
favourable given their own wage income. On the other hand, fixed-term employees may 





not necessarily be scarred by this experience, but instead may use a temporarily uncer-
tain job as a “bridge” into permanent employment. Only if fixed-term employment turns 
into a permanent phenomenon, there may be increased risks of poverty or social exclu-
sion. We finally assumed that the question whether fixed-term employment was used as 
a bridge or rather resembled a “trap” would be closely related to young people’s individ-
ual human capital. 
 
The results clearly confirm the less detrimental effect of fixed-term employment as 
compared to unemployment. In her comparative chapter, Rokicka (in this report) 
shows that differences between fixed-term and permanent employees in terms of poverty 
risks are clearly smaller than for the unemployed versus the employed; furthermore, the 
gap is declining over time. All in all, her results point to “no large material disadvantage” 
for fixed-term employees, reflected in the fact that negative effects where found only for 
income poverty but not for material deprivation and subjective exclusion. It seems rea-
sonable that, even though there are relative income disadvantages connected with 
fixed-term employment, these may not be large enough to cause severe material 
deprivation. Apparently, young fixed-term employees in Europe also do not see them-
selves as being socially excluded. These results are also confirmed in the country stud-
ies, which found either no significant effect at all for temporary employment (Germany), 
only minor differences in poverty risks as compared to other employment forms (UK) or 
only weak effects of the type of contracts (Italy). Beyond the explanations given above, 
Bertolini et al. highlight that the lack of significant differences may also stem from the fact 
that wages have declined also among permanent employees, thus decreasing the wage 
gap. Furthermore, fixed-term employment contracts nowadays have turned into a “nor-
mal” labour market phenomenon, thus making it less stigmatizing for those having expe-
rienced it. Against this background, it is no surprise that in Germany, a country with very 
high rates of temporary employment among its youth (see chapter 1), there is no indica-
tion of a “scarring” effect through periods of fixed-term employment.  
 
Results, however, need to be treated with certain care, given that the analyses often only 
looked at the likelihood of being income-poor, severely-deprived or experiencing a state 
of subjective social exclusion – not at relative losses in income, material goods or life 
satisfaction. The fact that we found only weak effects for these poverty indicators 
does not rule out that there are income disadvantages that adversely affect fixed-
term employees. Yet, within the observed five-year timeframe, these are not large 
enough to cause severe material disadvantages. However, as earlier literature has 
shown, there may be still disadvantages in longer time horizons, particularly when mak-
ing savings for later life (see Paskov 2008); a topic that is being critically discussed in 
other deliverables of the EXCEPT project (qualitative interviews; analysis of long-term 
effects in WP 6).   
3. Other atypical employment forms 
Contractual flexibility, however, is not the only dimension in which employment relation-
ships can be flexibilised. There are also opportunities to change the amount of working 
time as well as the wage associated with a certain type of job. Where applicable, country 
studies investigated also the effects of these types of flexible jobs on poverty and social 
exclusion.  





Both the UK as well as the German country study considered the influence of part-time 
employment, i.e. a reduction of working time to often 20-30 hours. Yet, results from both 
countries suggest that part-time jobs have no negative effect on the material situa-
tion of youth in the medium-term. This seems plausible given that part-time jobs often 
do not act as a precarious work form with clear wage disadvantages, but often are used 
to improve employee-based flexibility, e.g. during periods of study or throughout the early 
family phase. They thus often neither lead to severe drops in income on the household 
level nor are associated with experiencing social exclusion.  
Around the 2000s, Germany began to foster another type of atypical work, the so-called 
“mini-jobs”. These are jobs, often entailing low working hours that are paid at a flat-rate 
of 400 Euros (after 2013: 450 Euros) and are exempted from taxes and social security 
contributions. They thus are considered as a financially attractive solution for employers 
and for individuals that want to top up an otherwise meagre income (women with young 
children, students, pensioners or public benefit recipients). As the German case study 
showed, mini-jobs may also negatively affect youth’s income situation, yet results 
were mixed across dimensions. While the German study found a negative effect on 
income-based poverty, there was no effect on deprivation and on subjective income sat-
isfaction. Apparently, the low pay increases young individuals’ poverty risks in the me-
dium-term, particularly when these types of jobs are the only source of income. Yet, as 
German youths frequently use them as temporary top-ups to other income sources, the 
income effect does not seem to be large enough to cause severe material deprivation. 
The partly ambiguous results should, not hide that if mini-jobs go beyond temporary in-
come bridges (e.g. to have an income while studying), they may have harmful effects on 
youth, and thus cannot be compared to the rather positive example of fixed-term em-
ployment in Germany.  
4. Individual level factors 
One major assumption in the theoretical chapter was that effect of employment uncer-
tainty on the socio-economic situation of youth is not uniform, but differs between indi-
viduals with different degrees of human capital. Youth with higher educational attainment 
was expected to be better able to escape the poverty-enhancing cycle of unemployment 
and to use fixed-term employment rather as a stepping-stone into the primary labour 
market than to become trapped in it.  
Our empirical results showed some indication that when faced with initial labour market 
uncertainty, high-educated individuals find it easier to avoid poverty. No education-
specific effects were found for fixed-term employment, a finding likely due to the gener-
ally only modest to small differences in poverty risks between the fixed-term and the 
permanently employed (see the discussion above). Predominantly positive effects of ed-
ucation on avoiding poverty instead were found for those in unemployment. On the Eu-
ropean level, Rokicka (in this report) could show that socio-economic disadvantage aris-
ing from initial unemployment concentrated among the lower-educated but did not so 
much harm those with medium to high education. Similarly, the Italian country study 
highlighted that higher education effectively shielded Italian youth from poverty in the 
medium-term as it allowed them to be upwardly mobile after experiencing unemployment 
early in their careers. By and large, education thus increases the likelihood to exit from 





unfavourable employment circumstances and thus to avoid medium-term socio-eco-
nomic disadvantage. However, for those higher-educated that do not adequately man-
age to make the transition to employment, scarring effects seem to be particularly detri-
mental. As Unt and Täht (in this report) show for the Estonian case, those higher-edu-
cated that remained in unemployment for more than one year particularly suffered from 
income losses and relative poverty.    
While the main focus of the individual-level analyses was on the interaction between 
labour market uncertainty and human capital, further effects were found that point to 
additional risk respectively shielding factors with regard to early career uncertainty: 
• Relevant effects result from the household type in which young individuals are 
embedded. On the one hand, still living in the parental home effectively 
shielded youth from experiencing poverty through parental support and 
the sharing of resources (Hofäcker et al., in this report). This effect may be 
particularly strong for households with high work intensity and thus strong 
financial resources (Rokicka, in this report). Yet, at the same time, the move 
out of the parental home and the start of an own family may be associated 
with increasing poverty risks (Bertolini et al., in this report). 
• Further results point to the relevance of the economic context in which 
youth are living. German findings show that poverty risks are particularly high 
in Eastern Germany where the economic situation is significantly worse than in 
the West (Hofäcker et al., in this report). Similarly, findings from the Estonian 
and the Italian country studies (Unt and Täht respectively Bertolini et al., both 
in this report) – two countries that were hit by a deep recession after the 
financial crisis in 2008 – showed that economic downturns may, on the one 
hand, increase the risk of objective and subjectively perceived poverty. 
Yet, despite this effect, economic crises may equally reduce the scars 
associated with unemployment and/or atypical employment and thereby 
improve the chances of youth affected by labour market uncertainty to 
re-enter employment once the economy recovers. 
• Effects of other socio-demographic variables remained comparatively weak 
and inconsistent. Even though the previous analyses occasionally found 
gender differences – suggesting that women are at a somewhat higher risk of 
poverty – they were not robust enough across countries to speak of women as 
a general risk group of poverty and deprivation.1   
5. Institutional-level factors 
Socio-economic consequences for youth arising from employment uncertainties are not 
only affected by individual characteristics of youth themselves and their immediate social 
                                               
1
 As in most regressions, various other factors (such as age, education, labour market status) 
were already controlled for, this does not rule out that negative socio-economic outcomes may 
affect women disproportionately. Yet the influence is largely mediated by other individual 
characteristics and thus gender is not a risk factor per se. 





context. They may equally depend on the contextual settings provided through nation-
specific education, welfare and labour market institutions. In the previous theoretical dis-
cussions in chapter 1, we assumed that standardized educational systems with clear 
qualification signals are effective in reducing poverty risks by reducing search time for 
youth and employers alike, promoting close qualification matches and thus allowing for 
a smooth entry into the labour market. Unemployment, if it occurred, may be only short-
termed given the close link between education and the labour market, yet, if its duration 
increases, particularly youth in such vocation-specific education systems may experi-
ence stigmatization through it and suffer from long-term scars on the labour market. This 
effect was expected to be most pronounced when strong rules of employment protection 
promoted the development of tight labour market boundaries. We also hypothesized that 
labour market policies affect the outcomes of employment uncertainty for youth. Com-
prehensive active labour market policies improve qualifications and employment 
chances of young individuals and reduce the negative repercussions of early career em-
ployment uncertainties. Passive labour market policies, such as generous unemploy-
ment benefits, buffer the material consequences of unemployment and thereby reduce 
poverty and deprivation risks.  
Turning to the empirical results, particularly the comparative study by Strandh and Hög-
berg (in this report) confirmed the negative effect of too rigid labour market regula-
tion by showing that it is countries with strong overall employment protection that pro-
mote lower transition rates from fixed-term into permanent employment. Yet, in line with 
earlier findings by Breen (2005), Strandh and Högberg (in this report) could also show 
that educational policies promoting vocational specificity could offset the detri-
mental effects of employment regulation. This proved to be particularly so in countries 
where the gap between the regulation of employment overall and the regulation of fixed-
term contracts is low, leaving only little incentives to employers to use fixed-term con-
tracts as a means of flexibilisation. Given that educational signals are clearly observable, 
employers will then be more likely to substitute fixed-term contracts by permanent em-
ployment relationships. 
Effects of active and passive labour market policies were not explicitly tested in the pre-
vious analyses. Yet, it stands to reason that their influence on socio-economic outcomes 
may be limited. Germany – the country in our four-case-sample that exhibited the highest 
expenditure on both active and passive labour market policies – still displays a notable 
level of poverty on various dimensions, and scarring effects of unemployment are clearly 
prevalent. Even in Scandinavian countries, where ALMP expenditure is traditionally high 
and unemployment benefits are rather generous, youth poverty rates occasionally even 
surpassed the European average (see the case of Finland in Rokicka, in this report, 
Appendix 1 and 2). Results thus suggest that it is rather preventive educational poli-
cies – allowing for a close matching between labour market demands and youth’s 
qualifications that effectively prevent the emergence of negative socio-economic 
outcomes among youth in the medium-term – rather than interventions or financial 
support policies.      





6. Policy conclusions 
The previous analyses unanimously show that the most negative medium-term conse-
quences of labour market uncertainty arise from previous unemployment experience. 
Those youth affected by unemployment unanimously run a higher risk of being affected 
by income poverty, being materially deprived and by perceiving themselves as socially 
excluded in economic terms. In her pan-European overview, Rokicka (in this report) thus 
legitimately argues in favour of more policy attention on youth unemployment and “a 
more intensive inclusive policy for youth excluded from the labour market.” 
Results on the cumulative effect of unemployment warrant that particular policy atten-
tion should be paid to avoiding long-term unemployment. As shown in this report, 
short-term unemployment spells may not be avoidable, particularly in times of economic 
crisis. Yet, they may also be used by youth for optimizing job search and achieving up-
ward job mobility in the long-run. Both comparative as well as country study evidence 
show that short, early unemployment spells often do not imply long-term scarring. Yet, 
once unemployment becomes long-term, scarring effects are visible, even on the com-
paratively flexible labour markets of the UK and Estonia. Public policy is thus well-ad-
vised to invest into policies that enhance the employability and qualifications of unem-
ployed youth and allow them to exit from unemployment within a short time-frame. Such 
exits may not necessarily end with direct entries into the core labour market, but may 
also imply further periods in atypical employment forms. Yet, as our analyses show, 
given the higher pay and the better opportunities to acquire further skills and compe-
tences, these periods are not connected with such strong socio-economic disadvantages 
as unemployment and furthermore may act as stepping-stones into safe employment in 
the medium term. Employment policies thus may also aim not only at the direct 
integration into the “safe harbour” of permanent employment, but may also addi-
tionally promote a “stepwise” integration into the labour market. 
A basic prerequisite for successful labour market entry and a successful early career is 
that individual qualifications adequately match labour market demands. In this respect, 
the promotion of higher educational attainment can generally be recommended, 
given that better educated youth are better able to overcome periods of labour 
market uncertainty and enter into the primarily labour market. Yet, the mere promo-
tion of higher education will not be helpful as long as these qualifications do not become 
visible to employers. Our findings in this report suggest that labour market integration 
is best achieved by educational systems that standardize educational and voca-
tional degrees and thereby provide clear signals on the job market. Educational 
systems should be reformed to allow for such clear signalling of qualifications and abili-
ties – to help youth optimize their search behaviour and to make their qualifications and 
competencies clearly visible to employers. Germany might serve as an exemplary case 
to that end.  
In recent years, the flexibilisation of employment and the spread of atypical work forms 
has been a major trend on European labour markets, particularly for youth. As one of the 
key target groups of such uncertain work forms, youth thus were occasionally considered 
to be the “losers of globalization” (e.g. Buchholz 2008). Yet, our results indicate that an 
– intuitively sensible – re-regulation of labour market contracts may not be advan-
tageous to youth starting their careers under conditions of labour market uncertainty. 





European comparisons show that by and large, it is rather regulated economies where 
atypical employment makes up an “outsider segment” on the labour market, where youth 
in temporary jobs face highest entry barriers into permanent employment and where 
negative impacts of employment uncertainties are highest. Future policy directions may 
rather orient themselves at the promotion of atypical work forms as an opportunity for 
further skill enhancement and job search. In order to avoid the creation of outsider seg-
ments of young temporary workers, Strandh and Högberg (in this report) highlight that 
partial deregulation – i.e. a large gap between the (strict regulation) of permanent 
employment and a (flexible) regulation of temporary contracts - should be avoided. 
This would likely create negative incentives for the permanent use of temporary contracts 
as a flexibilisation measure in an otherwise regulated labour market.  
Finally, our results suggest that best conditions for youth exist under conditions of a fa-
vourable economic climate. In times of recession, on the other hand, youth find it more 
difficult to successfully enter into employment. Successful policy for youth thus is 
closely coupled with overall economic policy and the general promotion of high 
employment.  
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